



Shadow Report

Reviewing Progress made in Jordan for Targets
Number 4,5,6 and 10 under Goal Number 16 From



2018





Rasheed for Integrity and Transparency (Transparency International - Jordan) was established at the end of 2013, as a non-for-profit organization that works on strengthening the pillars of good governance based on integrity, transparency, accountability and the rule of law within Jordanian institutions. Rasheed (TI-JO) has been granted accreditation to become a full chapter of Transparency International and has access to the expertise of the Berlin based TI-Secretariat and more than a hundred TI chapters around the world, which work to eliminate corruption by bringing together government, civil society, business and media.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
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(2019/1/167)

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Executive Summary and Major Findings

Affirmed by political leaders and the general public alike over the past decade, combatting corruption remains a key priority in Jordan. However, widespread austerity protests throughout May and June 2018, an increasingly active civil society and the growing presence of social media have indeed rendered the fight against corruption in Jordan not only a priority, but also a necessity. Since 2008, the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) has produced and implemented a series of National Anti-Corruption Strategies.¹ The third and latest strategy has been launched at the beginning of 2017.² The goals detailed in these strategies complement Jordan 2025, Jordan's official roadmap toward attaining a resilient and equitable development trajectory, in accordance with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals set out by the United Nations.³

Over the past two years, important developments have been made in combatting corruption, developing plans to enhance the accountability of public institutions and enhancing citizens' access to information. In 2016, the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law No. 13 was passed, which expanded the powers held by the JIACC, including the power to prosecute anyone who commits any acts of corruption and the specific acts of corruption that can be prosecuted.⁴ The law also created a prosecution department within the judicial branch that specializes in JIACC cases specifically, mandatory minimum penalties for those convicted and a legal witnesses program that is tasked with ensuring anonymity, and protection for witnesses and informants.⁵ Furthermore, permits the JIACC to establish a Reconciliation and Settlement Trust Account at the Central Bank, which is tasked with saving and protecting recovered assets until they are returned to their rightful owners.⁶

In addition, new anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regulations for licensed financial institutions and select designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) were adopted in 2018.⁷ This measure further aligned legislation in these areas with international standards. Further, new amendments to the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law have been proposed in 2018. These amendments give the JIACC the power to monitor and verify instances of abnormal growth in wealth. The amendments also place election processes within the purview of JIACC oversight. Further, the amendments explicitly state that penalties related to corruption, in addition to the recovery of assets obtained from corruption, shall not be subject to statutes of limitations.⁸ Coupled with this new legislation, plans have been put in place, as per the 2017-2025 National Strategy, to implement monitoring projects that would provide a platform for electronic information sharing between various government institutions to detect and track corruption cases.⁹ Information is expected to be collected from relevant government institutions on the assets of the accused, their spouses and their minor children, which can be used in detecting corruption cases.¹⁰

In enhancing the accountability of public institutions, information on public procurement has been made accessible to the public through the General Supplies Department's central e-procurement database as of 2018. Further, Jordan's Government Achievement Unit at the Prime Ministry has committed to launching a central electronic portal for citizens, members of Parliament, donors and investors to monitor government performance. The database will monitor performance specifically by tracking the implementation of government plans throughout different governmental departments. This is paired with plans to launch and enhance a complaints registration system and follow-up mechanism, which will address complaints and refer them to the judiciary. These complaints may include violations committed against citizens and government services and their provision. While the former is still being worked on, significant progress has been made on the latter, with an online site and mobile application having been rolled out in 2017.

Jordan has also committed in its 2017 OGP Report to review its legislative framework, identifying gaps and proposing a new package of legislation and amendments. In particular, this legislation will work to align Jordan's access to information policies with international best practices. To enhance access to information in practice, an open data sources policy that facilitates access to data in the government's possession will be rolled out through an online platform. This platform has now been launched, and the data of three governmental departments are accessible to date.

Jordanian civil society organizations (CSOs) have also played a key role to ensure that Jordan meets its self-defined development goals. According to select Jordanian CSOs, civil society's influence has lied primarily in the following two spheres: raising public awareness on the importance of transparency in public and private institutions and holding legal awareness workshops and providing representation to ensure equal access to justice. Rasheed (Transparency International – Jordan), for its part, has played a role in publishing reports that track Jordan's progress and provide recommendations toward effectively fighting corruption.

However, there are many areas in which more can be done to encourage integrity and accountability. According to members of Jordanian CSOs, practices of corruption and bribery remain at all levels and within all spheres – private, public, and civil society itself. More must therefore be done to ensure that anti-corruption institutions have the capacity to fully and effectively carry out their work. More must also be done to capacitate the CSOs that track Jordan's progress on anti-corruption measures.¹¹ According to representatives of these CSOs, the first step toward achieving this is ensuring a more transparent and streamlined government approvals process for obtaining funding. This may include more regular notifications from relevant government agencies on approval progress, providing CSOs with more autonomy to select and define their goals, objectives and activities, and ensuring that all request rejections are accompanied by explicitly stated reasoning.¹² Secondly, CSOs should work toward improving cooperation and coordination among themselves, so as to ensure adequate knowledge sharing and reach across the country.¹³ With regards to access to information, Jordanian CSO representatives state that public access to information, in accordance with national legislation and international conventions, must still be guaranteed and strongly enhanced.¹⁴ Further, in the area of freedom of expression, it should be noted that in recent years, both government-instated censorship, as well as self-imposed censorship among media institutions, has become common practice for the stated sake of maintaining public order.¹⁵

There also remains room for improvement on certain legislative fronts. As the law currently stands, only public shareholding companies and foreign companies operating in Jordan are required to publish their annual accounts and supporting financial reports for public viewing.¹⁶ This underscores the need for greater private sector transparency through public reporting. Public reporting requirements would help to encourage accountability in the public sector as well, through regular, ideally public, declarations made by high-level officials of their interests, assets and income. Further, a body of laws addressing lobbying transparency must still be developed, and more rigorous oversight mechanisms must be instated to more effectively scrutinize the flow of weapons, and other assets related to the weapons industry, out of the Kingdom.¹⁷

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The SDGs set out an ambitious global development agenda until the year 2030. They consist of 17 goals and a total of 169 targets. The goals broadly cover three aspects of development: economic prosperity, social development and the protection of the environment.

Global progress towards the targets will be monitored through a set of indicators, a number of which have yet to be finalised, while the data needed to measure progress against some indicators has never before been collected by UN agencies. At the national level, countries are encouraged to integrate global targets into national planning and policy processes, developing national targets and indicators tailored to their specific circumstances.

Over the coming years, state parties will report on national progress against the 17 SDGs to the High-Level Political Forum on a voluntary basis. While “in-depth” reporting on SDG 16 is due in 2019, integrity risks across the SDG framework make it essential to monitor national progress against corruption from the outset. National Voluntary Review reports to the 2018 High-Level Political Forum will cover all goals, though this year’s focus is on SDG 6 (water and sanitation), SDG 7 (sustainable energy), SDG 11 (cities), SDG 12 (sustainable consumption), SDG 15 (ecosystems and biodiversity), and SDG 17 (partnership), providing opportunities to track the impact of corruption in these sectors.

Methodology

This questionnaire covers four SDG 16 targets, which specifically relate to the fight against corruption:

- 16.4 – By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime
- 16.5 – Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
- 16.6 – Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
- 16.10 – Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements

Research for this report was conducted from July to October 2018 through legal review, web-based desk research, and interviews and correspondences with relevant civil society organisations and government bodies. The online sources used include Jordanian government websites, websites of relevant international institutions, and Jordanian and international news websites. Information provided to Rasheed (Transparency International – Jordan) in interviews and correspondences with the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Anti-Money Laundering Unit (AMLU), the Companies Control Department (CCD), the Information Council, and select civil society organizations is also integrated throughout the report.

National Progress Report

Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime.

Jordan's progress toward reducing money laundering, strengthening the recovery of stolen assets and combatting all forms of organised crime, with a particular focus on progress made since the publishing of Jordan's 2017 SDG 16 Shadow Report, is as follows:

- The scope of the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Law was expanded to include societies and non-profit organizations in 2017.¹⁸
- In June 2018, the Central Bank of Jordan issued new anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing regulations for licensed banks. This ensured better alignment with FATF recommendations and changes in local and international markets.¹⁹
- 2018 anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regulations for licensed financial institutions and select DNFBPs define both foreign *and* local politically exposed persons, and mandate due diligence for both classifications.²⁰
- New amendments to the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law have been proposed. These amendments give the JIACC the power to monitor and verify instances of abnormal growth in wealth. The amendments place elections within the purview of JIACC oversight by adding the crimes stipulated in House of Representatives election laws to the list of acts that are to be viewed as corruption. Further, the amendments explicitly state that penalties related to corruption, in addition to the recovery of assets obtained from corruption, shall not be subject to statutes of limitations.²¹
- The AMLU underwent a national assessment that studied the threats of money laundering and terrorist financing in Jordan in coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This assessment was planned in 2017 and implemented throughout June and July of 2018.²² This assessment is yet to be published for public access.
- Numbers of Suspicious Transaction Reports and Notifications of Transactions Suspected to be Related to Money Laundering received by the AMLU has increased steadily since 2014.²³
- New amendments to the Companies Law became effective in October 2017 and instructions to implement this law are currently being drafted. The law and accompanying instructions aim to enhance corporate governance of public shareholding companies and private shareholding companies with capital of over 500,000 JOD. According to the CCD, this will in turn enhance integrity and transparency in companies across Jordan.²⁴

Target 16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.

Jordan's progress toward reducing corruption and bribery, with a particular focus on progress made since the publishing of Jordan's 2017 SDG 16 Shadow Report, is as follows:

- The 2017-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy has set out plans for the implementation of a monitoring project. This project would provide a platform for electronic information sharing between various government institutions and departments to detect and track corruption cases.²⁵
- The JIACC has prepared awareness-raising materials, lectures and seminars on integrity and corruption prevention for youth in schools, youth centers and universities. Further, training materials were produced for educational supervisors, professors, and deans.²⁶
- JIACC is implementing a program that promotes raising awareness through the religious preaching of both Muslim and Christian leaders in Jordan.²⁷

Target 16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.

Jordan's progress toward developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions, with a particular focus on progress made since the publishing of Jordan's 2017 SDG 16 Shadow Report, is as follows:

- Plans have been put forth in the 2017-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy to increase electronic connectivity and information exchange between the JIACC and other monitoring government institutions. Under this goal, the Commission established a monitoring project to compile information - specifically on the assets of those accused in corruption cases, their spouses and their minor children - from relevant government institutions that can be used in detecting corruption cases.²⁸
- The JIACC has implemented several training workshops for government officials - over 21 lectures on integrity and corruption prevention in various ministries and departments, and 7 meetings with government institutions since the inception of the 2017 Strategy.²⁹
- The JIACC has provided materials and training courses on integrity and anti-corruption standards to the Institute of Public Administration for its supervisory capacity building programs and new employee trainings.³⁰ The Institute of Public Administration is responsible for the development of human resources and building capacities within the public sector.
- In 2017 JIACC published Support for Improvement in Governance and Management report in partnership with the European Union and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that highlighted gaps in the unified public procurement and government tenders' systems that allow corruption.³¹ The report contained recommendations to fill these gaps, and the JIACC has begun acting on these recommendations through various programs included in its 2017-2025 Strategy.
- As of 2018, information on public procurement is accessible to the public through the General Supplies Department's central e-procurement database, joneps.gov.jo.
- According to JIACC data, the usage of reporting mechanisms for witnesses and victims of corruption has been increasing as years go by.³²
- Plans have been laid out to launch and enhance a complaints registration system and follow-up mechanism to address complaints in a serious, streamlined manner and refer them to the judiciary. This complaints registration system will address complaints and grievances related both to violations committed against citizens and to government services and their provision. While the former is still being worked on, significant progress has been made on the latter, with an online site and mobile application having been rolled out in 2017.³³

Target 16.10: Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.

Jordan's progress toward ensuring public access to information and protecting fundamental freedoms, with a particular focus on progress made since the publishing of Jordan's 2017 SDG 16 Shadow Report, is as follows:


- Jordan's Open Government Partnership Self-Assessment, completed in October 2017, contained a detailed commitment dedicated to designing and implementing a technical framework, based on best practices, to strengthen freedom of press in Jordan. According to the report, this commitment's implementation will be overseen by the Ministry for Media Affairs, and its framework will include a set of legislative amendments to be submitted to Parliament. The report also stated that civil society is expected to play a major role in the development of this framework, so as to better ensure the adoption of best practices and, ultimately, a greater guarantee of freedom of expression.³⁴
- Jordan has committed to reviewing its legislative framework, identifying gaps, and proposing a new package of legislation and amendments to the Parliament that will work to align Jordan's access to information policies with international best practices.³⁵
- Jordan's Government Achievement Unit at the Prime Ministry has committed to launching a central electronic portal for citizens, members of Parliament, donors, and investors to monitor government performance by tracking the implementation of government plans throughout different governmental departments.
- Jordan's Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology has committed to implementing an open data sources policy that facilitates access to data in the government's possession that is non-confidential and non-privacy violating. To this end, an online platform has been launched, and the data of three governmental departments are accessible to date – in particular the Ministry of Tourism and Archaeology, the Public Statistics Department, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
- The government is implementing a program that enabled persons with disabilities to access information regarding court access and the use of the justice system.³⁶
- Directives were sent to all governmental units requiring them to submit to the Ministry of Finance their financial accounts in a timely manner to be published, in order to increase the level of transparency surrounding budget disclosure and the publication of financial data.³⁷

COUNTRY LEGAL SCORECARD*

JORDAN

SDG AGGREGATE VALUE

Target 16.4 Score	58%
Target 16.5 Score	58%
Target 16.6 Score	58%
Target 16.10 Score	44%



POLICY AREA

Target 16.4

- Anti-Money Laundering
- Beneficial Ownership
- Asset Recovery
- Arms Trafficking

Target 16.5

- Anti-Corruption Framework and Institutions
- Private sector
- Transparency in Lobbying
- Transparency in Party & Election Campaign Finance

Target 16.6

- Transparency and Integrity in Public Administration
- Fiscal Transparency
- Integrity in Public Procurement
- Whistleblowing

Target 16.10


- Access to Information

* This scorecard is simply intended to assess whether a given country's legislative and institutional anti-corruption framework is in line with international best practice. It does not assess compliance with the legislative framework or the effectiveness of its implementation.

COUNTRY LEGAL SCORECARD*

2017 / 2018

JORDAN



POLICY AREA

Target 16.4	Target 16.5	Target 16.6	Target 16.10
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anti-Money Laundering Beneficial Ownership Asset Recovery Arms Trafficking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anti-Corruption Framework and Institutions Private sector Transparency in Lobbying Transparency in Party & Election Campaign Finance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transparency and Integrity in Public Administration Fiscal Transparency Integrity in Public Procurement Whistleblowing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to Information

* This scorecard is simply intended to assess whether a given country's legislative and institutional anti-corruption framework is in line with international best practice. It does not assess compliance with the legislative framework or the effectiveness of its implementation.



Recommendations

Since the drafting of the 2017 SDG 16 Shadow Report, notable progress has been made on the following recommendations listed in the 2017 report.

- a. Include domestic public officials within the definition of politically exposed persons (PEPs) and clearly stipulate the requirement for enhanced due diligence when conducting business with all PEPs, both foreign and domestic alike.
- b. Review and strengthen laws governing JIACC, especially to ensure that the JIACC is given the authority to investigate all types of corruption crimes stipulated in the UNCAC.
- c. Strengthen JIACC efforts in the areas of prevention, education, awareness-raising, and coordination with other national supervisory entities.
- d. Create an online system that compiles and publicly publishes all tender announcements and information on contract awardees.
- e. Unify the national procurement system and prepare a joint system for tenders and supplies.

The following recommendations respond to 2018 report findings. While many of these recommendations echo those made in the 2017 SDG 16 Shadow Report, some new recommendations have been added, based on 2018 findings.

Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime.

The following recommendations, proposed in the 2017 SDG 16 report, remain relevant at the time of reporting in 2018.

- a. Incorporate all relevant Financial Action Task Force Recommendations into the national anti-money laundering legislative framework.
- b. Consider signing the multilateral competent authority agreement on the exchange of country-by-country reports on key indicators of multinational enterprise groups and the competent authority multinational agreement on automatic exchange of financial account information.
- c. Expand the requirement to publicly publish company accounts and balance sheets in the newspaper beyond public shareholding companies and foreign companies operating in Jordan. Further, strongly encourage these companies to also publish their accounts and balance sheets online on their websites.
- d. Incorporate into the relevant licensing, registering and monitoring legislation a requirement that companies reveal, specifically, any beneficial owner, and name all authorities allowed to access this information, including the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Securities Commission, the Central Bank and all other supervisory bodies.
- e. Amend legislation to place burden of proof on the defendant, such that the defendant must always demonstrate that the assets were acquired lawfully in cases involving stolen assets.
- f. Amend relevant legislation to address the recognition and enforceability of foreign non-conviction-based confiscation of forfeiture orders.
- g. Consider ratifying the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, as well as the Arms Trade Treaty.
- h. Consider forming a permanent parliamentary committee focused specifically on military, defense and security matters.
- i. Consider amending relevant legislation to ensure greater parliamentary access to the General Intelligence Directorate head and the Armed Forces Chief of Staff that is not contingent upon the Council of Ministers' access.
- j. Include in future anti-corruption strategies specific policies for the general oversight of defense, intelligence and security apparatuses.

The following new recommendations have been added, based on 2018 findings.

- a. Publish the AMLU-IMF 2018 national assessment, studying the threats of money laundering and terrorist financing in Jordan in a timely manner.
- b. Continue to ensure that the financial and administrative resources allotted to law enforcement agencies keep pace with the growing need for security well into the future, given the surrounding civil wars and the sudden population influx due to refugee intake.

Target 16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.

The following recommendations, proposed in the 2017 SDG 16 report, remain relevant at the time of reporting in 2018.

- a. Incorporate into relevant legislation an article that clearly defines and criminalizes trading in influence as a standalone offense, in line with Article 18 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).
- b. Incorporate into relevant legislation a clear definition of concealment, in line with Article 24 of the UNCAC.
- c. Within relevant legislation, expand the definition of obstruction of justice to align with Articles 25a and 25b of the UNCAC.
- d. Supplement the newly-proposed amendments by further reviewing the laws governing JIACC, in order to ensure that the JIACC is given the authority to investigate all types of corruption crimes stipulated in the UNCAC
- e. Continue to strengthen JIACC efforts in the areas of prevention, education, awareness raising, and coordination with other national supervisory entities.
- f. Adopt an Audit Bureau-centered strategy that allows the Bureau to keep up with fast-paced development and expansion of roles within the ministries it is tasked with overseeing.
- g. Incorporate into relevant legislation an article that, first, secures the Audit Bureau's full independence in employing its powers, second, enables its staff to develop penalties for non-compliant institutions, and third, grants its staff with powers of judicial policing.
- h. Incorporate into relevant judiciary-centered legislation specific requirements for the implementation of fair trial safeguards.
- i. Incorporate into the Anti Money Laundering law an article specifying the bribery a foreign public official as a punishable offense.
- j. Incorporate into relevant legislation the requirement that all campaign financial disclosures – submitted by parties, candidates, and candidate lists to the Committee of Party Affairs and IEC – must be published for public viewing.
- k. Amend relevant legislation to include regulations for ensuring the political autonomy of the Committee of Party Affairs. This may include adding an article ensuring financial and administrative independence, as well as an article stating that committee members are subject to illicit enrichment laws and audit bureau control within the context of their committee work. Now that political parties have gained a more favorable place within the electoral system, it may be beneficial to consider making committee membership a full-time commitment, open to individuals who are not Senate members and who are barred from running in any election.
- l. Develop a body of laws directly addressing lobbying transparency.

The following new recommendations have been added, based on 2018 findings.

- a. Ensure that annual reports prepared by the Audit Bureau are uploaded onto online platforms and advertise its dissemination.
- b. Continue to ensure effective follow-through on all targets and goals set out in the 2017-2025 National Anti Corruption Strategy.
- c. Instate more diverse mechanisms to strengthen transparency and accountability in the practices of law enforcement entities, adding to the already-established Transparency and Human Rights Bureau.

Target 16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.

The following recommendations, proposed in the 2017 SDG 16 report, remain relevant at the time of reporting in 2018.

- a. Consider amending the legal framework to require high-level public officials and senior civil servants to declare their interests at least once per year.
- b. Incorporate into relevant legislation the requirements and processes for interest disclosure, as well as the penalties for non-compliance. These requirements, processes and penalties may be modeled after those already applied to income and asset disclosure and should be preventative, thus augmenting the current requirement of reporting only when a situation arises and when the public employee sees fit.
- c. Consider amending relevant legislation to include requirements for the publishing of information contained in income and asset declarations.
- d. Continue to publish all key budget documents in practice, including pre-budget statements, the executive budget proposal and supporting documents, the enacted budget, a citizen budget, in-year reports in budget success and execution, mid-year reviews, a year-end report and an audit report.
- e. Commit to law the publishing of all key budget documents on an annual basis, including: pre-budget statements, the executive budget proposal and supporting documents, the enacted budget, a citizen budget, in-year reports in budget success and execution, mid-year reviews, a year-end report and an audit report.
- f. Amend relevant legislation to include specific thresholds for sole-sourced purchasing of goods and services unrelated to public works.
- g. Incorporate into relevant legislation the requirement that all bidders must disclose beneficial ownership.
- h. Amend relevant legislation to specify the contract award information that must be publicly published, specifically information on the procuring entity, the supplier, the number of bidders, the good or service procured, and the value of the contract.
- i. Incorporate into relevant legislation additional whistleblower protections such as relief from legal liability and protection from prosecution, in accordance with the law.
- j. Amend relevant legislation to specifically include protection of whistleblowers who disclose their information publicly or to third parties, such as the media or NGOs, if necessitated by circumstance.
- k. Include information on the JIACC website addressing the security of the hotline and online informant submission tool. By ensuring informant security and anonymity, more witnesses may feel comfortable submitting information.

The following new recommendation has been added, based on 2018 findings.

- a. Continue to update and advertise the new e-procurement system, to ensure accuracy and public visibility.

Target 16.10: Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.

The following recommendations, proposed in the 2017 SDG 16 report, remain relevant at the time of reporting in 2018.

- a. Consider reshaping the Board of Directors of the Register of Societies, specifically in terms of equalizing representation from civil society and the public sector.
- b. Consider amending the Board of Societies requirements for general assembly notifications

and decision approvals, with the aim of making these requirements less cumbersome for organizations.

- c. Review the levels of administrative and financial influence that public and private sector actors have on independent media institutions.
- d. Redefine 'journalist' according to international standards and keep Press Association membership open to all journalists representing all media outlets.
- e. Incorporate into relevant legislation the requirement that the all bodies tasked with awarding media licensures must state the reason for licensure refusal.
- f. Review the 2006 Prevention of Terrorism Act and other relevant legislation citing public security concerns to ensure that no prejudice against freedom of expression is present, and review the process of non-trial of journalists before the State Security Court.
- g. Review the Electronic Crimes Law to ensure that journalists are not wrongfully detained and that litigation is not prolonged in conformity with the Press and Publication Law.
- h. Review the limitations placed upon the types of information that can be disclosed, as stipulated in the Law on Securing the Right to Information Access, and consider amending to adhere to international standards, specifically Articles 10, 13(f), and 13(l).
- i. Consider amending legislation to include a 'harm test' stipulation, which ensures that disclosures are only refused when they pose a risk of harm to a protected interest, for the following information types: agreements with other States, national security, foreign relations, and judicial investigations.
- j. Consider amending legislation to include provisions for mandatory public interest overrides, which allow information to be disclosed when disclosure is in the overall public interest, even at the harm of a protected interest.
- k. Incorporate into the law particular mechanisms to ensure the Information Commissioner Board's power to perform its functions, including the power to review classified documents and inspect the premises of public bodies.

The following new recommendations have been added, based on 2018 findings.

- a. Enhance and ensure transparency in the CSO funding approvals process.
- b. Continue to ensure effective follow-through on all commitments made in the 2017 Open Government Partnership Self-Assessment.

General Recommendations

- a. Continue to review and amend legislation where needed to ensure full alignment international standards.
- b. Expand and enforce the requirement that government institutions and private companies publish key data for public consumption, with an emphasis on accessibility of information.
- c. Ensure the financial and administrative independence of all key public institutions that serve anti-corruption functions.
- d. Further capacitate civil society by ensuring a transparent funding approvals process.
- e. Review legislation to ensure that no prejudice against freedom of expression is present.
- f. Add to the information already available in the official Jordanian e-Government system. By compiling all legislation and data into one database, information will become less disparate and more easily accessible to the general public.
- g. Ensure that the websites of all public institutions are regularly updated with the latest data and reports to facilitate a consistent and up-to-date flow of information.

Questionnaire

1. National SDG Implementation Plan and Monitoring Process

DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
Indicator number	1.1 =
Indicator question(s)	Has the government taken steps to develop an SDG action plan on how to implement the Agenda 2030 at the national level?
Response	<p>In 2002, Jordan instated the Higher National Committee on Sustainable Development (HNCSD) as the national platform for dialogue surrounding sustainable development. The HNCSD is chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, whose ministry in 2015 managed the development of Jordan 2025, a national strategy that incorporates Agenda 2030 and aims to promote and direct sustainable social and economic policy within Jordan into 2025. More than 300 experts from the governmental, business, and civil society sectors supported the Jordan 2025 Steering Committee, and various processes – such as advertising a Public Call for Submissions and holding a National Conference – were carried out to foster broader engagement with citizens, civil society organizations, political parties, and businesses.</p> <p>In July 2017, Jordan was one of forty-three countries that completed and presented at the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) a National Voluntary Review. Jordan’s National Voluntary Review highlighted the country’s progress toward the goals set out by the Jordan 2025 roadmap, challenges both encountered and foreseen, and the measures that must still be taken to achieve set goals.³⁸</p> <p>The primary challenges that Jordan faces in realizing its sustainable development goals, as cited in its National Voluntary Review, include: rises in oil and food prices, regional instability and its negative effects on trade, tourism, and investment, and significant population growth as a result of the regional refugee crisis.³⁹</p>

DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
Indicator number	1.2 =
Indicator question(s)	Which government body or bodies are in charge of the implementation of the national SDG implementation process, and in particular concerning the implementation of SDG 16?
Response	<p>The Higher National Committee on Sustainable Development (HNCSD), chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, has been designated as the primary body in charge of the national SDG implementation process.</p> <p>The government bodies that take part in the implementation of SDG 16 specifically include: The Anti-Money Laundering Unit, the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Information Council, and the Public Security Directorate, among others.</p>

DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
Indicator number	1.3 =
Indicator question(s)	Has civil society been able to contribute to the selection of national indicators concerning SDG 16 and have there been any formal discussions about how anti-corruption targets will fit into the implementation of a national SDG plan?
Response	<p>As the National Voluntary Review was being developed, relevant stakeholders – such as civil society organizations focusing on human rights, women’s rights, and community development; youth and volunteer organizations; the private sector; workers’ unions; local councils and committees; figures within academia; the science and technology communities; and representatives from refugee communities – were consulted in workshops and meetings to contribute to the drafting of the review.</p> <p>However, although government transparency and accountability targets – as well as into-corruption performance measurement indicators – are included in Jordan 2025, the National Voluntary Review itself does not go into great detail on progress made toward targets 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, and 16.10. While the review stresses the importance of freedom of expression and the media in promoting stability and peace, data on country-wide progress toward target 16.10 was not included. In addition, although aims such as judicial independence, greater access to justice, and penal code amendments were mentioned, these aims remain only tangentially related to targets 16.4, 16.5, and 16.6.</p> <p>More specific anti-corruption targets can be found in Jordan’s National Integrity Charter and Executive Plan to Enhance the National Integrity System, as well as the 2013-2017 and 2017-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategies. These materials were developed in consultation with anti-corruption partners in the private and public sectors, NGOs, and civil society institutions, all of which provided data and information that was integrated into the Charter, Executive Plan, and Strategy. The Charter and Executive Plan contains data from relevant anti-corruption actors (including civil society) through outreach activities, consultative meetings, and the announcement of an email address and fax number to receive public recommendations and notes. The Strategy contains data collected from meetings and workshops with relevant anti-corruption actors, online questionnaires, and previous anti-corruption evaluation reports.</p> <p>It is recommended that more specific anti-corruption targets, which can be found in the aforementioned charter, executive plan, and strategy, be integrated into all future sustainable development plans and reviews.</p>

DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
Indicator number	1.4 =
Indicator question(s)	Has the development of national SDG implementation reports relating to SDG 16 been open and inclusive?
Response	No implementation reports relating specifically to SDG 16 are publicly available at this time.

DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
Indicator number	1.5 =
Indicator question(s)	How do you assess the quality of the official assessment and the data provided in official implementation reports for targets 16.4, 16.5, 16.6 and 16.10?
Response	No official assessments or implementation reports on progress toward targets 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, and 16.10 specifically are publicly available at this time.

DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
Indicator number	1.6 =
Indicator question(s)	Are there any salient corruption or governance issues which are omitted or not adequately addressed in the official national report?
Response	No official national assessments or reports on progress toward targets 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, and 16.10 specifically are publicly available at this time.

2. Recent Developments

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	2.1 =
Indicator question(s)	Has the country adopted a national anti-corruption action plan? Scoring 1: A national anti-corruption action plan has been adopted 0.5: There is an ongoing process to draft and adopt a national anti-corruption action plan 0: There is no national anti-corruption action plan and no apparent process to adopt one -: Not applicable or no data available
Response	Score: 1 In 2012, the National Integrity Charter and Executive Plan to Enhance Jordan's National Integrity System was instated to serve as a pillar of reform that would work to address citizen confidence in and trust toward government institutions. ⁴⁰ The Jordanian government has also developed a series of National Anti-Corruption Strategies, including the 2008-2012 Strategy, the 2013-2017 Strategy, and the 2017-2025 Strategy. ⁴¹

DIMENSION	THIRD-PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	2.2 =
Indicator question(s)	___% of respondents state that their government performs "well" at fighting corruption in government, according to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer.
Response	According to Transparency International's 2017 Global Corruption Barometer, 6% of respondents felt that their government performs "very well" in fighting corruption in government, and 28% of respondents felt that their government performs "fairly well" in fighting corruption in government.

DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
Indicator number	2.3 =
Indicator question(s)	Has your country's current political leadership made public declarations about fighting corruption in the past two years? Have there been high-level commitments by the current administration to strengthen the legal framework, policies or institutions that are relevant to preventing, detecting and prosecuting corruption?

Response	<p>Figures such as King Abdullah II, Jordan’s current Prime Minister Omar Razzaz, the Senate President, and the Minister of Labor have, within the past two years, made public statements about fighting corruption, which have been reported on by the press. The King has underscored the importance of, and Jordan’s determination to, build a strong system of accountability.⁴² In June 2018, Prime Minister Razzaz expressed government support for the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) and stated that a code of conduct for ministers would be drafted and presented for public feedback, noting that transparency must be built through dialogue between leadership and stakeholders throughout Jordanian society.⁴³ Similarly, the former Minister of Labor expressed his support for the JIACC’s work, citing the Commission’s field visits to government agencies and its effort to follow up on suspected cases of corruption. The Minister also stressed the importance of close cooperation between the JIACC and the Ministry of Labor in fighting all forms of corruption and preventing violations by public sector employees.⁴⁴ Jordan’s Senate President named combatting corruption and nepotism a “top priority” for Jordan in December of 2017.</p>
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DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
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Indicator number	2.4 =
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Indicator question(s)	Is there evidence that laws and policies are not equally applied to all officials, resulting in an increased risk for misuse of power and grand corruption?
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Response	<p>While there are not many published cases that can be used as significant evidence either for or against the unequal application of laws and policies among officials and elites, past cases such as the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company case, which spanned a number of years, continue to receive criticism for their lack of transparency and their failure to hold the accused accountable.⁴⁵ Currently, a multi-million dollar ‘cigarettes case’ is receiving nationwide attention, given the scale of the case and public speculation that the suspects had links to public officials. While these links have not been proven, government figures have nonetheless stressed their commitment to holding all involved individuals accountable. Media sources are highlighting this case as a test of the government’s stance on corruption.⁴⁶ However, the 2013 sentencing of Jordan’s former intelligence chief to 13 years in prison and the imposition of a multi-million dollar fine for corruption indicates that there is some precedent for holding officials accountable for misuse of power and corruption.⁴⁷</p>
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DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
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Indicator number	2.5 =
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Indicator question(s)	Have there been significant anti-corruption reforms or advances in the fight against corruption in the past two years?
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Response	<p>Advances in the fight against corruption within the past two years have included the launching of the third National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2017-2025 and the approval of new anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regulations for financial institutions and select DNFBS in June 2018.⁴⁸ Also in 2018, new amendments to the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law have been proposed. These amendments give the JIACC the power to monitor and verify instances of abnormal growth in wealth. Notably, the amendments also add crimes stipulated in the House of Representatives election laws to the list of acts that are to be viewed as corruption, thus placing elections within the purview of JIACC oversight. Further, the amendments explicitly state that penalties related to corruption, in addition to the recovery of assets obtained from corruption, shall not be subject to statutes of limitations.⁴⁹ In addition, a special parliamentary session was held in May 2017 to discuss an increase in penalties for violations against public funds, and the Cabinet in April 2017 issued a decision to include societies and NGOs as subjects of the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism law.⁵⁰</p>
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	<p>In 2016, the Jordanian government passed the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law itself (IACC Law, Law Number 13 of 2016). This law enumerated the powers held by JIACC, including the power to prosecute anyone who commits any acts of corruption (Article 4j) and the specific acts of corruption that can be prosecuted by the JIACC (Article 16).⁵¹ The IACC Law also created a prosecution department within the judicial branch that specializes in JIACC cases (Article 17), mandatory minimum penalties for those convicted (Article 23), and a legal witnesses program that is tasked with ensuring anonymity and protection for witnesses and informants (Article 24). Furthermore, the law specifies that collection processes for assets derived from corruption cannot be dropped (Article 29), and permits the IACC to establish a Reconciliation and Settlement Trust Account at the Central Bank that saves and protects recovered assets until they are returned to their rightful owners (Article 30).</p>
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DIMENSION	BACKGROUND
Indicator number	2.6 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>How do you assess the space for civil society and the media to investigate and highlight corruption risks and cases, and to demand accountability from the country's political and economic elite?</p>
Response	<p>While the media, within the current context, would be best suited to investigate and highlight corruption risks and cases in Jordan, Rasheed (Transparency International - Jordan) gave the collective Jordanian media a poor rating in its National Integrity System evaluation report. Although it has played an increasingly important role in highlighting a number of corruption cases over the past five years, the media as an institution largely lacks independence in practice, given that the majority of media outlets are owned by the public sector.⁵²</p> <p>In addition, the Access to Information Law does not include a self-disclosure principle, in which public institutions are required to regularly publish information regarding their work. This issue is primarily evident on governmental institution websites, which are irregularly updated and often exclude statistics related to their work.⁵³</p> <p>Furthermore, the NIS evaluation found that, within the past two years, the media has largely retreated from its role in exposing and monitoring corruption. The roots of this media retreat can be traced back to a general lack of information, as well as a widespread fear of retaliation and possible prosecution.⁵⁴ Despite this, the media has retained its important role in publicizing corruption cases raised by the House of Representatives, reports issued by the JIACC, and press conferences held by the JIACC President.⁵⁵</p> <p>With regards to civil society, surveyed representatives of select Jordanian civil society organizations state that their ability to operate effectively is dependent on a more transparent and streamlined government approvals process for obtaining funding. To this end, these CSO representatives suggest the issuance of more regular notifications from relevant government agencies on approval progress, the provision of more autonomy to CSOs to select and define their goals, objectives and activities, and the provision of explicitly stated reasoning when funding approval requests are rejected.⁵⁶ Secondly, a lack of cooperation and coordination among CSOs themselves limits adequate knowledge sharing and reach.⁵⁷</p>

Target 16.4: "By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime."

3. Anti-Money Laundering

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Has the country adopted a law to criminalize money laundering, in line with recommendation 3 of the FATF?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Compliant 0.75: Largely compliant 0.5: Partially compliant 0: Non-compliant -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.75</p> <p>The anti-money laundering laws adopted in Jordan are, in large part, in line with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)'s Recommendation 3. Law No. 46 of 2007 meets the following Recommendation 3 requirements: 3.1, 3.2 (in Article 4 of the 2007 Law), 3.3 (in Article 4 of the 2007 Law), 3.4 (in Article 3 of the 2007 Law), 3.6 (in Article 3 of the 2007 Law), 3.9 (in Article 25 of the 2007 Law), 3.10 (in Article 31 of the 2007 Law), and 3.11 (Article 24 of the 2007 Law).⁵⁸</p> <p>Specifically, Jordan meets the FATF Recommendation 3 requirements in the following areas: (1) ML should be criminalized on the basis of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, (2) the predicate offenses for ML should cover all serious offenses, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offenses (at minimum, a range of offenses in each of the designated categories of offenses), (3) where countries apply a threshold approach or a combined approach including threshold, predicate offenses should, at a minimum, comprise all offenses that: fall within the category of serious offenses under national law, are punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year's imprisonment, or are punished by a minimum penalty of more than six months' imprisonment, (4) the ML offense should extend to any type of property, regardless of value, that directly represents the proceeds of crime, (6) predicate offenses for money laundering should extend to conduct that occurred in another country, which constitutes an offense in that country, and which would have constituted a predicate offense had it occurred domestically, (9) proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions should apply to natural persons convicted of ML, (10) criminal liability and sanctions, and where it is not possible, civil or administrative liability and sanctions, should apply to legal persons (this should not preclude parallel criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings with respect to legal persons in countries in which more than one form of liability is available, such measures are without prejudice to the criminal liability of natural persons, and all sanctions should be proportionate and dissuasive), and (11) unless it is not permitted by fundamental principles of domestic law, there should be appropriate ancillary offences to the ML offense, including: participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempt, aiding and abetting, facilitation, and counseling the commission.</p> <p>However, the law does not provide enough detail to adequately cover recommendations: 3.5, which states, "when proving that property is the proceeds of a crime, it should not be necessary that a person be convicted of a predicate offense;" 3.7, which stipulates, "the money laundering offence should apply to persons who commit the predicate offense, unless this is contrary to fundamental principles of domestic law;" and 3.8, which specifies, "it should be possible for the intent and knowledge required to prove the money laundering offense to be inferred from factual circumstances."⁵⁹</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.2 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>* Has the government during the last three years conducted an assessment of the money laundering risks related to legal persons and arrangements, in line with Principle 2 of TI's "Just for Show?" report? Has the final risk assessment been published?</p> <p>Scoring 1: A risk assessment was carried out and is available to the public 0.5: A risk assessment was carried out; only an executive summary of the risk assessment has been published 0: No, the risk assessment has not been published or conducted -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>The AMLU underwent a national assessment that studied the threats of money laundering and terrorist financing in Jordan, as well as the weaknesses and threats faced by its anti-money laundry and terrorist financing system, in coordination with the IMF. This assessment was planned in 2017 and implemented in throughout June and July of 2018.⁶⁰ Although it has not yet been published, a higher score – relative to last year – is used to signify movement on this front.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.3 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are financial institutions (banks) prohibited by law from keeping anonymous accounts and are they required to undertake due diligence on their customers, in line with FATF recommendation 10?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Financial institutions are prohibited by law from keeping anonymous accounts; they are also required to undertake due diligence on their customers, in line with FATF recommendation 10 0.5: Only one of those provisions is in place: financial institutions are prohibited by law from keeping anonymous accounts or they are required to undertake due diligence on their customers 0: Financial institutions are allowed to offer anonymous accounts and they are not required to carry out due diligence on their customers -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Financial institutions in Jordan are prohibited from keeping anonymous accounts and are required to undertake due diligence on their customers, according to new instructions issued by the Central Bank of Jordan and approved by the AMLU in June, 2018.⁶¹</p> <p>These regulations, effective as of June 26, 2018, replaced Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Instructions No. 51 of 2010 and are based upon FATF 2012 recommendations and recent market developments, both locally and internationally.⁶² In particular, the instructions integrate elements of FATF's risk-based approach, such as new and specific procedures for banks to: conduct required client checks, identify high-risk persons, both Jordanian and foreign, and adhere to specified practices when sending, receiving, or mediating the transfer of money.⁶³ Further, the regulations require both the development of anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing training programs and the allocation of funds to be used specifically for these training programs.⁶⁴</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.4
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are financial institutions required by law to inform relevant authorities when they suspect (or have reasonable grounds to suspect) that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity, in line with FATF recommendation 20?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: Financial institutions are required by law to inform relevant authorities when they suspect or have grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity, in line with FATF recommendation 10</p> <p>0.5: Financial institutional are required by law to inform relevant authorities, but the requirements are only partially in line with FATF recommendation 10</p> <p>0: Financial institutions are not required by law to report funds they suspect are the proceeds of criminal activity</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Financial institutions are required by law to inform relevant authorities when they suspect that funds are related to money laundering or terrorist financing, according to the regulations issued pursuant to the Banking Law No. 28 of 2000, the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Law No. 46 of 2007, and the new 2018 regulations for financial institutions.⁶⁵</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.5 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) – casinos, real estate agents, jewelers, lawyers, notaries, other legal professionals, accountants, and trust and company service providers – required to carry out customer due diligence, to keep records, and to report suspicious transactions to the financial intelligence unit, in line with FATF recommendations 22 and 23?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: Designated non-financial businesses and professions by law are required to carry out customer due diligence, to keep records and to report suspicious transactions, in line with FATF recommendations 22 and 23.</p> <p>0.5: There are some legal obligations for designated non-financial businesses and professions to carry out customer due diligence, or to keep records, or to report suspicious transactions. These requirements are only partially in line with FATF recommendations 22 and 23.</p> <p>0: There are no legal obligations for designated non-financial businesses and professions to carry out customer due diligence, or to keep records, or to report suspicious transactions</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>

<p>Response</p>	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>Jordan's legislation is, in part, aligned with FATF Recommendations 22 and 23 on designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). The Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Law No. 46 of 2007 lists the following DNFBPs as entities required to comply with the provisions of the law: "persons or entities trading in real estate and its development; persons or entities trading in precious metals and stones; and persons or entities that perform the following business transactions on behalf of a third party: sale or purchase of real estate, management of funds or any other financial assets, management of bank accounts, postal saving accounts, or investments accounts in local and international financial markets, legal procedures necessary for establishing or managing any legal person, purchasing or selling commercial stores, and organization of contributions related to establishing or managing companies" (Article 13b). Only entities carrying out legal procedures for legal entities are specified, and casinos are not relevant within the Jordanian context. Accountants, as well as trust and company service providers, are not explicitly mentioned in the law, but could be covered under the "management of funds or any other financial assets" and "management of bank accounts" specifications.</p> <p>DNFBPs are required to follow the same due diligence procedures that, by law, financial entities must carry out, as specified within Article 13. Politically exposed persons (PEPs) are now defined as those connected to public offices in foreign countries, as per the instructions issued pursuant to the 2007 Law, as well as those connected to public offices in Jordan, as per the 2018 regulations for financial institutions and select DNFBPs, including licensed real estate companies. Previously, the instructions for financial institutions and licensed real estate companies called for enhanced diligence for PEPs according to Recommendation 22, but such practices of enhanced diligence apply only to foreign PEPs.⁶⁶</p> <p>In addition, it is not adequately addressed whether or not reliance on third parties to carry out customer due diligence is permitted for DNFBPs, as specified in Recommendation 22. The instructions for companies trading in real estate and precious stones and metals also include most regulations specified in Recommendation 23. However, screening procedures for employee hiring and the employment of an independent audit function to test internal controls are not mentioned.</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
<p>Indicator number</p>	<p>3.6 =</p>
<p>Indicator question(s)</p>	<p>Does the law require financial institutions to conduct enhanced due diligence in cases where the customer or the beneficial owner is a PEP (politically exposed person) or a family member or close associate of a PEP?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Yes, financial institutions are required to conduct enhanced due diligence in cases where their client is a foreign or a domestic PEP, or a family member or close associate of a PEP 0.5: Yes, but the law does not cover both foreign and domestic PEPs, and their close family and associates 0: No, there is no requirement for enhanced due diligence in the case of PEPs and associates -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
<p>Response</p>	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>According to the new regulations issued in 2018, financial institutions are required to conduct enhanced due diligence on both foreign politically exposed persons and their first-degree family members (at minimum) and local politically exposed persons and their family members.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.7 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law require enhanced due diligence by DNFBPs in cases where the customer or the beneficial owner is a PEP or a family member or close associate of the PEP?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Yes, DNFBPs are required to conduct enhanced due diligence in cases where their client is a foreign or a domestic PEP, or a family member or close associate of a PEP 0.5: Yes, but the law does not cover both foreign and domestic PEPs and their close family and associates 0: No, there is no requirement for enhanced due diligence in the case of PEPs and their associates -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>DNFBPs whose regulations were re-written in 2018 define both foreign and domestic PEPs as higher risk, thus necessitating enhanced due diligence.⁶⁷ However, new regulations for all internationally-recognized DNFBPs that adhere to this same standard must be created.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.8 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Has the country signed the multilateral competent authority agreement on the exchange of country-by-country reports on key indicators of multinational enterprise groups?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Yes 0: No -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>Jordan is not currently a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Forum and has not signed the multilateral competent authority agreement on the exchange of country-by-country reports on key indicators of multinational enterprise groups.⁶⁸</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.9 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Has the country signed the competent authority multinational agreement on automatic exchange of financial account information?⁶⁹</p> <p>Scoring 1: Yes 0: No -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>Jordan has not signed the competent authority multinational agreement on automatic exchange of financial account information.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	3.10 =
Indicator question(s)	How is the jurisdiction's performance on the exchange of information for tax purposes on request assessed by the OECD's Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes? 1: Compliant (C) 0.75: Largely Compliant (LC) 0.5: Partially Compliant (PC) 0: Non-compliant (NC) -: Not applicable or no data available
Response	Not applicable.

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	3.11 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country's score in the Basel Institute on Governance's Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index?
Response	Jordan's score on the Basel Institute on Governance's 2017 Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index is 4.9 on a scale of 0 (low risk) to 10 (high risk). This is a slight increase as compared to Jordan's 2016 score of 4.88. ⁷⁰ This score gives Jordan a 111 ranking out of 146 total countries, the second-most favorable ranking within the Middle East region.

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	3.12 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country's secrecy score in the Tax Justice Network's Financial Secrecy Index?
Response	No data available.

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	3.13 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the estimated illicit financial outflow of funds from your country in the latest available year, according to Global Financial Integrity?
Response	The estimated illicit financial outflow of funds from Jordan in 2013 (the latest available year) was 3,359 (in millions of USD), according to Global Financial Integrity. ⁷¹

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	3.14 =
Indicator question(s)	Is there evidence that money laundering is effectively prosecuted?
Response	According to the Ministry of Justice, 12 cases were received in 2016, 17 cases were received in 2017, 11 cases were closed in 2016, and 18 cases were closed in 2017 within regulatory courts. These cases resulted in 29 verdicts and 26 convictions (12 total convictions in 2016 and 14 total convictions in 2017). ⁷² To evaluate these processes in the future, the following data, published publicly, would also be useful: the number of criminal investigations for money laundering activity, and the average length of custodial sentences imposed for money laundering convictions.

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	3.15 =
Indicator question(s)	How many suspicious transactions reports did financial institutions and different types of DNFBPs file in the last two years for which data is available?
Response	<p>According to Jordan's Anti Money Laundering & Counter Terrorist Financing Unit's latest annual reports, the number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) received from entities obliged to report, listed in the reports as banks, money exchange companies, payment and collection companies, financial services companies, lawyers, real estate companies, and jewelry companies, has increased steadily since 2014, during which time 155 SARs were received.⁷³ This increased to 319 in 2015, to 550 in 2016, and finally to 595 in 2017.⁷⁴</p> <p>The number of Notifications of Transactions Suspected to be Related to Money Laundering received from regulatory and supervisory authorities and other competent authorities, listed in the reports as Central Bank of Jordan, Securities Commission, Anti Corruption Commission, Public Security Directorate, Companies Control Department, General Customs Department, Income Tax and Sales Department, and Judicial Authority, decreased slightly from 29 in 2014 to 28 in 2015, but increased significantly to 52 in 2016 and to 59 in 2017. While requests for information issued by the AMLU to counterpart Units in other countries remained stagnant at 11 in 2014 and 2015, the number increased to 16 in 2016 and 21 in 2017. The number of requests for information received from counterpart units increased from 56 in 2014 to 71 in 2015, then decreased slightly to 65 in 2016 and 51 in 2017. Increases in reports submitted to the AMLU and counterpart requests submitted by the AMLU over the past four years indicate a steady increase in the activity of the Unit.</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	3.16 =
Indicator question(s)	Have there been any noteworthy changes or developments in the past two years that indicate an improvement or deterioration in the framework or practice to prevent and fight money laundering?
Response	<p>Throughout 2017 and the first half of 2018, the AMLU held 21 workshops and meetings on topics related to money laundering and terrorist financing on a national scale.⁷⁵ Since 2016, the AMLU trained Jordanian banking and insurance companies on anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing measures and to build the capacities of DNFBPs to effectively monitor and counter money laundering. According to the AMLU, the capacity-building for DNFBPs workshop focused on raising awareness among DNFBPs on new developments in international anti-money laundering standards, including the FATF, as well as building capacities among DNFBPs to apply a risk-based approach to anti-money laundering supervision processes.⁷⁶</p> <p>On a regional and international scale, Jordan attended Egmont Group meetings, participated in CEF, MENAFATF, and FATF training courses, participated in Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) annual plenaries, and participated in Counter ISIL Finance Group meetings throughout the past two years.⁷⁷ In February 2018, Jordan hosted the Counter ISIL Finance Group meeting.⁷⁸ Further, Jordan signed memorandums of understanding with the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, and the Financial Analysis Unit of the Ministry of the President of the Republic of Panama to promote cooperation and the transfer of information.⁷⁹</p> <p>In the area of legislation, the scope of the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Law was expanded to include societies and non-profit organizations in 2017. In addition, in June 2018, the Central Bank of Jordan issued new anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing regulations for licensed banks, ensuring better alignment with FATF recommendations and changes in local and international markets.⁸⁰</p> <p>However, there have been a number of recent incidents in which Jordanian banks have been sanctioned for breaches of anti-money laundering regulations. These instances include the imposition of sanctions on the Cyprus branch of the Jordan Ahli Bank, reported on in January 2018 and the imposition of sanctions on the Cyprus branch of the Jordan Kuwait Bank, reported on in November 2016.⁸¹</p>

4. Beneficial Ownership Transparency

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	4.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>To what extent does the law in your country clearly define beneficial ownership?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Beneficial owner is defined as a natural person who directly or indirectly exercises ultimate control over a legal entity or arrangement, and the definition of ownership covers control through other means, in addition to legal ownership 0.5: Beneficial owner is defined as a natural person [who owns a certain percentage of shares], but there is no mention of whether control is exercised directly or indirectly, or if control is limited to a percentage of share ownership 0: There is no definition of beneficial ownership, or the control element is not included -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The Anti Money Laundering Law No. 46 for Year 2007 defines the beneficiary owner as "the natural person with the real interest for whom the business relationship is conducted for or on his behalf, or who has full or effective control over a legal person or has the right to conclude a legal arrangement on its behalf."⁸²</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	4.2 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law require that financial institutions have procedures for identifying the beneficial owner(s) when establishing a business relationship with a client?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Yes, financial institutions are always required to identify the beneficial owners of them clients when establishing a business relationship 0.5: Financial institutions are required to identify the beneficial owners only in cases considered as high-risk, or the requirement does not cover the identification of the beneficial owners of both natural and legal customers 0: No, there is no requirement to identify the beneficial owners -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The law stipulates that entities subject to the provision of the Anti Money Laundering Law, including both financial institutions and Transparency International's minimum specified DNFBPs, must "give due diligence to the identification of the customers entity, legal status, activity of the customer, purpose of the business relationship and nature, and the beneficiary owner of the relationship between he entities and the customer, if any, and verifying such." It also states that entities subject to the provision of the law must "keep records and legal instruments to document the local and international financial transactions to include sufficient data to identify such transactions; as well as maintaining such records, documents, legal instruments, data and information including customer's due diligence data and beneficiary owners for not less than five years from the date of completion of the transaction or the date of termination of the business, as the case may be, which shall be updated periodically".⁸³</p>

	<p>The specific entities subject to this law are both financial entities (banks operating in Jordan, exchange and money transfer companies, persons or companies exercising any of the activities subject to the supervision and licensing of the Securities Commission and the Insurance Commission, entities offering postal services, and entities that: grant all types of credit, provide payment and collection services, issue and administrate instruments payments and credit, trade in stock exchange market and capital market instruments for its own account of for clients, purchase and sell debts with or without the right of recourse, provide financial leasing, and manage investments and financial assets on behalf of a third party) and non-financial entities (all persons/entities: trading in real estate and real estate development, trading in precious metals and stones, or performing any of the following business transactions: sale and purchase of real estate; management of funds or any other financial assets; management of bank accounts, postal saving accounts, or investment accounts in local and international financial markets; legal procedures necessary for establishing or managing any legal person, purchasing, or selling commercial stores; or organization of contributions related to the establishing or managing companies).⁸⁴</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	4.3 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law specify which competent authorities (e.g. financial intelligence unit, tax authorities, public prosecutors, anti-corruption agencies, etc.) have access to beneficial ownership information?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Yes, the law specifies that all law enforcement bodies, tax agencies, and the financial intelligence unit should have access to beneficial ownership information 0.75: Yes, a decree or another authoritative standard or policy specifies that all law enforcement bodies, tax agencies, and the financial intelligence unit should have access to beneficial ownership information 0.5: Only some competent authorities are explicitly mentioned in the law, decree or policy 0: The law or relevant decrees or policies do not specify which authorities should have access to beneficial ownership information -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>As stipulated in the 2011 Instructions No. 3, issued pursuant to the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Law, companies are required to designate an accredited, independent Reporting Officer and Deputy Reporting Officer in the Officer's absence.⁸⁵ These officers are tasked with implementing the provisions of the Anti Money Laundering Law and its related instructions, including the gathering of information regarding beneficiary ownership. The entity's chairman, board members, general managers, and all employees, in compliance with the law, must alert the Reporting Officer of any transactions suspected to be connected to money laundering or terrorist financing, and the Reporting Officer must then inform the AMLU immediately of any suspicious transaction. However, the instructions only specify the employment of this reporting mechanism in the event of suspicious transactions, or at the AMLU's request.</p> <p>Further, while the bodies such as the Securities Commission, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade are tasked with the supervision and monitoring of securities companies, banks, and companies – which includes having access to information such as company owners – none of these authorities were explicitly mentioned in the legislation that contained information on beneficiary ownership monitoring procedures.⁸⁶</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	4.5 =
Indicator question(s)	Which public authority supervises/holds the company registry?
Response	The Companies Control Department (CCD), within Jordan's Ministry of Industry and Trade holds and supervises the company registry. ⁸⁷

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	4.6 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>What information on beneficial ownership is recorded in the company registry?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: All relevant information is recorded: name of the beneficial owner(s), identification or tax number, personal or business address, nationality, country of residence and description of how control is exercised</p> <p>0.75: Information is partially recorded</p> <p>0.5: Only the name of the beneficial owner is recorded</p> <p>0: No information is recorded</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>According to the CCD, all owners, partners, and shareholders of a company are required to register their names to the company and sign a form stating that there are no 'hidden persons' in ownership. If such a form is not signed, the company cannot be registered. Thus, a company is forbidden to have beneficiary owners if these owners are not registered to the company. However, the CCD stated that, in practice, some company owners, shareholders, and partners may violate this law.⁸⁸</p> <p>If the CCD has reason to suspect hidden persons or other unlawful activities, Article 273 of the Companies Law 22 of 1997 and its Amendments gives the CCD the power to form an investigation committee that is tasked with auditing the company in question. Further, if a complaint is raised initially to the JIACC or the AMLU about a registered company, the CCD is notified and the agencies will work in close coordination to monitor the company in question. According to the CCD, 20 investigation committees were formed in 2017 and 8 investigation committees were formed in 2018 as of July 10, 2018.</p> <p>Because the law requires that all owners, partners, and shareholders be registered under these categories, 'beneficial ownership' specifically is not a field that companies are required to submit to the registry. Instead, the identifying information recorded in the registry includes owner, partner, and shareholder names, national identification numbers, and nationalities. Business addresses and the names of general managers are also included in the registry.⁸⁹</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	4.7 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>What information on beneficial ownership is made available to the public?</p> <p>Scoring 1: All relevant information is published online: name of the beneficial owner(s), identification or tax number, personal or business address, nationality, country of residence and description of how control is exercised 0.75: Information is partially published online, but some data is omitted (e.g. tax number); sufficient information is accessible to identify the beneficial owner 0.5: Only the name of the beneficial owner is published, or information is only made available on paper/physically 0.25: Only the name of the direct owner (who may not be beneficial owners) is accessible 0: No information is published, or accessible information is insufficient to identify direct or beneficial owners -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.25</p> <p>All the aforementioned information is available to the public through the company registry, which can be found online.⁹⁰</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	4.8 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law require legal entities to update information on beneficial ownership, shareholders, and directors provided in the company registry?</p> <p>Scoring criteria: 1: Yes, legal entities are required by law to update information on beneficial ownership or information relevant to identifying the beneficial owner (directors/shareholders) immediately or within 24 hours after the change 0.75: Yes, legal entities are required to update the information on beneficial ownership or directors/shareholders within 30 days after the change 0.5: Yes, legal entities are required to update the information on the beneficial owner or directors/shareholders on an annual basis 0.25: Yes, but the law does not specify a specific timeframe 0: No, the law does not require legal entities to update the information on control and ownership -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.75</p> <p>In the event that information relevant to identifying owners, shareholders, and directors changes, the CCD typically requires that these changes be reported within ten days. In the case of a death, there is a 60 to 90-day limit for reporting changes. According to the CCD, in an effort to encourage investment, a one to two-week breach of the 10-day requirement does not typically result in repercussions. However, if there is a significant breach of the 10-day condition, there will be repercussions that may eventually result in advancing the case to the general prosecutor, and the breach will be recorded on an incident tracker that is held internally within the CCD. This tracker allows CCD employees to monitor breaches and share internal knowledge with new employees.⁹¹</p>

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	4.10 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country's score in the Open Company Data Index produced by Open Corporates?
Response	Jordan's score on the Open Company Data Index, produced by Open Corporates, is 25/100. ⁹²

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	4.11 =
Indicator question(s)	How strong is the level of transparency of the company registry in practice?
Response	<p>The company registry remains transparent in practice. It is easily accessible online, access is free, and it is easily searchable because of its inclusion of various search parameters: company name, company co-owner, general manager, sector, company number, by date, amount of starting capital, company service, national number of the owner, companies that closed during a certain time, owner's nationality, and others.⁹³</p> <p>However, the registry does not include annual accounts and other company filings. According to the CCD, only public shareholding companies and foreign operating companies are required by law to publicly publish their accounts and balance sheets in the newspaper. The CCD also recommends to these companies that they publish their accounts and balance sheets online on their websites, but this is not required by law.⁹⁴</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	4.12 =
Indicator question(s)	Have there been any developments in the past two years that indicate an improvement or deterioration of the transparency of corporations and other legal entities?
Response	<p>According to Jordan's 2016 NIS report, not all private sector entities practice transparency. As the NIS report explains, a Jordanian company's dedication to transparency is largely dependent on its size and its relationship with the government. For instance, public joint stock companies and banks are required to disclose accurate data and information, while smaller companies do not have such obligations.⁹⁵</p> <p>However, it is promising that most major public companies and banks have begun publishing their annual reports, including financial and administrative data, on their websites. This has been accompanied by recent discussions over greater ethics and integrity in the corporate sector. In addition, the Jordan Strategy Forum issued a policy paper on corporate codes of conduct. Given the recent popular protests highlighting corruption issues in both the public and private sectors, Jordan may begin to see its smaller companies follow suit.⁹⁶</p> <p>In terms of legislation, according to the CCD, new amendments to the Companies Law became effective in October 2017 and instructions to implement this law are currently being drafted. This law and accompanying instructions will enhance corporate governance for public shareholding companies and private shareholding companies with capital of over 500,000 JOD, which, according to the CCD, will in turn enhance integrity and transparency within companies across Jordan.⁹⁷</p>

5. Recovery of Stolen Assets

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	5.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the country have a specific asset recovery policy?</p> <p>Scoring 1: A comprehensive asset recovery policy is in place 0.5: The country has adopted an asset recovery policy, but it fails to address some important aspects 0: No asset recovery policy has been adopted -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>Jordan's asset recovery policy is addressed in the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law (Law No. 13 of 2016). In particular, Article 29 of Law No. 13 of 2016 states that asset recovery processes cannot be dropped or withdrawn, even if a court issues a decision to drop the lawsuit for public right, cessation of prosecution, or amnesty due to punitive exemptions or lack of responsibility. An additional amendment to this law, proposed in 2018, reinforces this by barring the use of statutes of limitations in cases of corruption and asset recovery.⁹⁸ Furthermore, Article 30 permits the Commission to instate a "Reconciliation and Settlement Trust Account" at Jordan's Central Bank, which is tasked with preserving the assets derived from acts of corruption that have been seized or recovered, until the assets are returned to their rightful owners.⁹⁹</p> <p>However, while the asset recovery policy in place is fairly comprehensive, it does not address certain important aspects. Please see indicator number 5.2 for these gaps.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	5.2 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Has the country established a wide range of asset recovery mechanisms, including a) measures that allow for the seizure and confiscation of proceeds from money laundering without requiring a criminal conviction (non-conviction-based confiscation), b) a policy that requires an offender to demonstrate that the assets were acquired lawfully, and c) the recognition/enforceability of foreign non-conviction-based confiscation/forfeiture orders?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The country has adopted measures that allow for non-conviction-based confiscation and/or measures that shift the burden of proof that assets were acquired legally on the offender, as well as a mechanism that allows for the recognition and enforcement of foreign non-conviction-based confiscation orders 0.5: The country has adopted two of the above mechanisms 0.25: One of the above mechanisms has been adopted 0: None of the approaches has been adopted -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.25</p> <p>In terms of enumerated asset recovery mechanisms, Article 23 of the 2016 Law states that the JIACC, during its investigation, may instruct the court to "suspend any contract or agreement or privilege or concession where it deems it apparent from the face value of the evidence that it was obtained as a result of an act of corruption, until the issuance of a decision in the case."¹⁰⁰</p> <p>However, the law does not put forth the requirement that the offender must always demonstrate that the assets were acquired lawfully. For certain offenses, such as illicit enrichment, the burden of proof is placed upon both the public official, who must explain any significant increase in his or her wealth, if such wealth does not seem to reflect his or her earnings, and the prosecutor, who must prove that the earnings were illegally acquired. Otherwise, the burden of proof in criminal cases is to be carried out by the public prosecutor.¹⁰¹ In addition, the law does not address the enforceability of foreign non-conviction-based confiscation orders.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	5.3 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Has the country created a specialized asset recovery team or unit?</p> <p>Scoring 1: There is a team, unit or agency that specializes in asset recovery and the legal framework provides sufficient political independence and resources to carry out its responsibilities 0.5: There is a team, unit or agency that specializes in asset recovery and the legal framework provides either sufficient political independence or sufficient resources to carry out its responsibilities 0.25: There is a team, unit or agency that specializes in asset recovery but the legal framework fails to provide sufficient political independence and resources for this body 0: There is no specialized team or agency tasked with asset recovery -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The 2016 Anti-Corruption Commission Law gives the JIACC the power to implement asset recovery proceedings. The JIACC has the authority to prosecute any person who commits any act of corruption and seize his or her movable and immovable assets (Article 3). The JIACC is also given the authority to instate a Reconciliation and Settlement Trust Account at the Central Bank that is designated for preserving assets recovered from corruption cases until they are returned to their rightful owner or owners (Article 30). The 2016 law protects the independence of the JIACC in all its tasks, including asset recovery, by stating that the JIACC “shall carry out its authorities and tasks freely and independently without influence or interference by any other party” and that the Commission shall remain financially and administratively independent in all its functions, including asset recovery processes (Articles 3 and 5).¹⁰²</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	5.4 =
Indicator question(s)	Is there evidence of a strong political commitment to promoting asset recovery?
Response	<p>In 2016, the then-Minister of Justice pledged that both the Ministry and Jordan as a whole would reinforce Jordan’s newly drafted legislation on asset recovery.¹⁰³ Also in 2016, Jordanian government officials involved in asset recovery participated in a series of workshops and working meetings held by the Council of Europe. These workshops and meetings aimed to highlight international best practices in interagency information sharing for asset recovery; provide information on international asset recovery processes, international networks for asset recovery, and requesting international mutual legal assistance; and develop standard operating procedures for the government bodies involved in managing and overseeing asset recovery processes.¹⁰⁴</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	5.5 =
Indicator question(s)	Does the country actively participate in international cooperation networks focusing on asset recovery?
Response	<p>Jordan has attended the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery since 2012 and all plenaries of MENAFATF.¹⁰⁵ Jordan is also a member of MENAFATF and the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery, a body closely connected to the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (STAR).¹⁰⁶</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	5.6 =
Indicator question(s)	Is there public evidence of any asset recovery cases involving your country in the past two years?
Response	<p>According to the latest published data, there were 18 cases requiring asset recovery in 2014, which included the recovery of both money and land. The total amount seized in these 18 cases was equivalent to 16,936,570 Jordanian Dinar, or roughly 23,850,381 U.S. Dollars.¹⁰⁷ The 2015 Annual Report listed 8 cases requiring asset recovery in 2015, which includes 32 individual customs evasion cases counted as one case. The total amount of assets seized in 2015 was equivalent to 115,350,471 Jordanian Dinar, or roughly 162,438,602 U.D. Dollars. The total amount of assets seized in the 32 customs evasion cases was equivalent to 110,000,000 Jordanian Dinar, or roughly 154,903,073 U.S. Dollars.¹⁰⁸</p> <p>Popular Jordanian news outlets have also published a number of news stories on instances that involved the seizure and/or recovery of assets within the past two years. These stories have covered cases involving both public officials and regular civilians. Two examples include the seizure of the moveable and immovable assets of a high-ranking former Jordanian tax official in June 2018 for abuse of public funds and the seizure of moveable and immovable assets of 14 individuals in January 2017 for conning residents to make fraudulent investments.¹⁰⁹</p>

6. Fight Against Organised Crime

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	6.1 =
Indicator question(s)	Is there evidence of strong public trust in the integrity of the police?
Response	<p>According to Transparency International's most recent report, only 12% of Jordanians surveyed felt that most or all police are corrupt, indicating that the public generally trusts those in law enforcement. Interestingly, according to this survey, the Jordanian public believed that police were the least corrupt of all institutions asked about within the survey. The other institutions asked about included: the president/prime minister, members of parliament, government officials, local councilors, tax officials, judges and magistrates, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and business executives.¹¹⁰</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	6.2 =
Indicator question(s)	Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organized crime into the police, the prosecution, or the judiciary? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
Response	<p>There is no evidence through media investigations or reports of the penetration of organized crime into the police, the prosecution, or the judiciary.</p> <p>However, Jordan's Public Security Directorate has a Transparency and Human Rights Bureau tasked with receiving and investigating complaints from citizens about instances of abuse and malpractice among staff members of the Public Security Directorate.¹¹¹</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	6.3 =
Indicator question(s)	Is there evidence of effective policing against organized crime by law enforcement units? Do these bodies have sufficient independence, resources, capacity and adequate integrity mechanisms to be effective?
Response	<p>The government has proven to be alert and prepared to combat organized crime in its various forms. In April 2018, the German Foundation for International Legal Cooperation (IRZ) held a seminar in partnership with the Office of the Public Prosecutor General in Amman to exchange experience and best practices on fighting organized crime, and in particular, the threats posed by terrorism, money laundering, and human trafficking. The Jordanian delegation included representatives from the Office of the Public Prosecutor General in Amman and public prosecutors from other parts of the country. The participants, along with their German counterparts, stressed the need for law specialized law enforcement authorities and for strengthening cooperation between the police and the justice system.¹¹²</p> <p>Though only tangentially related, in April 2018, media reported that the Minister of Justice met with the National Committee of Preventing Human Trafficking to discuss the Anti-Human Trafficking Law draft. The Minister of Justice highlighted the importance of this law, given that it places great emphasis on the rehabilitation and protection of victims. According to the article, 88 Public Security Department-referred human trafficking cases were dealt with by the Jordanian Ministry of Labor in 2017.¹¹³</p> <p>Further, on several occasions, the media has reported on terror plots thwarted by Jordan's law enforcement and intelligence authorities, the most recent of which occurred in January 2018.¹¹⁴ Jordanian law enforcement and intelligence authorities are also active in raiding suspected terrorist hideouts and cells, most recently in August 2018.¹¹⁵</p> <p>In terms of independence necessary to effectively combat organized crime, law enforcement agencies execute State directives only, thus removing, both by law and in practice, from any partisan bias. Further, all employees of law enforcement agencies are forbidden by law from practicing partisan activities or being involved in political parties.¹¹⁶ In addition, law enforcement agencies are allotted the funding and human resources necessary to remain effective. However, it is vital to ensure that the financial and administrative resources allotted to these agencies keep pace with the growing need for security well into the future, given the surrounding civil wars and the sudden population influx due to refugee intake.¹¹⁷</p>

7. Arms Trafficking

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	7.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Has the country ratified the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The Protocol has been ratified (or accepted) 0: The Protocol has not been ratified -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Jordan has ratified the Protocol.¹¹⁸</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	7.2 =
Indicator question(s)	Has the country signed and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)? Scoring 1: The ATT has been ratified 0.5: The ATT has been signed but not ratified 0: The ATT has not been signed or ratified -: Not applicable or no data available
Response	Score: 0 Jordan has neither signed nor ratified the ATT. ¹¹⁹

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	7.3 =
Indicator question(s)	Does the government have a well-scrutinized process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty?
Response	<p>Jordan committed in 2001 to a United Nations consensus decision to adopt, support, and implement the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. To this end, Jordan has submitted reports on the national application and implementation of this program of action. Within the regional sphere, Jordan adopted the 2002 Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives, and Hazardous Material.¹²⁰</p> <p>However, Jordan's Parliament does not have any permanent committees focused on military, defense, or security matters. Ensuring adequate technical expertise and sufficient administrative resources to supervise arms export decisions is therefore difficult.¹²¹ In addition, while the Prime Minister holds the right to question the General Intelligence Directorate head and the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, the Parliament's access to these figures is contingent upon the Council of Ministers' access, which has historically been limited.¹²² According to Transparency International's 2015 Government Defense Index report, instances of weapons being sent from Jordan to neighboring countries with shaky human rights records and others engaged in civil conflict have been reported.¹²³</p> <p>However, some expert decisions have, in practice, demonstrated some alignment with international protocols. These decisions include the export of Nimr tactical vehicles to Libya only after sanctions were lifted in 2005 and an announcement regarding the development of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher that stated the exports would "comply with UN rules in this regard to guarantee the transparency of the process."¹²⁴</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	7.4 =
Indicator question(s)	Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within the defense and security apparatus tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
Response	<p>As stipulated by the General Intelligence Law No. 24 of 1964, Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate (GID) has within it a Military Council with jurisdiction over all defense personnel in intelligence matters.¹²⁵ According to a statement made by the Jordanian Government in 2013, the GID's court is tasked with prosecuting individuals for crimes, including corruption and bribery that threaten to violate the GID's integrity. There are also Military and Police Courts that function independently from the GID.¹²⁶</p> <p>In addition, other independent oversight bodies, such as the JIACC and the Audit Bureau, are mandated to investigate acts of corruption in any governmental body, including state defense and security establishments.¹²⁷ However, according the JIACC's past national strategies, defense, intelligence, and security apparatuses – with the exception of the Public Security Directorate, which is mentioned briefly – do not seem to be of primary focus.</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	7.5 =
Indicator question(s)	How effective are controls over the disposal of assets? Is information on these disposals and the proceeds of their sale transparent?
Response	According to a government representative reviewer for Jordan's Defense Index Country Assessment report, the Military Supplies Act No. 3 of 1995 and its instructions set out certain regulations for the sale and disposal of assets, and disposals are scrutinized by a delegated audit body. ¹²⁸ However, while information on sales is often reported in press releases, industry organizations, and defense-trade publications, asset disposal audits and relevant information on the processes and procedures of asset disposals are not made available to the public. ¹²⁹

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	7.6 =
Indicator question(s)	How do you assess the integrity and corruption risks related to customs and border officials? Do customs and border agency have adequate capacity and resources to ensure effective control of goods moving in and out of the country?
Response	The capacities allotted to Jordan's Customs Department suggest its control over goods moving in and out of the country. In terms of structure, the Director General of the Jordanian Customs Department oversees all Clearance Agents and other department officials and is appointed by the cabinet. According to Articles 171 and 172, department officials receive certain service authorizations from the Director General upon their appointment, and civil and military authorities, as well as public security forces, are required to provide any necessary assistance to department officials when asked to do so. The Department is also entitled to exchange information with all Ministries, government agencies, and other official bodies for the purpose of executing its mission. ¹³⁰ The Customs Department also contains an Enforcement Directorate, which is tasked specifically with identifying and seizing all smuggled goods. This Directorate is given the power to coordinate anti-smuggling programs on regional and international levels, in cooperation with the Intelligence Liaison Office for the Middle East and the World Customs Organization. Further, the Department is provided with the capacity to improve the efficiency of its information systems to facilitate information sharing with neighboring countries and international customs administrations, as well as the capacity to improve the efficiency of its laboratories used to detect harmful and dangerous items in line with international standards. Government websites also stress the provision of a positive working environment through skills building and support for customs workers, in order to promote motivation and efficiency amongst these personnel. ¹³¹

Target 16.5: "Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms."

8. Experience and Perceptions of Corruption

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	8.1 =
Indicator question(s)	___% of respondents state that they or a member of their household made an unofficial payment or gift when coming into contact with public services over the past 12 months, according to Transparency International's ___ Global Corruption Barometer (or similar national surveys).
Response	4% of respondents state that they or a member of their household made an unofficial payment or gift when coming into contact with public services over the past 12 months, according to Transparency International's 2017 Global Corruption Barometer report. ¹³² However, it should be noted that these low results could, in part, be attributed to the use of <i>wasta</i> , or personal connections used to access public services and to get things done quickly. In Jordan, this is not viewed as bribery. ¹³³

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	8.2 =
Indicator question(s)	___% of respondents state that corruption or bribery is one of the three most important problems facing this country that the government should address, according to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer (or similar national surveys).
Response	No data available.

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	8.3 =
Indicator question(s)	___% of respondents state that their government performs "badly" at fighting corruption in government, according to Transparency International's ___ Global Corruption Barometer.
Response	29% of Jordanian respondents stated that their government performs "very badly" in fighting corruption in government, and 32% stated that their government performs "fairly badly" in fighting corruption in government, according to Transparency International's 2017 Global Corruption Barometer. ¹³⁴

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	8.4 =
Indicator question(s)	In Transparency International's most recent Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, the country scored ___ points on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), ranking ___ out of 176 countries.
Response	In Transparency International's most recent Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, Jordan scored 48 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), ranking 57 out of 176 countries. Jordan's Corruption Perceptions Index has become slightly more favorable since 2013, during which time it stood at 45. However, Jordan's indices in 2014 and 2015 were 49 and 53 respectively, indicating a slight increase in Jordanian perceptions of the presence of corruption within their country.

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	8.5 =
Indicator question(s)	Has corruption experienced by people increased or decreased in recent years?
Response	<p>Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer shows that, of those who came into contact with public services in the 12 months preceding the reporting period, 67% reported paying, or someone in their household paying, a bribe to registry and permit services, 49% to tax revenue services, 45% to land services, 44% to judiciary services, 35% to education services, 34% to medical and health services, 17% to police services, and 14% to utilities services.¹³⁵ These figures are significantly lower in 2016, after which 2% of respondents who had come into contact with public services in the past 12 months reported paying bribes, giving gifts, or doing favors for personnel working in public school services, 2% for public hospital services, 2% for ID, voter's card, or permit services, 2% for utilities services, 3% for police services, and 5% for court services.</p> <p>However, as noted previously, the use of <i>wasta</i> is not viewed as bribery and the 2013 question asked for data regarding the respondent or anyone in his or her household, while the 2016 question asked for data regarding only the respondent.¹³⁶</p> <p>In 2013, 29% believed that corruption in Jordan had increased a lot (12%) or a little (27%) over the two years preceding the reporting period, 44% believed that the level had remained the same, and 18% believed that the level had decreased a little (13%) or a lot (5%).¹³⁷ In 2016, 75% felt that the level of corruption in Jordan had increased a lot (60%) or a little (15%) over the one year preceding the reporting period, 12% felt that the level stayed the same, and 12% felt that the level decreased a little (10%) or decreased a lot (2%).¹³⁸ This captures a significant upsurge in perceptions of increasing corruption among Jordanians.</p>

9. Anti-Corruption Framework and Institutions

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	9.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are the following offences clearly defined and banned by criminal law?</p> <p>a. Active bribery of domestic public officials, in line with Art. 15(a) of UNCAC</p> <p>Scoring 1: The offence is clearly defined and banned 0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition 0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned -: Not applicable or no data available</p> <p>b. Passive bribery of domestic public officials, in line with Art. 15(b) of UNCAC</p> <p>Scoring 1: The offence is clearly defined and banned 0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition 0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned -: Not applicable or no data available</p> <p>c. Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official, in line with Art. 17 of UNCAC</p> <p>Scoring 1: The offence is clearly defined and banned 0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition 0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned -: Not applicable or no data available</p> <p>d. Trading in influence, in line with Art. 18 of UNCAC</p> <p>Scoring 1: The offence is clearly defined and banned 0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition 0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned -: Not applicable or no data available</p> <p>e. Abuse of functions, in line with Art. 19 of UNCAC</p> <p>Scoring 1: The offence is clearly defined and banned 0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition 0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned -: Not applicable or no data available</p>

f. Illicit Enrichment, in line with Art. 20 of UNCAC

Scoring

1: The offence is clearly defined and banned

0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition

0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned

-: Not applicable or no data available

g. Bribery in the private sector, in line with Art. 21 of UNCAC

Scoring

1: The offence is clearly defined and banned

0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition

0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned

-: Not applicable or no data available

h. Embezzlement of property in the private sector, in line with Art. 22 of UNCAC

Scoring

1: The offence is clearly defined and banned

0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition

0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned

-: Not applicable or no data available

i. Embezzlement of property in the private sector, in line with Art. 22 of UNCAC

Scoring

1: The offence is clearly defined and banned

0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition

0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned

-: Not applicable or no data available

j. Concealment, in line with Art. 24 of UNCAC

Scoring

1: The offence is clearly defined and banned

0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition

0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned

-: Not applicable or no data available

k. Obstruction of justice, in line with Art. 25 of UNCAC

Scoring

1: The offence is clearly defined and banned

0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition

0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned

-: Not applicable or no data available

Response

a. Score: 1

The offense is clearly defined and banned by criminal law. The act of offering a bribe, gift, or other benefit to any state official, person selected to perform a public service through election or appointment, or person assigned to perform an official function in order (1) to encourage said official to carry out an act that does not fall within the duties of his/her office or (2) refrain from performing an act that does fall within the duties of his/her office is criminalized and punishable, according to Articles 172 and 173 of the Penal Code.¹³⁹

b. Score: 1

The offense is clearly defined and banned by criminal law. Articles 170 and 171 of the Penal Code states that the acceptance of any bribe, gift, promise, or other benefit by any state official, person selected to perform a public service through election or appointment, or person assigned to perform an official function, in order that the official act or refrain from acting upon his/her official duties, is banned and punishable.¹⁴⁰

c. Score: 1

The offense is clearly defined and banned by criminal law. According to Article 174 of the Penal Code, any public official who takes for him/herself state money, private persons' money, or other property that he/she is supposed to control, administer, collect, or keep safe in the course of his/her duties will be punished. In addition, any employee of any bank, specialized lending institution, or public shareholding company who misappropriates money that belongs to said institutions will be punished. The Article also criminalizes forging checks and bonds; making false entries in registers, ledgers, and records; distorting, deleting, or damaging accounts, securities, and other instruments; and performing, in general, any other act with the aim of hiding such misappropriation. The Article specifies that any partner or accomplice in embezzlement is subject to the same punishment as the perpetrator.¹⁴¹ In May 2017, the Jordanian Parliament held a special session to discuss new legislation that increased penalties for violations against public funds, thus highlighting the importance of this issue.¹⁴²

d. Score: 0.5

Trading in influence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition. The Penal Code's Articles on bribery (Articles 170-173) define a bribe as "a gift or a promise or any other benefit in order to [encourage a state or public service official to] carry out an act that does not fall within the duties of his/her office; or to refrain from carrying out an act that falls under the duties of his/her office." This is a broad definition and can thus, according to the UNODC, cover trading in influence, but the specific act of *trading in influence* is not defined in the Penal Code.¹⁴³

e. Score: 1

Article 182 of the Penal Code states that any public official who uses his/her authority, directly or indirectly, to obstruct or delay the implementation of laws or regulations in force, the collection of fees and taxes prescribed by law, or the execution of judicial decisions or any order issued by any competent authority shall be punished. In addition, Article 183 states that any public official who does not carry out the duties of his/her post or does not implement the orders of his/her supervisor per the law also constitutes ground for punishment.

f. Score: 1

Article 6 of the Financial Declaration Law of 2006 defines illicit enrichment as all movable or immovable property, benefits, or beneficial rights acquired, for him/herself or others, by any public official by means of abuse of office or capacity. The Article specifies that if there is an inexplicably significant increase in assets owned by the official or his/her children that does not match the official's income, and if the official is unable to prove the legitimate source of this increase, this increase will be deemed the result of an abuse of office.

g. Score: 0

The Penal Code's articles on bribery refer *only* to "any state official or person seconded to perform a public service either through election or appointment and any other person assigned to perform an official function such as an arbitrator or an expert" in articles 170-173.¹⁴⁴

h. Score: 1

The offense is defined and banned in Article 422 of the Penal Code. Specifically, Article 422 names the act of receiving any property, item, or document to be kept, to perform a certain job, or includes an undertaking or release of debt, based on a trust and to be used and returned and denying receiving the item or replacing, consuming, or refusing to hand it over punishable by law.

i. Score: 1

The Anti Money Laundering Law (Law No. 46 of 2007) stipulates in Article 4 that any money obtained from the following crimes is considered to be related to money laundering: (1) any crime that is to be punished with a felony penalty according to Jordanian law, and (2) crimes specified by international agreements to which Jordan adheres that deem the proceeds of such crimes to be subject to money laundering regulations, provided that Jordanian law also punished such crimes. Article 3 of the law prohibits the laundering of proceeds resulting from any of the aforementioned crimes, regardless of whether these crimes are committed inside or outside Jordan, provided that the act is subject to penalty according to valid laws of the country within which the act was committed.¹⁴⁵

j. Score: 0.5

In the Anti Money Laundering Law, the act of concealment is mentioned in the definition of money laundering, which the law criminalizes. The money laundering definition put forth by the law is, "every conduct involving acquisition, possession, disposing of, moving. Managing, keeping, exchanging, depositing, investing of funds or manipulating its value or movement and transferring, or any action that leads to conceal or disguise its source, origin, nature, place, disposition means, ownership, or related rights, with knowledge that the funds are proceeded of one of the crimes stipulated in article 4 [detailed above] of this law." However, there is no standalone definition of concealment, and, although concealment is punishable according to the law, it is only punishable within the context of money laundering.¹⁴⁶

	<p>k. Score: 0.5</p> <p>Jordan addressed and criminalized obstruction of justice through violent means in its Penal Code, as specified in Article 25 of UNCAC. However, there are shortcomings in the Penal Code’s characterization of obstruction of justice definition. Article 208 of the Penal Code partially addressed UNACA’s Article 25a in stipulating that “whoever inflicted any form of violence and force, not allowable by law, in order to obtain a confession for committing a crime or information regarding such a crime [...] shall be punished by imprisonment [...].” However, this covers only the extraction of information, evidence, and confessions through violent means. It does not cover the “use of physical force, threats, or intimidation or the promise, offering, or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence [...].”</p> <p>UNACA’s Article 25b is also partially addressed in the Penal Code, specifically in Article 185. Article 185 states that “whoever attacks or violently resists a public official while executing the applicable laws or regulations or while collecting the fees and taxes stated in the law or while executing a judicial decision or order or any other order issued by a competent authority shall be punished [...].” However, this law only specifies violent resistance and does not specify threats or intimidation, as stipulated in UNACA’s Article 25b.¹⁴⁷</p>
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DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	9.2 =
Indicator question(s)	Please provide case statistics for each of those offences, including, if available, the number of trials in each of the past two years (ongoing and finalized), the number of convictions, the number of settlements, the number of acquittals and the number of cases currently pending.
Response	According to data provided by the Ministry of Justice, in 2016 and 2017, there were 42 total convictions within cases classified as bribery (12 total in 2016 and 30 total on 2017); 58 convictions within cases classified as embezzlement (20 total in 2016 and 38 total in 2017); for illicit enrichment, 0 cases; for money laundering, 12 cases received in 2016, 17 cases received in 2017, 11 cases closed in 2016, and 18 cases closed in 2017 in regulatory courts, resulting in 29 verdicts and 26 convictions (12 total convictions in 2016 and 14 total convictions in 2017); for concealment, 0 cases; and for obstruction of justice, 0 cases. ¹⁴⁸ These conviction statistics, along with the number of trails, settlements, acquittals, and pending cases, are vital to effectively measuring compliance with, and implementation of, anti-corruption frameworks. Such data should thus be monitored and compared on a yearly or bi-yearly basis.

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	9.3 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Anti-Corruption Agency</p> <p>a. To what extent is there formal operational independence of the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), and what evidence is there that, in practice, it can perform its work without external interference?</p> <p>b. To what extent does it have adequate resources and capacity to achieve its goals in practice?</p> <p>c. To what extent are there mechanisms in place to ensure the integrity of the ACA, and to what extent is its integrity ensured in practice?</p> <p>d. To what extent does the ACA engage in preventive, educational and investigation activities on corruption and alleged corruption cases?</p>
Response	<p>In practice, the JIACC, over the past three years, gained notable, society-wide recognition, brought on by recent political movements that condemned the spread of corruption in all its forms. Since its inception in 2006, the JIACC has undertaken a significant number of corruption cases, some of which were highly visible and issues of public opinion.¹⁴⁹</p> <p>However, the laws governing the JIACC should be reviewed to ensure that the JIACC is given the authority to investigate all types of corruption crimes stipulated in the UNCAC. In addition, relative to other institutions, the JIACC is allotted a smaller amount of resources, which are subject to debate by both the Parliament and the Cabinet.¹⁵⁰ In addition, while the JIACC's coordination with other national supervisory entities, such as the Companies Control Department and the Ministry of Labor, does exist, more streamlined mechanisms for communication and coordination should be created between the JIACC and institutions such as the Department of Financial Disclosure, Customs, the Audit Bureau, the AMLU, and the Attorney General.¹⁵¹ However, it should be noted that the JIACC has held several training workshops on concepts of integrity and corruption prevention for various government departments. Further, the 2017-2025 National Strategy listed as a goal the implementation of a monitoring project that would provide a platform for electronic information sharing between various government institutions and departments to detect and track corruption cases.¹⁵²</p> <p>Since the inception of its 2017-2025 strategy, the JIACC has made a number of significant strides in the area of public engagement and awareness raising. Awareness-raising materials, lectures, and seminars on integrity and corruption prevention have been prepared for youth in schools, youth centers, and universities, and training materials were created for educational supervisors, professors, and deans. Further, the JIACC is implementing a program that promotes raising awareness through the religious preaching of both Muslim and Christian leaders in Jordan. The JIACC should continue with these efforts to strengthen its public engagement and awareness-raising programming.¹⁵³</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	9.4 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Supreme Audit Institution</p> <p>a. To what extent is there formal operational independence of the audit institution, and what evidence is there that, in practice, it can perform its work without external interference?</p> <p>b. To what extent does it have adequate resources and capacity to achieve its goals in practice?</p> <p>c. To what extent are there mechanisms in place to ensure the integrity of the audit institution, and to what extent is its integrity ensured in practice?</p> <p>d. To what extent does the audit institution provide effective audits of public expenditure? Are its reports, findings, and recommendations available to the public?</p>

Response	<p>Like the JIACC, the Audit Bureau is regarded as one of the principal control agencies in the country, given its mandate to monitor all public institutions, departments, municipalizes, and companies in which the government holds more than a 50% share. The Bureau has gained much credibility within recent years and has secured the confidence of both the government and the general public.¹⁵⁴</p> <p>However, fast-paced development and expansion of roles within the various ministries necessitate the adoption of a strategy that allows the Bureau to keep up with such changes. This strategy must consider areas such as retaining full control over revenue and expenditure monitoring, retaining control over pre and post audit procedures, and developing both internal and external controls to ensure such regulation. Modern control mechanisms and international standards, such as the International Accounting Standards, should also be adopted to control public spending. In addition, the Bureau lacks legislation that, first, secures its full independence in employing its powers, second, enables its staff to develop penalties for non-complaint institutions, and third, grants its staff with powers of judicial policing.¹⁵⁵ Further, while the Bureau produces a comprehensive report annually that is submitted to the House of Representatives and is usually uploaded onto the Bureau's website for the public to view, some years' reports cannot be found on the website and public awareness-raising measures about the content of the reports should be introduced as a component of report dissemination.¹⁵⁶</p>
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DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	9.5 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Judiciary</p> <p>a. To what extent is the judiciary independent by law, and to what extent does it operate without interference from the government or other actors?</p> <p>b. To what extent are there laws seeking to ensure appropriate tenure policies, salaries and working conditions of the judiciary, and does it have adequate levels of financial resources, staffing, and infrastructure to operate effectively in practice?</p> <p>c. To what extent does the public have access to judicial information and activities in practice?</p> <p>d. To what extent is the integrity of members of the judiciary ensured in practice? To what extent is the judiciary committed to fighting corruption through prosecution and other activities?</p>
Response	<p>The judiciary remains highly autonomous, as the legal framework, overall, provides regulations and rules to ensure the integrity and impartiality of judicial decisions. Further, the 2011 formation of the Constitutional Court has expanded the judiciary's means of monitoring the executive branch. Corruption cases are heard just like any other case and require by law the same investigation, pursuit, and evidence gathering processes. In terms of resources, within the past ten years, the judiciary's budget has expanded tremendously, thus ensuring adequate financial resources to carry out its duties. This budget expansion has, in large part, been reflected in the salaries, benefits, and working conditions of judges.¹⁵⁷ Public Prosecutors also exist under the Ministry of Justice and thus function under the laws and instructions of the judicial authority and its code of conduct. Further, public Prosecutors are held accountable by the Judicial Inspection Department within the Ministry of Justice, which carries out investigations on allegations of corruption or misuse of office.¹⁵⁸</p> <p>However, more must be done to implement fair trial safeguards and avoid administrative duplications with law enforcement agencies. Further, there is no legal provision necessitating that the judiciary circulates its reports and decisions for public access. However, the Judicial Council is required to prepare an annual report, which includes information on the activities, resolutions, strategies, achievements, and actions taken by the Council to further develop the work of the judicial authority. These reports are available online for the public to download or read.¹⁵⁹</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	9.6 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Law Enforcement Agencies</p> <p>a. To what extent are law enforcement agencies independent by law, and to what extent are they independent in practice?</p> <p>b. To what extent do law enforcement agencies have adequate levels of financial resources, staffing, and infrastructure to operate effectively in practice?</p> <p>c. To what extent do law enforcement agencies have to report and be answerable for their actions in practice? To what extent is the integrity of members of law enforcement agencies ensured?</p> <p>d. To what extent do law enforcement agencies detect and investigate corruption cases in the country?</p>
Response	<p>Law enforcement agencies execute State directives only, thus removing, both by law and in practice, from any partisan bias. Further, all employees of law enforcement agencies are forbidden by law from practicing partisan activities or being involved in political parties. However, law enforcement agencies do not practice full independence, when it comes to protecting and supporting State and regime interests, particularly during times of protest.¹⁶⁰</p> <p>Law enforcement agencies have at their disposal the funding and human resources required to carry out their activities and develop their infrastructure. However, it is vital to ensure that the financial and administrative resources allotted to these agencies keep pace with the growing need for security, given the surrounding civil wars and the sudden population influx due to refugee intake.¹⁶¹</p> <p>According to the NIS report, the endeavors of law enforcement agencies to fight corruption within the past few years have been met with great success. However, these agencies need to instate more diverse mechanisms to strengthen transparency and accountability in their practices, adding to the already-established Transparency and Human Rights Bureau.¹⁶²</p>

10. Private Sector Corruption

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	10.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is it a criminal offence under the country's laws to bribe a foreign public official?</p> <p>Score:</p> <p>1: The offence is clearly defined and banned</p> <p>0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition</p> <p>0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>The act of bribing a foreign public official is not adequately defined within relevant legislation.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	10.2 =
Indicator question(s)	Does the country's legal framework prohibit collusion? Scoring: 1: The law prohibits hard core cartels and collusion 0.5: The law prohibits hard core cartels, but not all major forms of collusion are banned 0: The law does not prohibit hard core cartels or most forms of collusion -: Not applicable or no data available
Response	Score: 1 The Competition Law (Law No. 33 of 2004) outlaws "collusion in tenders or bids, whether in overbidding or underbidding, but it shall not be considered collusive to submit joint offers in which the parties announce such joint offer ab initio, and without the goal of such joint bidding being to prevent competition on any way" (Article 5). In addition, Article 5 prohibits the fixing of process of products, services, or conditions of sale; the fixing of quantities of production or service provision; sharing the market on the basis of geographical regions, quantities of sales, purchases, customers, or any other basis that negatively affects completion; and setting barriers to entry of enterprises into the market or eliminating them from the market. This Article's stated purpose is to prohibit all "practices, alliances, and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit, or prevent competition." Although the law does not employ the term 'hard core cartel,' it does prohibit all major hard-core cartel and collusion activities. ¹⁶³

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	10.4 =
Indicator question(s)	Are anti-collusion provisions effectively enforced?
Response	As stipulated by the Competition Law, the body dedicated to investigating collusive practices is The Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Article 12), and the Minister of Industry and Trade is charged with taking all measures necessary to guarantee the execution of court decisions regarding penalties against violators of this law (Article 18). ¹⁶⁴ Relevant legislation provides the Competition Directorate with adequate independence to carry out its work. First, it is required of all enterprises wishing to carry out economic concentration operations to submit a petition to the Directorate with ample information regarding the enterprises concerned, and the Directorate reserves the right to request from the parties concerned all additional information or documents deemed necessary. Further, the Directorate is given the power to contribute to setting competition plans and legislation, enter commercial shops, offices, and stores during working hours to conduct inspections or searches, seize and review any relevant documents, records, or files, conduct all necessary investigations, and listen to the testimony of any person suspected of violation competition laws. ¹⁶⁵ Further, according to the Directorate's latest published reports, its investigations and studies have increased from 7 in 2004 to 18 in 2013, 13 in 2014, and 11 in 2015. ¹⁶⁶ In addition, the judiciary appoints judges and prosecutors tasked with trying suits related to anticompetitive practices specifically. The Ministry of Industry and Trade also held training courses and arranged external visits for these judges and prosecutors to learn about regional and international experiences and best practices in competition law, highlighting the importance of this area of law and the Ministry's willingness to dedicate the resources needed to the dedicated authorities. ¹⁶⁷

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	10.5 =
Indicator question(s)	Are there specific rules or practices related to the transparency of corporations that result in high corruption risks?
Response	<p>Jordan attempts to mitigate private sector corruption risks by enforcing certain rules regarding transparency. Companies that are required to appoint an external auditor are: public shareholding companies, private shareholding companies, and private limited companies both for profit and not for profit. The Companies Law also requires that general partnerships and limited partnerships with a capital of over 100,000 JD appoint an external auditor. Further, private shareholding companies and limited liability companies are required to submit financial records to relevant authorities annually, public shareholding companies are required to submit every six months, and general and limited partnerships are required to submit annually if their capital exceeds 100,000 JD. If companies do not follow through on these required submissions, they are given a notification of breach and, following a warning period, are prosecuted. According to the Companies Control Department, authorities are strict in following up on these submissions and in tracking company history of breaches.¹⁶⁸</p> <p>However, there remains some room for improvement in making financial information available to the general public for viewing. According to the Companies Control Department, only public shareholding companies and foreign companies operating in Jordan are required by law to publish their financial information in the newspaper. It is also not required, but rather suggested, that these companies also publish this financial information on their websites for public viewing.¹⁶⁹</p>

11. Lobbying Transparency =

Score: 0

There are no official laws or policies on lobbying transparency to date. Lobbyists, lobbying targets, and lobbying activities are not defined, and no mandatory lobbying register exists.

12. Party and Campaign Finance Transparency

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	12.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there a legal framework regulating the financing of political parties and the finances of candidates running for elected office?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: There is a legal framework regulating the financing of political parties and the finances of candidates running for elected office</p> <p>0.5: There is a legal framework regulating the financing of political parties and the finances of candidates running for elected office but some actors or candidates are not subject to this regulation</p> <p>0: there is no such framework</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>

Score: 0.5

When considering legislation regulating parties and elections, it is important to note the new election law of 2016, which was instated with the intention of strengthening political parties and preventing votes for candidates solely according to tribal or familial affiliations. In particular, all running candidates must join a list and all parties must submit their respective lists of candidates to each district within the country. Each Jordanian voter must then vote for one of these lists, which will include several candidates from his or her district, and choose individual candidates from his or her chosen list.¹⁷⁰ However, despite this new law, both political parties and individual candidates remain important entities in Jordanian electoral politics. For this reason, the following responses will consider the legislative frameworks pertinent to both parties and candidates, in turn.

The Law on Political Parties (Law No. 39 of 2015) is the latest law addressing the financing of political parties. Article 25 requires that all party donations be identified, announced, specific, and from Jordanian sources, and may include donations from specified natural and corporate Jordanian persons. The same article goes on to prohibit a party's acceptance of cash, funding, grants, or in-kind donations from anonymous sources and foreign states or entities.¹⁷¹

According to Article 20, a party cannot offer cash, grants, or in-kind donations to any of its members. However, the law stipulates that a party may invest its funds in: party periodicals and other printed literature, the ownership of media outlets in compliance with relevant legislation, the ownership of real estate for its branches and headquarters, the holding of ceremonies and events, and treasury bonds in compliance with relevant legislation (Article 26). In general, Article 26 limits the party expenditure to the lawful aims and purposes set forth in its bylaws.¹⁷²

The government contribution bylaw was drafted and approved in 2016 to directly authorize and restrict certain government contributions and incentives offered to political parties. This bylaw kept the government contribution amount to political parties at JD 50,000 per year, the amount originally stipulated Law No. 62 of 2013, given that one year has passed since party establishment. This direct contribution to parties from the public treasury may be increased to 50,000 JD if the party's candidates run in at least 35% of the constituencies and had been party members for at least one year prior to Lower House elections. During election years, the government can grant parties with an additional 20,000 JD for campaign expenses, and an additional 5,000 JD is given to parties that form coalitions.¹⁷³ According to government officials, the goal of this bylaw is to assist parties that have clearly-defined platforms reach Parliament.¹⁷⁴ In addition, while the Law on Political Parties does not provide parties tax relief on donations or loans, rent of State owned premises at subsidized rates, or exemption of party supplies from customs duties, the law does provide exemption from all government taxes and fees on immovable properties and allows parties to use public cultural and social facilities for events (Articles 27 and 24, respectively). While all political parties are subject to the above regulations, the lower score reflects other shortfalls in the legislation, particularly that law does not specify limits on contributions or which types of in-kind contributions are permitted.¹⁷⁵

Response

As for candidates, official instructions, in accordance with the Independent Election Commission Law of 2012, were issued in 2016 to act as the authoritative document on candidate finance regulations.¹⁷⁶ The instructions forbid candidates and lists to accept any financial or material contributions from foreign governments, international organizations, foreign companies, and foreign citizens (Article 13). The instructions also forbid candidates and lists to accept any monetary or material contributions from funds that the candidate or list knows have been obtained through illicit activity such as stolen funds, contributions from outlawed establishments, and donations from wanted individuals (Article 13).¹⁷⁷

Article 14 goes on to establish maximum ceilings for expenditure on campaigns, based upon constituency sizes, voter numbers, and standards of living. Specifically, the expenditure ceiling for Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa is 5 JD per voter, multiplied by the number of voters within the constituency. The expenditure ceiling for the remainder of the governorates is 3 JD per person, multiplied by the number of voters in the constituency.¹⁷⁸

These instructions go further to set specific starting and ending dates for campaigns and regulate where campaign events may be held. According to Article 3, a candidate's campaign begins on the date the candidate announces his/her candidacy and ends 24 hours before Election Day, and candidates may not conduct campaigns in ministries, government directorates, public institutions, educational institutions, and places of worship (Article 7).¹⁷⁹

Similar to the Law on Political Parties, these instructions do not specify limits on contributions or what types of in-kind contributions are allowed. Neither does it include any stipulations on whether tax relief is allowed on donations or loans. Another shortfall present in both party-centered and candidate-centered regulations is the lack of specification that the financial disclosures submitted to the Committee of Party Affairs and the IEC must be published for public viewing.¹⁸⁰

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	12.2 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are political parties and individual candidates running for elected office required to disclose financial statements for their campaigns detailing itemized income and expenditure, as well as individual donors to their campaign finances?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release itemized income and expenditure reports on their campaigns and to disclose donors who contributed to a party's or candidate's electoral campaign, with the threshold of disclosure at 1,000 Euro/USD or less 0.5: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release income reports of political campaigns to the public and to disclose major donors who contributed to a campaign, with a threshold between 1,001 and 5,000 Euro/USD 0.25: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release income reports of political campaigns to the public and to disclose big donors of an electoral campaign, with the threshold being between 5,001 and 20,000 Euro/USD 0: Parties and candidates are not required to release financial information, or the reporting does not require the disclosure of donors who contributed more than 20,001 Euro/USD to a campaign -: Not applicable or no data available</p>

<p>Response</p>	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Regarding parties, Article 8 of the Law on Political Parties requires that every party create a bylaw requiring the identification of their party's financial resources, as well as provisions detailing the mechanisms the party will use to organize its financial affairs, plan its annual budget, carry out bookkeeping procedures that record how funds are spent, distribute disbursements, and produce final accounts statements for the preceding year. In addition, Article 22 states that a party must keep detailed records of all its revenues and expenditures, and Article 29 requires every party to appoint a certified accountant to audit its yearly finances and account statements. The article also requires parties to submit to the Committee of Party Affairs, on an annual basis within three months of the end of the fiscal year, its annual budget and financial statements of the preceding year, along with a statement signed by the party's secretary general that includes a breakdown of the party's financial resources. According to Article 29, the Committee's Chairperson or an official delegated by the Chairperson, who must be either a certified accountant or Audit Bureau representative, has the right to review the accounts and finances of a party, audit its financial records, and submit a report to the Committee and the party's secretary general.¹⁸¹</p> <p>Regarding candidates, in order to regulate campaign finances, electoral candidate lists are required to open a special account through which all campaign spending is transacted. In addition, electoral lists must appoint a certified accountant to audit the list's account and submit a report on resources and expenditure to the Commission upon request (Article 15, Independent Election Commission Instructions). List commissioners or any of their candidates must also declare their sources of campaign funding and their channels of expenditure (Article 14). However, unlike the regulations governing party finances, these instructions do not specify that these reports must be submitted on a yearly basis.¹⁸²</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
<p>Indicator number</p>	<p>12.3 =</p>
<p>Indicator question(s)</p>	<p>Are political parties and, if applicable, individual candidates running for elected office required to disclose annual accounts with itemized income and expenditure and individual donors?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release itemized income and expenditure reports on their annual accounts and disclose donors who contributed to a party's or candidate's annual finances, with the threshold of disclosure at 1,000 Euro/USD or less 0.5: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release annual Income reports to the public and to disclose major donors, with a threshold between 1,001 and 5,000 Euro/USD in contributions over one year 0.25: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release annual income reports to the public and to disclose big donors, with the threshold being between 5,001 and 20,000 Euro/USD in contributions over one year 0: Parties and candidates are not required to release annual financial information, or the reporting does not require the disclosure of donors who contributed more than 20,001 Euro/USD over one year -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
<p>Response</p>	<p>Score: 0.25</p> <p>Candidate lists, as well as parties, are required to appoint a certified accountant to audit the party's or list's accounts and submit to the Committee or the Commission, respectively, a report on resources and expenditure. The Law on Political Parties stipulates that this submission must be on a yearly basis, but the IEC Executive Instructions on Guidelines for Electoral Campaigns Publicity (No. 7 for year 2016) does not specify that submissions must be on a yearly basis.¹⁸³ Neither the law nor the instructions name an exact threshold for contributions to be disclosed. In addition, no specific formats for resource declaration are included in the law and the instructions. However, both the law on parties and the instructions on candidates clearly state that parties and candidates must declare all sources of campaign funding to the relevant authority.¹⁸⁴</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	12.4 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are parties' (and, if applicable, candidates') electoral campaign expenditures subject to independent scrutiny?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The campaign finances of parties and/or candidates for elected office are subject to independent verification, and the legal framework provides the oversight body with sufficient independence, powers and resources to scrutinize the statements and accounts in an effective manner 0.5: The campaign finances of parties and/or candidates for elected office are subject to verification, but available the legal framework fails to guarantee the political independence of the oversight body and/or does not provide the oversight body with sufficient powers and resources to effectively scrutinize the statements and accounts in an effective manner 0: Parties and/or candidates are not required to release financial information on their electoral campaigns, or the law does provide for a control mechanism -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>While regulations ensure political independence for the IEC in practice, no equivalent regulations exist, as of yet, for the Committee of Party Affairs. In particular, the IEC is, by law, financially and administratively autonomous to practice its assigned duties (IEC Law No. 11 of 2012 and Amended with Law No. 46 of 2015, Article 3). In addition, the Commission is given the power to request, at any time, a detailed report on any candidate's or list's resources and expenditures, prepared by the list's or the candidate's appointed and accredited auditor. The law states that the commissioners of the IEC are subject to the illicit enrichment law and audit bureau control (Article 25) and must assume their posts as full-time positions a must not hold any other positions in the public or private sectors, in order to eliminate potential conflicts of interest (Article 9).¹⁸⁵</p> <p>The regulations stipulated on commissioner selections add an additional layer of assurance in IEC political autonomy. The commission members are selected by a committee that includes the Chairman of the House of Representatives, the Head of the Judicial Council, and the Chairman of the House of Senates and is presided by the Prime Minister. These commissioners, among other requirements, must be Jordanian citizens for a period of ten years or more and must not be members of the Senate. Commissioners are also barred from running in any election supervised by the Commission and from participating, either directly or indirectly, in the election campaign of any candidate (Article 17).¹⁸⁶</p> <p>To date, no information has been published indicating that any IEC Commissioners or staff members have committed any acts that might affect the IEC's autonomy. In order to ensure that this does not change, an internal control unit within the IEC is tasked with investigating any suspicions of activity that might negatively affect the IEC's autonomy.</p> <p>The Committee of Party Affairs, for its part, is a semi-governmental committee includes the secretary-generals of the office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Culture, a civil society representative, and a representative from the National Center for Human Rights (Article 9, Law No. 39 of 2015). While the Committee's Chairperson and his or her delegate – a certified accountant or representative of the Audit Bureau – are also given the authority to review the accounts and financial records of a party at any time, the legislative framework ensuring the political autonomy of the Committee is much less robust than that ensuring the autonomy of the IEC. Indeed, semi-governmental nature of the committee necessitates that the majority of its members hold political office during their tenure on the committee.¹⁸⁷</p> <p>According to the Ministry of Justice, no cases of campaign financing violations, neither by political parties nor by candidates and candidate lists, had been reported over the past two years.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	12.5 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are the annual accounts of political parties (and, if applicable, of candidates) subject to independent scrutiny?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: Annual financial statements of parties and/or candidates are subject to independent verification, the legal framework provides the oversight body with sufficient independence, powers and resources to scrutinize the statements and accounts in an effective manner</p> <p>0.5: Annual financial statements of parties and/or candidates for elected office are subject to verification, but available the legal framework fails to guarantee the political independence of the oversight body and/or does not provide the oversight body with sufficient powers and resources to effectively scrutinize the statements and accounts in an effective manner</p> <p>0: Parties and/or candidates are not required to release annual financial statements, or the law does provide for a control mechanism</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>Please see response 12.4.</p>

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	12.6 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the score in the Money Politics and Transparency assessment produced by Global Integrity?
Response	No data available.

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	12.7 =
Indicator question(s)	Have political parties and/or candidates been sanctioned for violating political finance rules or non-compliance with disclosure requirements in the past two years, according to publicly available evidence?
Response	According to the Ministry of Justice, in 2016, there was one conviction for the acceptance of donations or funding from Jordanian persons without disclosing and recording, and one conviction for terrorist financing. In 2017, there were 3 convictions for the acceptance of donations or funding from Jordanian persons without disclosing and recording, one case in which the individual(s) in question were declared innocent, and one conviction for terrorist financing. Currently, there is one ongoing case for the acceptance of donations or funding from Jordanian persons without disclosing and recording.

13. Transparency and Integrity in Public Administration

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there a law, regulation or Code of Conduct in place, covering public officials, employees and representatives of the national government, that adequately addresses the following issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. integrity, fairness, and impartiality; b. gifts, benefits, and hospitality; and c. conflicts of interest? <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: A law, regulation or Code of Conduct is in place and addresses the aspects mentioned above</p> <p>0.5: A law, regulation or Code of Conduct is in place but only addresses two of the aspects mentioned above</p> <p>0.25: A law, regulation or Code of Conduct is in place but only addresses one of the aspects mentioned above</p> <p>0: No law, regulation or Code of Conduct is in place or an existing law, regulation or Code fails to address any of those aspects</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The Jordanian Code of Conduct in the Public Sector adequately addresses the topics of integrity, fairness, and impartiality (Articles 3, 5, 9); gifts, benefits, and hospitality (Article 8); and conflicts of interest (Article 9).¹⁸⁸</p> <p>More specifically, Article 3 states that the Code of Conduct shall apply to all civil service staff, along with all staff of other independent government institutions and departments, and that all individuals subject to this code shall practice the principles of justice, equal opportunity, transparency, accountability, professionalism, integrity, and neutrality that the code is founded upon. Article 3 also states that any violation requires accountability and disciplinary actions in accordance with the rules of the code. Article 5 goes further to specify that employees should “work to serve the goals and objectives [needed to achieve] the public interest only.” Article 8 stipulates that an employee should not “accept or request any gift or hospitality or any other benefits of any kind, whether directly or through a medium, [that] may have a direct or indirect impact on objectivity in the implementation of [his/her job] functions, or would affect [his/her] decisions, or has compelled him to commit something for acceptance.” Article 9 requires that employees “refrain from any activity that would lead to the emergence of a real or apparent conflict or a potential reconciliation between personal interests on one hand and [their] functional responsibilities and tasks on the other,” as well as “refrain from any activity [that] is not commensurate with the objective and impartial performance of his duties, or can lead to preferential treatment for the natural or legal persons in their dealings with the government, or harms the reputation of his department, or [puts] its relationship with the public at risk.”¹⁸⁹</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.2 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there a law or clear policy in place to address the 'revolving door' – the movement of individuals between public office and private sector, while working on the same sector or issue, which may result in conflicts of interest and in former public officials misusing the information and power they hold to benefit private interests?</p> <p>Scoring 1: There is a law or clear policy addressing the 'revolving door' 0: There is no law or policy addressing the 'revolving door' -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Within this code, the topic of the 'revolving door' is addressed and measures are put forth to prevent any conflicts of interest that may arise. Specifically, Article 9 of the Code of Conduct states that an employee cannot accept a post, within one year following his or her employment in the public sector, with any institution that has had official dealings with his former office, unless he or she obtains the written approval of the relevant minister. The article also does not allow the former public employee to provide advice to clients of these institutions, based upon information gained from his or her former public post regarding programs and policies of the department with which he or she was working, if this information is not already available to the public. There is also a provision that requires all public employees to immediately inform his or her direct supervisor in writing if any conflicts of interest arise: in any employee's dealings with the government, between any employee's private interest and public interest, in any instance of subjection to official pressure that is incompatible with the employee's duties, or in any instance that raises doubts about the employee's objectivity in his or her position. In addition, the Code instructs public employees to avoid establishing close relationships with individuals and institutions that heavily rely on the decisions of the department for which he/she works. This policy on movement between public office and the private sector is addressed in an article on conflict of interest (Article 9), which applies to "all staff subject to civil service and the staff of independent institutions and departments."</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.3 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law or policy that addresses the 'revolving door' cover all relevant public-sector decision-makers?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The law or policy in principle provides comprehensive coverage of relevant public-sector decision-makers 0.5: The law or policy addressing the 'revolving door' covers most relevant public-sector decision-makers but fails to include some relevant positions 0.25: The law or policy addressing the 'revolving door' only applies to some relevant decision-makers and fails to include many relevant decision-making posts. 0: No law or policy exists or an existing law or policy does not specify which positions are covered -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Please see response 13.2.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.4 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there a mandatory cooling-off period – a minimum time interval restricting former officials from accepting employment in the private sector that relates to their former position – for members of the government and other relevant high-level decision-makers?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The policy contains a minimum cooling-off period of at least 2 years for certain positions and cases where the new employment of former government members and other high-level decision-makers would result in a conflict of interest 0.5: The policy contains a minimum cooling-off period of at least 6 months for certain positions and cases where the new employment of former government members and other high-level decision-makers would result in a conflict of interest 0: There are no or shorter minimum post-employment restrictions -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>Please see response 13.2.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.5 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there a single public body or are there designated authorities responsible for providing advice and overseeing 'revolving door' regulations?</p> <p>Scoring 1: There is a single body, or there are various designated authorities charged with providing advice and overseeing the implementation of the policy 0: No authority or public body is charged with overseeing the implementation of the policy -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Ministers and secretaries-general are responsible for overseeing and ensuring the application of the Code of Conduct in its entirety, including Article 9. In addition, ministers must give written approval for an employee to change posts, within one year of their public post, to an institution that works closely with their former office.¹⁹⁰</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.6 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are there proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for both individuals and companies that do not comply with the law or policy controlling the 'revolving door'?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Sanctions in the law (or policy) can be considered proportionate and dissuasive 0.5: There are sanctions in the law (or policy) but they are not considered to be proportionate and dissuasive 0: The law (or policy) includes no sanctions -: Not applicable or no data available</p>

Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>The code does not specify sanctions for individuals and companies that do not comply with the policies regulating the 'revolving door' specifically. However, the code does state that any violation of any provision, thus including the 'revolving door,' "requires accountability and to take disciplinary action and penalties in accordance with the rules of this system."¹⁹¹</p> <p>Because unchecked 'revolving doors' often form relationships that may lead to conflict of interest, the non-disclosure of such relationships may amount to a violation of the Anti-Corruption Commission Law's Article 5, which deems as corruption the "undeclaring or undisclosed of investments or properties or benefits that may lead to conflict of interest if laws and regulations require that, of which personal benefits can be directly or indirectly gained from him who refrained from declaring" and "the abuse of authority contrary to the provisions of the law."¹⁹² The penalties for such acts of corruption are imprisonment for not less than four months, a fine not less than five hundred Dinars and not exceeding five thousand Dinars, or both (Article 22).¹⁹³</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.8 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the legal framework require high-level public officials and senior civil servants to regularly (at least once per year) declare their interests, including any paid or unpaid positions and financial interests in companies and other entities?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The legal framework requires high-level public officials and senior civil servants to declare their interests at least once per year. 0.25: The legal framework requires high-level public officials and senior civil servants to declare their interests but either does not require this on at least an annual basis or does not specify how regularly declarations are required 0: High-level public officials and senior civil servants are not required to declare their interests -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>In enumerating the policies for declaration of interest, the Financial Declaration Law No. 54 of 2006 defines any money, moveable or immovable, as a benefit or a right of interest. Article 5 states that those subject to the law must submit a declaration of financial assets and liabilities of themselves, their spouses, and their minor children within three months of receiving declaration forms, and periodically during the month of January, after two years have passed from the time of the previous submission. As stipulated by the 2014 Illicit Enrichment Law, officials of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as other civil service employees, must comply with financial disclosure requirements enumerated in Law No. 54 f 2006.¹⁹⁴ The 2014 Illicit Enrichment law established the Financial Disclosure Department within the Ministry of Justice to manage financial disclosures. The Department is headed by a Court of Cassation judge, who is chosen by the Judicial Council, and is staffed with a sufficient amount of employees necessary to run the Department, as stated by the law.¹⁹⁵</p> <p>In the event that an official, subject to 2006 and 2014 laws, does not comply with the enumerated asset disclosure requirements, Articles 11 and 12 of the 2006 laws details a number of dissuasive and proportionate penalties based upon the offense. While the Financial Declaration Law and the Illicit Enrichment Law adequately detail the requirements and processes for income and asset disclosure, as well as the penalties for non-compliance, no equivalent legislation details interest disclosure processes. In addressing interest disclosure, the Code of Conduct only requires that the employee submit in writing any potential conflicts of interest to his or her supervisor immediately, when they happen.¹⁹⁶</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.9 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Do the interest disclosure requirements cover officials of all branches of government – executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and civil service as well as other relevant public bodies?</p> <p>Scoring 1: the interest disclosure applies to high-level officials from the executive, legislature, judiciary and civil service/other public bodies 0.75: the interest disclosure applies to three of these sectors 0.5: the interest disclosure applies to two branches of government 0.25: the interest disclosure applies to one branch of government 0: there is no interest disclosure requirement -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The interest disclosure mechanisms stipulated in the Code of Conduct apply to any and all public servants.¹⁹⁷</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.10 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the legal framework require high-level public officials and senior civil servants to regularly (at least once per year) declare their income and assets?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The legal framework requires high-level public officials and senior civil servants to declare their income and assets at least once per year. 0.25: The legal framework requires high-level public officials and senior civil servants to declare their income and assets but either does not require this on at least an annual basis or does not specify how regularly declarations are required 0: High-level public officials and senior civil servants are not required to declare their income and assets -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>Please see response 13.8.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.11 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Do the income and asset disclosure requirements cover officials of all branches of government –executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and civil service as well as other relevant public bodies?</p> <p>Scoring 1: the asset and income disclosure apply to high-level officials from the executive, legislature, judiciary and civil service/other public bodies 0.75: the asset and income disclosure applies to three of these sectors 0.5: the asset and income disclosure applies to two branches of government 0.25: the asset and income disclosure applies to one branch of government 0: there is no asset and income disclosure requirement -: Not applicable or no data available</p>

Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Article 3 of the Illicit Enrichment Law specifies the officials that must comply with financial disclosure policies, stating that "the provisions of this law shall apply as of the date of the financial disclosure law No. 54 of come into force to whoever occupied or occupies any of the following posts: a- Prime Minister and ministers, b- chairman and members of the Senate, c- chairman and members of the House of Representatives, d- chairman and members of the Constitutional Court, e- judges, f- governor and deputy governor of the Central Bank, g- Chief of Royal Court, secretary general and minister of royal court, consultants of the King and consultants in the royal court, h- heads of independent agencies, authorities and members of their councils, i- heads and members of the council of commissioners, if any, j- rectors of public universities, k- ambassadors and senior staff and similar capacity and/or salary in government departments, of financial institutions and public institutions, l- Mayor of GAM and members of city council and heads of municipal councils and members of the first and second class municipalities in accordance with Municipalities Act, m- Chairmen of public central tender committees and civil private tenders, ministry and security committees, tenders and procurement committees in the government departments, public institutions, municipalities and their members, n- the representatives of the government, social security in boards of directors of the companies where the government and social security contribute to, o- chairmen and members of boards of directors or any director general of companies wholly owned by the government or social security or of financial institutions or public institutions, p- presidents and members of sports, labor, charities and cooperative councils and heads of parties and secretaries-general.¹⁹⁸</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.12 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the framework require that information contained in interest declarations and income and asset disclosures be made publicly accessible?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: All or most information contained in interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms has to be made available to the public (some redaction may be necessary to protect legitimate privacy interests)</p> <p>0.75: Information contained in both interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms has to be made available to the public, but there are significant omissions for either interest declarations or income and asset disclosure forms</p> <p>0.5: Information from interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms has to be publicly accessible, but there are significant omissions for both interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms</p> <p>0.25: Only limited information from either interest declarations or income and asset disclosure forms has to be made publicly accessible</p> <p>0: No information contained in interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms has to be made publicly accessible</p> <p>- : Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>There is no requirement that information contained in interest and asset declarations must be made accessible to the public.¹⁹⁹</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.13 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the legal framework establish an oversight body that is provided with sufficient political independence and legal powers to scrutinise income and asset disclosures?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The legal framework provides for an independent oversight mechanism with sufficient independence and powers to scrutinise income and asset declarations 0.75: The legal framework provides for oversight of the income and asset declarations, but only provides the body or bodies with either sufficient independence or with adequate powers to scrutinise the submissions 0.25: The legal framework provides for oversight of the income and asset declarations, but provides the body or bodies neither with sufficient independence nor with adequate powers to scrutinise the submissions 0: The legal framework does not provide for any oversight of the income and asset declarations - : Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The 2014 Illicit Enrichment law established the Financial Disclosure Department within the Ministry of Justice to manage financial disclosures. The Department is headed by a Court of Cassation judge, who is chosen by the Judicial Council, and is staffed with a "sufficient number of employees necessary to run this Department."²⁰⁰</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	13.14 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law or policy contain dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for failure to comply with interest and income and asset disclosure requirements?</p> <p>Scoring 1: The law or policy contains dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for non-filing of disclosures, or for incomplete or false claims made in disclosures, covering both interests and income and assets 0.75: The law or policy contains sanctions for non-filing of disclosures, or for incomplete or false claims made in both interests and income and assets disclosures, but these sanctions are only dissuasive and proportionate in either the area of interest declarations or income and asset disclosures 0.5: The law or policy contains sanctions covering interest and/or income and asset disclosures, but in neither area are such sanctions dissuasive and proportionate 0.25: The law or policy contains sanctions covering interest and/or income and asset disclosures but they only cover some types of non-compliance (such as false or incomplete claims) while failing to address other forms of non-compliance (such as the non-submission of declarations) 0: The law or policy contains no sanctions for non-submission of interest and income and asset declarations, or for incomplete or false claims made in disclosures - : Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The law or policy contains dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for non-filing of disclosures, or for incomplete or false claims made in disclosures, covering both interests and assets. The 2014 Illicit Enrichment Law specifies a year imprisonment or 1000 JoD in fine (or both) for not providing the disclosure and 3 months of imprisonment for submitting inaccurate information.²⁰¹</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	13.15 =
Indicator question(s)	Have there been cases in the past two years of sanctions being imposed on elected or high-level public officials or senior civil servants for failing to file declarations of their interest declaration or their assets and income declaration, or for intentionally providing false or incomplete information in their disclosure, according to publicly available evidence?
Response	Data specifically on cases of sanction imposition on officials for failing to file declarations of interests, assets and income is largely unavailable publicly. According to the Ministry of Justice, investigation committees are formed within the individual institutions concerned. ²⁰²

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	13.16 =
Indicator question(s)	How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the disclosure mechanism for interests, assets and income? Is there a disclosure requirement for gifts and hospitality received by public officials and civil servants (if applicable)? Have there been any developments in the past two years that indicate an improvement or a deterioration of the disclosure mechanism?
Response	<p>Disclosure mechanisms for assets and income are fairly comprehensive. In fact, the Code of Conduct goes as far as instating mechanisms for gift and hospitality acceptance. Article 8 requires that all employees of public institutions refuse to accept any gift, hospitality, or any other benefit that may have a direct or indirect impact on his or her objectivity within his or her post. However, when the employee cannot be refused gifts, hospitality, or any other benefit, given that this gift, hospitality, or benefit is not deemed impactful on the employee's objectivity or when it is decided that the acceptance of certain types of hospitality would be to the benefit of the institution, the employee must inform his direct supervisor, and the supervisor must instruct the employee in writing whether to accept or reject the gift, hospitality, or benefit. If the gift is deemed acceptable, the supervisor must notify the employee whether the gift will be retained by the institution, donated to charity, disposed of, or retained by the employee. The Code also stipulates that public institutions should instate a register of accepted gifts and how they were handled.²⁰³</p> <p>However, in addressing interest disclosure, the Code of Conduct only requires that the employee submit in writing any potential conflicts of interest to his or her supervisor immediately, when they happen.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, the Financial Declaration Law and the Illicit Enrichment Law only detail the disclosure mechanisms for assets and income. Thus, disclosure mechanisms established to monitor assets and income are much more robust than those established to monitor interests.²⁰⁵</p> <p>According to the JIACC, one goal set forth by the 2017-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy is to increase electronic connectivity and information exchange between the Commission and other monitoring partners. Under this goal, the Commission established a monitoring project to compile information, specifically on the assets of the accused, their spouses, and their minor children, from relevant government institutions and departments that can be used in detecting corruption cases.²⁰⁶</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	13.17 =
Indicator question(s)	Does publicly available evidence suggest that sufficient resources are allocated to the implementation of an ethics infrastructure? Have there been other noteworthy changes to public sector ethics framework, based on publicly available evidence?
Response	<p>The JIACC, within which the Directorate of the Ombudsman is also integrated, is allotted a smaller amount of resources relative to other government institutions, as its resource allotments are subject to debate by both the Parliament and the Cabinet.²⁰⁷ On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice, under which the Financial Disclosure Department exists, is highly autonomous both in terms of its legislative framework and its resource allotment.²⁰⁸</p> <p>According to the JIACC's report of achievements on the 2017-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy, the Commission implemented several training workshops for government officials, over 21 lectures on integrity and corruption prevention in various ministries and departments, and 7 meetings with various government departments and institutions since the inception of the 2017 Strategy. Further, it has provided materials and training courses on integrity and anti-corruption standards to the Institute of Public Administration – the institution responsible for the development of human resources and building capacities within the public sector – for its supervisory capacity building programs and new employee training programs.²⁰⁹</p> <p>In addition, Prime Minister Omar Razzaz, Jordan's newly-appointed prime minister who took office following the resignation of his predecessor over widespread protests against austerity measures, recently gave visibility to the Financial Disclosure Department and disclosure mechanisms more generally by meeting with the Director of the Financial Disclosure Department and disclosing his personal finances.²¹⁰ While doing so, the Prime Minister urged all ministers to submit their financial disclosures to the Department, in accordance with the Illicit Fortunes Law.²¹¹</p>

14. Fiscal Transparency

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	14.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there legislation or policy in place requiring a high degree of fiscal transparency?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: The legal framework requires a high degree of fiscal transparency and the publication of all the key budget documents listed above;</p> <p>0.75: The legal framework requires a fairly high degree of fiscal transparency and the publication of 7 of the key budget documents;</p> <p>0.5: The legal framework requires some degree of fiscal transparency and the release of 6 of the key budget documents</p> <p>0.25: The legal framework requires little fiscal transparency and only the release of 5 of the key budget documents</p> <p>0: The legal framework requires insufficient transparency and only the release of 4 or less of the key budget documents</p> <p>- : Not applicable or no data available</p>

Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>The Budget Organic Law No. 58 of 2008 established the within the Ministry of Finance the General Budget Department, whose Director is appointed by the Council of Ministers and upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance.²¹² The General Budget Department is tasked with preparing the general budget, preparing the budgets of all government institutions, allocating resources according to development priorities, preparing a statement of needed operations to approve the budgets, following up on department performance evaluations, providing advice on draft legislations and any other department tasks that have financial implications, and providing recommendations on the final financial statements of all departments before their approval. While current legislation stipulates all required processes in budget planning, financing, implementing, and auditing, as well as processes of managing public debt, the relevant legislation only requires that three key budget documents be published. These documents include the enacted budget, issued as a law as stipulated by the constitution Article 112-6, the final accounts as stipulated by Financial Bylaw No. 3 of 1994 article 57, and the executive budget proposal as stipulated by Article 112-1 of Constitution.²¹³</p>
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DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	14.2 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country's score and rank in the most recent Open Budget Survey, conducted by the International Budget Partnership?
Response	Jordan's latest Open Budget transparency score and ranking, conducted in 2017, is 63 on a scale of 1 (no transparency) to 100 (full transparency), with Jordan providing the public with "substantial" budget information. This is an increase from Jordan's 2015 score of 55 and is the highest score of the countries surveyed in the Middle East region. ²¹⁴

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	14.3 =
Indicator question(s)	Are key budget-related documents published in practice?
Response	<p>In practice, Jordan made all eight of the aforementioned documents available to the public online within a timeframe consistent with international standards in 2017.²¹⁵ During 2015, the Mid-Year Review was not produced or published, and in 2008, 2010, and 2012, the Citizens Budget was not produced or published and the Mid-Year Review was only published for internal use. 2006 represented the year with the least budget transparency, during which the Citizens Budget was not produced or published and the Pre-Budget Statement and Mid-Year Review were published for internal use only. This increase in transparency over time is reflected in Jordan's increased Open Budget survey score, which according to the International Budget Partnership, increased significantly from 2006 to 2017 largely because of Jordan's release of a Mid-Year Review and the advanced comprehensiveness of its budget documents. Examples of this increased comprehensiveness include the addition of expenditure data by functional classification in the Executives Budget proposal and macroeconomic forecasts in the Pre-Budget Statement.²¹⁶</p> <p>In addition, comprehensive tables and quantitative data presented on the General Budget Department facilitate public access to the data of both past budgets and the current 2018 budget.²¹⁷</p>

15. Public Procurement

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	15.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law clearly define up to what threshold(s) single-sourced purchases of goods, services and public works are allowed?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: Thresholds concerning the single-sourcing of goods, services and public works are clearly defined by law</p> <p>0.75: Thresholds concerning the single-sourcing of goods, services and public works are clearly defined by a decree (or a similar administrative standard)</p> <p>0.25: Thresholds for two of the three categories are clearly defined by a law or a decree</p> <p>0: Thresholds for only one or none of the categories are defined by a law or a decree</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>Government Procurement Regulations No. 32 of 1993 addresses supplies (goods) and services, according to its definition of procurement (“the movable properties required for any department, their maintenance, insurance, and services needed for the department”).²¹⁸ The Government Works Bylaw No. 71 of 1986 addresses public works. Both legislations mandate that principles of competition and equal opportunity to qualified and capable parties be applied whenever possible and in the manner deemed appropriate by the purchasing authority. To this end, best qualities and best prices must always be taken into account upon purchase (Article 6 of Government Works Bylaw, Article 9 of Government Procurement Regulations).²¹⁹</p> <p>However, only the Government Works Bylaw specifies thresholds for sole-sourced purchases of public works. Article 21 states that negotiations and direct awards for the execution of works cannot exceed: 250,000 JD if authorized by (1) a resolution from the Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the Minister of Public Works and Housing (Minister) if the tender pertains to the Minister of Public Works and Housing or any other minister (relevant minister) if the tender pertains to another department, provided that this recommendation is coupled with a recommendation from a technical committee formed by the Minister or relevant minister for this purpose and (2) a post-resolution decision by the Minister or any relevant minister; 100,000 JD if authorized by a decision from the Minister of Public Works and Housing (Minister), upon recommendation from a technical committee formed by the Minister under the chairmanship of the Secretary General or by a decision of the relevant minister and upon recommendation from the Minister of Public Works and Housing’s Tender Committee; or 30,000 JD if authorized by a decision from the Secretary General, upon the recommendation of a technical committee formed by the relevant minister or by a decision of a governor upon the recommendation of the governorate’s Tender Committee.²²⁰</p>

	<p>The Article also covers thresholds for negotiations and direct awards for the provision of technical services, or “studies, engineering, and technical designs for the works and projects, as well as supervision of its execution and operation [including] appliances, materials, supplies and works including laboratory and field testing, surveying works and any technical or engineering consultations regarding works” (Article 2). The provision of these technical services must not exceed: 150,000 JD if authorized by (1) a resolution from the Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the Minister, provided that this recommendation is coupled with a recommendation from a technical committee formed by the Minister for this purpose and (2) a post-resolution decision from the Minister; 50,000 JD if authorized by the decision of the Minister, upon recommendation from a technical committee formed by the Minister under the chairmanship of the Secretary General; 20,000 JD if authorized by a decision from the relevant minister, upon recommendation from a technical committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary General; or 10,000 JD if authorized by a decision from the Secretary General, upon recommendation from a technical committee formed by the relevant minister. However, the regulations for sole-source contracting of public works and related services above these thresholds are not addressed within the bylaw. The Article also allows for negotiations and direct awards for the execution of public works or the provision of technical services if the value of the work or service does not exceed 5,000 JD if decided by the relevant minister him/herself.²²¹</p> <p>As stated above, the Government Procurement Regulations do not specify thresholds for sole-sourced purchases of goods and services not related to public works. It only specifies that bids can be invited if the value of procurement to be purchased does not exceed 5,000 JD (Article 15). However, according to the regulations, the act of inviting bids from certain pre-chosen parties differs from the act of directly purchasing procurement through negotiations.²²²</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	15.2 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>What are exceptions in the legal framework for public procurement that allow for single-sourced contracting above these thresholds?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: Single-sourcing of contracts above certain thresholds is not allowed or only allowed in limited circumstances that are clearly defined by law</p> <p>0.5: The law provides exceptions that may be vulnerable to misuse</p> <p>0: The law does not address this aspect or provides highly ambiguous reasons based on which single-sourced contracting is possible</p> <p> -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>The aforementioned regulation and bylaw do not specify any exceptions that allow for single-sourced contracting above the aforementioned thresholds.²²³</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	15.3 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the legal framework require that information on public procurement above certain thresholds be published?</p> <p>1: The legal framework requires tender announcements and contract award information to be released and procurement contracts to be published in full text (possibly with partial redactions)</p> <p>0.5: The legal framework requires tender announcements and contract award information (including information on the procuring entity, the supplier, the number of bidders, the good/service procured, the value of the contract) to be released</p> <p>0: Less information than described above has to be published</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>Article 7 of the Government Procurement Regulations states that tender notices shall be announced and that the Secretariat of the Tenders' Committee must announce the names of the contract awardees on the "special note board or by means defined by the Director General or the Secretary General" (Article 61, Government Procurement Regulations). However, the regulations do not directly specify the specific contract award information – including information on the procuring entity, the supplier, the number of bidders, the good or service procured, and the value of the contract – that must be published.²²⁴</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	15.4 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are bidders required to disclose their beneficial owners?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: Bidders have to disclose beneficial owners, and this information is made public for successful bidders</p> <p>0.5: Bidders have to disclose beneficial owners, this information is not made public</p> <p>0: There is no requirement for bidders to disclose their beneficial owners</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>A Section at the Tenders Department is assigned to keep, for statistical purposes, the information about Jordanian and non-Jordanian contractors and consultants operating in the Kingdom, governmental works and technical services. However, no stipulations for the disclosure of beneficiary owners are stated within the legislation.²²⁵</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLAINE
Indicator number	15.5 =
Indicator question(s)	Are there legal provisions, regulations or policies in place for bidders to file complaints in case they suspect irregularities at any stage of the procurement process?
Response	<p>Article 61 of the Government Procurement Regulations states that the note board must feature the names of the bid awardees for four working days, in order to allow adequate time for objections. In practice, all bidders are also typically present for the opening of received bids, and the reasons for discarding bids are specified and read out loud. The bidders who did not attend can contact the Department for feedback, and notably, this session is open to the general public.²²⁶ According to an OECD report, dissatisfied bidders can file complaints to the Chairman of the Tendering Committee. If the bidder remains unsatisfied with the decision made by the Chairman, the bidder can file a complaint to the Minister who may also issue a decision. If the bidder is again unsatisfied, the bidder can take the matter to court, through which the bidder will receive a final judicial decision.²²⁷</p> <p>In terms of accountability, controls are typically carried out during the pre-tendering stage by the procuring entity and are dependent upon that entity's specific norms. External controls are mandated at the pre-tendering, tendering, and post-tendering stages, and public procurement processes are subject to the oversight of the Audit Bureau and the Anti-Corruption Commission.²²⁸</p> <p>However, in 2017, the JIACC published a Support for Improvement in Governance and Management report in partnership with the European Union and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that highlighted gaps in the unified public procurement and government tenders systems that could allow for corruption. The report contained recommendations to fill these gaps, and the JIACC has begun acting on these recommendations through various programs included in its 2017-2025 Strategy.²²⁹ The European Union's Ambassador to Jordan emphasized the importance of ensuring integrity within Jordan's public procurement system, given that public procurement usually comprises around 40% of the state budget.²³⁰</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLAINE
Indicator number	15.6 =
Indicator question(s)	Which information and documents related to public procurement and other relevant government contracts are published proactively and are available in full text? Are any of these documents published online through a central website or database?
Response	<p>Beginning in 2018, information on public procurement is accessible to the public through the General Supplies Department's central e-procurement database, joneps.gov.jo. Documents that detail particular conditions and technical specifications are often included in JONEP tender invitations, opening results for each bidder are listed, and the bidder name, country of origin, awarding decision number, delivery period, unit and unit price, manufacturer, awarding quantity, and total price are listed in the details of awarding section.²³¹</p> <p>Prior to the 2018 inception of JONEP, a moderate amount of information on public procurement was available through both online sources (including on the Government Tenders Department website) and public events and announcements. However, the publishing of this information was inconsistent, thus making the establishment of the JONEP system a notable improvement.</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLAINE
Indicator number	15.7 =
Indicator question(s)	To what extent does the country use electronic procurement that is open, provides the public with access to procurement information and opportunities to engage in the procurement process?
Response	Please see response 15.6.

16. Whistle-Blowing and Reporting Mechanisms

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	16.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there a legal framework to protect whistle-blowers from the public and the private sector who report reasonable belief of wrongdoing?</p> <p>Score:</p> <p>1: The law provides protection for whistle-blowers from both, public and private sector</p> <p>0.5: The law provides protection for whistle-blowers from either the public or the private sector</p> <p>0: There is no protection of whistle-blowers guaranteed by law</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Bylaw No. 62 of 2014 defines a whistleblower as “any person who provides information on a mater of corruption.”²³² Article 24 of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law address protection of whistleblowers as defined in the bylaw, particularly that the Anti-Corruption Commission must provide sufficient protection for informants, including whistleblowers and their families and others close to them, in corruption cases. The Commission must protect whistleblowers from any potential retaliation or intimidation by: providing whistleblowers with protection at their places of residence and workplaces, refraining from disclosing information regarding their whereabouts and identity, providing them with protection from discrimination, ill-treatment, or arbitrary dismissal in the workplace, allowing them to provide testimony through modern communication technology that will ensure their safety, and providing them with safe accommodation, financial aid, and any other measures to ensure their security.²³³</p> <p>The Law also specifies that any disclosure of information related to the whereabouts or identity of whistleblowers, assault of whistleblowers, mistreatment and discrimination toward whistleblowers, and the prevention of whistleblowers’ testimonies are also punishable offenses (Article 26).²³⁴</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	16.2 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law provide for broad definitions of whistleblowing and whistle-blower?</p> <p>Score: 1: The law contains a broad definition of whistleblowing and whistle-blower, that is fully in line with TI's principles 0.75: The law contains a broad definition of whistleblowing and whistle-blower, that is largely in line with TI's principles 0.5: The law contains a definition of whistleblowing and whistle-blower, that is partly in line with TI's principles but excludes some important potential cases 0: The law does not contain a definition of whistleblowing or whistle-blower, or the definition is very narrow -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>Bylaw No. 62 of 2014 defines a whistleblower as "any person who provides information on a matter of corruption." While the definition covers any person, who discloses information of corruption, the definition does not specifically mention all instances aligned with TI's principles, including: criminal offenses, breaches of obligation, miscarriages of justice, specific dangers to public health, safety, or the environment, abuse of authority, unauthorized use of public funds or property, gross waste or mismanagement, conflict of interest, or acts to cover up any of these.²³⁵</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	16.3 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law provide sufficient protection for whistle-blowers?</p> <p>Score: 1: The law does provide strong protection for whistle-blowers 0.75: The law provides good protection for whistle-blowers, but there are some important weaknesses 0.5: The law provides limited protection for whistle-blowers 0: The law provides no or insufficient protection for whistle-blowers -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>As stated above, the JIACC must protect whistleblowers from any potential retaliation or intimidation by: providing whistleblowers with protection at their places of residence and workplaces, refraining from disclosing information regarding their whereabouts and identity, providing them with protection from discrimination and ill-treatment in the workplace, allowing them to provide testimony through modern communication technology that will ensure their safety, and providing them with safe accommodation, financial aid, and any other measures to ensure their security.²³⁶ Further, any disclosure of information related to the whereabouts or identity of whistleblowers, assault of whistleblowers, mistreatment and discrimination toward whistleblowers, and the prevention of whistleblowers' testimonies are also punishable offenses.²³⁷</p> <p>However, the law does not mention additional protections such as relief from legal liability, protection from prosecution, and compensation for reprisals. Neither does it include any regulations on the protection of whistleblowers who disclose their information publicly or to third parties, such as the media or NGOs, if necessitated by circumstance.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	16.4 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law provide for adequate and diverse disclosure procedures?</p> <p>Score:</p> <p>1: The law provides for strong disclosure procedures</p> <p>0.5: The law fails to address some important aspects</p> <p>0: The law provides no or inadequate disclosure procedures</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>Please see response 16.8.</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	16.5 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law provide for adequate remedies for whistle-blowers?</p> <p>Score:</p> <p>1: The law provides for adequate remedies, including compensation rights, the reversal of the burden of proof in favour of the whistle-blower, and the right to a new supervisor or department</p> <p>· 0.75: The law provides several remedies, including two out of the following: compensation rights, the reversal of the burden of proof, and the right to a new supervisor or department</p> <p>0.5: The law fails to address several important aspects, and only provides for one of the following: compensation rights, the reversal of the burden of proof, and the right to a new supervisor or department</p> <p>0: The law provides no or inadequate remedies</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>The law and bylaw refer to these remedies in only general terms. In addressing compensation rights, the law states that the JIACC's protection unit must provide whistleblowers with safe accommodation, financial aid, and any other measures to ensure their security and with protection from discrimination and ill-treatment, including arbitrary dismissal, in the workplace. In addition, the law states that any perpetrator or accomplice in corruption crimes may be exempt two-thirds of the sentence if he or she provides competent authorities with information, proof, or evidence that leads to asset recovery in corruption cases. This, in part, places the burden of proof on the perpetrator, but it does not amount to a full reversal of the burden of proof in favor of the whistleblower who alleges detrimental action, as specified in the TI principles.²³⁸</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	16.6 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there an independent authority responsible for the oversight and enforcement of whistleblowing legislation?</p> <p>Score: 1: There is an independent authority with a strong and comprehensive mandate to oversee and enforce whistleblowing legislation 0.5: There is an independent authority, but its mandate to oversee and enforce whistleblowing legislation is limited 0: There is no independent authority to oversee and enforce whistleblowing legislation -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The JIACC is tasked with receiving complaints from witnesses, victims, informants, and whistleblowers. Within the JIACC, the Protection Unit is tasked with receiving applications for protection, developing relevant protection methods for each case, concealing any identifying information, and providing protection in coordination with the Public Security Directorate. The Protection Unit must also inform the Chairman of the Commission Board and the General Prosecutor immediately if any assaults or threats are made against protected persons.²³⁹ Both the reporting mechanisms and the witness protection mechanisms operate with sufficient independence, capacity, and resources, given that, by law, the JIACC as a whole remains financially and administratively independent with the ability to “undertake all necessary legal actions to achieve its objectives.”²⁴⁰ Further, the Public Security Directorate and the Ministry of Justice both operate with sufficient independence to fulfill their roles in enforcing whistleblowing legislation (please see responses 9.3, 9.5, and 9.6 for more information on the autonomy of government bodies relevant to overseeing and enforcing whistleblowing legislation).</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	16.7 =
Indicator question(s)	Where an independent authority to oversee and enforce whistleblowing legislation exists, does it have sufficient powers and resources to operate effectively?
Response	Please see responses 9.3, 9.5, and 9.6 for information on the autonomy and resources of relevant government authorities.

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	16.8 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there a law/policy that establishes a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption (such as a hotline or a secure and anonymous electronic post box)? Does the law provide the body charged with operating it with sufficient independence and powers to investigate the reports it receives?</p> <p>Score: 1: The law/policy creates a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption. The body charged with operating it is provided with sufficient independence and powers to investigate the reports it receives 0.5: The law/policy creates a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption, but it does not provide the body charged with operating it with sufficient Independence and powers to investigate the reports it receives 0: There is no law or policy mandating that a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption be established -: Not applicable or no data available</p>

<p>Response</p>	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>To facilitate witness reporting, the JIACC website includes a hotline telephone and fax number, as well as an electronic submission form that specifically asks for the informant’s authorization for mentioning his or her name in investigation proceedings. However, no information addressing the security of the hotline and online informant submission tools themselves is included on the JIACC website.²⁴¹ Both the reporting mechanisms and the witness protection mechanisms operate with sufficient independence, capacity, and resources, given that, by law, the JIACC as a whole remains financially and administratively independent with the ability to “undertake all necessary legal actions to achieve its objectives.”²⁴²</p> <p>Once the complaint is received, Bylaw No. 62 of 2014 – or the protection of whistleblowers, witnesses, informants and experts in cases of corruption, their relatives and persons who are closely related to them – states that informants’ names must be sealed and kept in a safe that only the chairman of the JIACC and the assigned judge can order to disclose (Article 7b).²⁴³</p> <p>In terms of offering diversity in disclosure procedures, Jordan’s 2017 Open Government Partnership Midterm Self-Assessment details plans to launch and enhance a complaints registration system and follow-up mechanism to address complaints in a serious, streamlined manner and refer them to the judiciary. This complaints registration system will address complaints and grievances related both to violations committed against citizens and to government services and their provision. While the former is still being worked on, significant progress has been made on the latter, with an online site and mobile application having been rolled out in 2017.²⁴⁴</p>
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DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	16.9 =
Indicator question(s)	Does such a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption exist in practice?
Response	Data provided by the JIACC indicates that reporting mechanisms for witnesses and victims of corruption are being used more frequently as years go by. For instance, the number of complaints/reports received by the JIACC in 2017 was 2050, as compared to a 157-total received during all previous years. Of the complaints received, 528 were referred to the JIACC’s investigative authority, 27 were referred to the General Prosecutor, 792 were kept on permanent record, 115 were deferred for the coming year, and 745 were subject to other actions, including referral to relevant authorities, adding to previous complaints, and referral to the JIACC’s Directorates of Prevention, Legal Affairs, or Grievances. Further, 92 requests for witness protection were received in 2017, as compared to 13 total received for all past years. 12 of these requests were accepted in 2017 and 27 remain under analysis. ²⁴⁵

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	16.10 =
Indicator question(s)	Is data and information regarding the operation and performance of such reporting mechanisms (in compliance with relevant privacy and data protection laws) published?
Response	The data referenced in response 16.9 is included in the JIACC’s annual reports. While the 2017 report and its relevant data have not yet been published on the JIACC website for public viewing, all past reports, which include data relevant to the operation and performance of reporting mechanisms, are published on the JIACC website. ²⁴⁶ According to the JIACC, data for 2018 is still under scrutiny and has therefore not been published yet. ²⁴⁷

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	16.11 =
Indicator question(s)	Is there evidence that relevant state bodies have taken active steps to promote public awareness of this reporting mechanism?
Response	<p>Since the 2014 inception of the witness protection program, the JIACC has initiated outreach and advertisement efforts to raise awareness, both among personnel from various sectors and among the general online public. The JIACC has held various workshops and meetings on the witness protection program for NGO staff, public security officers, media personnel, and public officials.²⁴⁸ In addition, the hotline and online forms for informants are advertised on the home page of the JIACC official website, and the topics of whistleblowing and witness protection are discussed in JIACC posts on their official Facebook page.²⁴⁹</p> <p>However, more awareness raising programs – particularly regarding witness protection mechanisms available through legislation and in practice – must be implemented to reach the general public. According to Transparency International’s 2016 MENA Global Corruption Barometer report, survey respondents in Jordan reported that the main reason they do not report incidents of corruption is fear of retaliation.²⁵⁰</p>

Target 16.10: “Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.”

17. Protection of Fundamental Freedoms

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	17.1 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country’s score and rating in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Rating?
Response	Like in 2017, Jordan’s Freedom in the World 2018 score is 37, on a scale of 0 as least free to 100 as most free. Its net freedom status, from ranging from ‘Free’ to ‘Not Free,’ is rated ‘Partly Free’. ²⁵¹

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	17.2 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country’s rank and score in the most recent World Press Freedom Index, issued by Reporters Without Borders?
Response	In 2018, Jordan’s World Press Freedom Index was scored 41.71 (‘not very free’) on a scale of 0 as ‘faultless to almost faultless’ to 100 as ‘no rights.’ Jordan ranks 132 out of 180 countries. Jordan’s score improved slightly by 1.53 since the 2017 Index publication, and it increased 6 places in the country rankings. ²⁵²

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	17.3 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the legal framework contain any provisions that threaten or undermine the ability of journalists, bloggers researchers, human rights advocates and other civil society actors to exercise their fundamental rights, to uncover and report on all forms of corruption, and to hold leaders accountable?</p>
Response	<p>Article 15 of the Constitution, coupled with Articles 3 and 4 of the Press and Publication Law, guarantees freedom of expression and opinion, as well as freedom of the press and media, by stating that the government will secure for all Jordanians – private citizens, journalists, scientific researchers, artists, and cultural figures– the freedom of opinion and their right to expression through writing, speaking, portrayal, and all other means of expression, provided that the limits of law are observed and public and moral order is preserved. This freedom of press includes printing, publication, and all forms of media, within the limits of the law. Further, no publication or media can be stopped, and no licenses can be revoked, without a court order in accordance with the laws set forth (Articles 19, 31, 35 of the Press and Publication Law). In addition, Article 16 of the Constitution preserves the right of Jordanians to establish societies, provided that they remain peaceful and within the limits of the law.²⁵³</p> <p>However, Articles 17 and 18 of the Press Associations Law stipulate that the Press Association Law, public authorities, and all other Jordanian organizations will not recognize any journalists or other media professionals who are not registered as members of the Press Association and prohibit anyone who is not registered in the Association’s records from working in journalism. In addition, Article 18 of the Press Associations Law, Article 13 of the Press and Publication Law, and Article 15 of the Audio-Visual Media Law require licenses in order to issue any sort of publication or practice broadcasting works. It should be noted that the Press and Publications Law and Audio-Visual Media Law do not state whether or not applicants for a newspaper license or a broadcast works license have the right to legally challenge their rejection. Further, the Audio-Visual Media Law gives the Council of Ministers – the body tasked with licensure granting – the right to refuse to grant broadcasting licenses to any entity without stating the reason for rejection (Article 18). Each of these provisions gives the Council of Ministers ultimate power over journalists or media institutions that may wish to uncover or report on any instances of corruption and lack of accountability.²⁵⁴</p> <p>Similarly, Article 5 of the 2009 Amendment of the Law on Societies (Law No. 22 of 2009) gives the Board of Societies – made up of seven representatives from ministries and four from the civil society sector who are appointed by the Cabinet for two years (Article 4) – the power to license civil society organizations and determine the relevant ministry that will oversee the organization. In addition, Articles 14 of the Law on Societies (No. 51 of 2008) requires that the organization notify the relevant supervisory minister of the time, location, and agenda of the organization’s general assembly two weeks in advance, or else the meeting will be deemed illegal. Article 14 also stipulates that all decisions by the assembly are deemed invalid until approved by the board within 60 days of their submission. If no response is received after 60 days, the organization is instructed to assume that its decisions were approved. Again, these regulations give the relevant ministry significant control over the licensure and actions of civil society organizations that may be in the position to uncover or report upon instances of lack of accountability.²⁵⁵</p> <p>Further, the Press and Publication Law prohibits the publishing of any material that “offends individuals’ dignity and personal freedoms, or contains untruthful rumors or information about them.”²⁵⁶ Although this is a standard defamation law, neither the laws regulating press and expression, nor the laws regulating civil society, cover protection of whistleblowers who decide to make public disclosures or report their information to the press or CSOs/NGOs, in the event that their allegations of corruption are indeed true. This, coupled with a 2011 amendment to the anticorruption law that criminalizes reporting on corruption without ample proof of misconduct and the fines imposed by the Press and Publications Law for defamation offenses, may make it less likely for journalists to report on corruption.²⁵⁷</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	17.4 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are any policies or practices in place that undermine the ability of journalists, bloggers researchers, human rights advocates and other civil society actors to exercise their fundamental rights, to uncover and report on all forms of corruption, and to hold leaders accountable?</p>
Response	<p>In practice, there are some cases in which governmental agencies instruct the Press Association or the Press and Publications Department to issue an official government request to stop all publications on certain specific topics. In addition, the judiciary is given the power to bar the publication of information on cases still under hearing – a power that the judiciary has practiced on certain occasions.²⁵⁸</p> <p>Media institutions must also consider their stakeholders, which may limit their independence or willingness in publishing on such issues as corruption and lack of transparency. The Minister for Media serves as the chairman of the board for both the Jordanian Television and the News Agency, two public sector media institutions.²⁵⁹ The government also has the power to appoint the boards of directors of, as well as allocate and provide state funding for, public media institutions, which include PETRA, Jordan Radio and Television, and the Audio-Visual Commission. Regarding private sector media institutions, Social Security Corporation is a shareholder in both Al Dustour and Al Rai newspapers.²⁶⁰ According to Rasheed-Transparency International’s National Integrity System report, figures from both the public and private sectors appear on the editorial boards of private media institutions, which may impede the institution’s willingness and ability to publish objective information on economic issues, which, if the situation arose, could include instances of corruption.²⁶¹</p> <p>Furthermore, self-censorship for the stated sake of public order has become common practice among media institutions. In line with Article 5 of the Press and Publication Law and Article 20 of the Audio-Visual Media Law on the preservation of public order, the Audio-Visual Media Commission has instructed licensed and approved satellite channels, broadcast channels, and websites to cease the publishing of any information regarding public security and public security employees, unless under the direct request of the Public Security Directorate.²⁶² The stated penalty in these instructions was perjury, thus creating an unfavorable environment for journalists to publish any content related to public security and its supporting employees. If a corruption case were to arise within the public security realm during this ordered cessation, it can be assumed that journalists would avoid reporting it. It should also be noted that in October 2015, the Law Interpretation Bureau put forth a ruling that stated Article 11 of the Electronic Crimes Law, which allows for the imprisonment of online media practitioners, applies to cases of online slander – a notable decision, given that Article 42 of the Press and Publication law prohibits detainment based solely upon the expression of opinion in writing, verbally, or in any other form.²⁶³</p> <p>However, it is promising that Jordan’s Open Government Partnership Self-Assessment, completed October 2017, contained a detailed commitment dedicated to designing and implementing a technical framework, based on best practices, to strengthen freedom of press in Jordan. According to the report, this commitment’s implementation will be overseen by the Ministry for Media Affairs, and its framework will include a set of legislative amendments to be submitted to Parliament. The report also stated that civil society is expected to play a major role in the development of this framework, so as to better ensure the adoption of best practices and, ultimately, a greater guarantee of freedom of expression.²⁶⁴</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	17.5 =
Indicator question(s)	Have there been documented cases of killings, kidnappings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture or attacks against journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists, human rights and civil society advocates or other people who investigated, uncovered and advocated against corruption in the previous two years?
Response	Given that journalists, associated media personnel, and other civil society figures often practice self-censorship on a range of topics including corruption, these individuals very rarely face the aforementioned forms of retaliation. ²⁶⁵ Thus, no cases of killings, kidnappings, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, or attacks have been reported over the past two years.

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	17.6 =
Indicator question(s)	Have there been cases of attacks against NGOs, journalists, and others advocating or reporting on corruption adequately investigated and resolved in the past two years? Were perpetrators identified and held accountable?
Response	Please see response 17.5.

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	17.7 =
Indicator question(s)	Have there been documented cases of government censorship, including of online communication, or of undue political interference that limits people's ability to inform and express themselves online in the past two years?
Response	<p>Reported in Human Rights Watch's 2017 report on Jordan, authorities arrested eight men in January 2017, including two former public officials, in response to critical online comments pertaining to corruption. The men were held on suspicion of attempting to disrupt public order and "undermine the political regime."²⁶⁶ However, they were released shortly after without charges. Similarly, in October 2017, authorities detained a well-known cartoon artist for a brief time for issuing a cartoon that was deemed offensive to Christians.²⁶⁷</p> <p>It should also be noted that in June 2017, Jordan joined Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates in scaling back on its diplomatic ties with Qatar by closing Al Jazeera 's Amman bureau. The Jordanian government cited as the reason for closure the need to ensure regional stability and to coordinate its policies with other Arab countries, after "'reviewing the crisis' between Qatar and neighboring Gulf states."²⁶⁸</p>

18. Access to Information

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	18.1 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the legal framework (including jurisprudence) recognize a fundamental right of access to Information?</p> <p>Scoring 1: There is a full constitutional recognition of a public right of access to information 0.5: There is a limited constitutional right 0: There is no constitutional right to information - : Not applicable or no data available</p>

Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>There is no right of access to information enumerated within the Jordanian Constitution itself. However, Article 7 of the Law on Securing the Right to Information Access (Law No. 47 of 2007) states, "subject to the provisions of the applicable legislations, each Jordanian citizen has the right to obtain the information he/she requires according to the Provisions of this Law should he/she have lawful interest or justification."²⁶⁹</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
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Indicator number	18.2 =
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Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the right of access to information apply to all materials held by or on behalf of public authorities in any format, regardless of who produced it?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: The right applies to all materials held by or on behalf of public authorities, with no exceptions</p> <p>0.5: There right applies to materials held by or on behalf of public authorities, but there are exceptions for "internal documents" or databases</p> <p>0: The definition of information is very limited and includes several and/or broad exceptions of information that is not covered by the right</p> <p>- : Not applicable or no data available</p>
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Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>The right of access to information applies to all materials held by or on behalf of public authorities, with no exceptions. This is specified by the definition of 'information' in Article 2, "any oral or written data, written, copied, recorded, or electronically stored records, statistics or documents or stored by any other means falling within the scope of the control or the liability of the official charge."²⁷⁰</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
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Indicator number	18.3 =
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Indicator question(s)	<p>To which branches and bodies does the right of access apply?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: The right of access applies, with no bodies excluded, to 1) executive branch; 2) the legislature; 3) the judicial branch; 4) state-owned enterprises; 5) other public authorities including constitutional, statutory and oversight bodies (such as an election commission or an information commission); and 6) private bodies that perform a public function or that receive significant public funding</p> <p>0.75: The right of access applies to at least five of the above-mentioned sectors, with no particular bodies excluded</p> <p>0.5: The right of access applies to at least four of the above-mentioned sectors, but some bodies are exempt</p> <p>0.25: The right of access applies to at least three of the above-mentioned sectors or several key bodies are exempt (such as secret services, military, police, president etc.)</p> <p>0: There is no access to information framework; or: no clear provision on the institutions that are covered; or: the right of access applies to less than three of the above-mentioned sectors and several key bodies are exempt (such as secret services, military, police, president etc.)</p> <p>- : Not applicable or no data available</p>
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Response	<p>Score: 1</p> <p>As stipulated in Article 2's definition of Department, the right of access applies to all branches and bodies, with no exclusions. Specifically, Article 2 specifies that the scope of the Jordanian citizen's right of access includes "the ministry, department, authority, entity or any public institution, public official institution or company that is in charge of the management of a public facility."²⁷¹</p>
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DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	18.4 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are there clear and reasonable maximum timelines for responding to a request, regardless of the manner of satisfying the request?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>1: Timeframe is 10 working days (or 15 days, or two weeks) or less</p> <p>0.5: Timeframe is 20 working days (or 30 days, four weeks or one month) or less</p> <p>0.25: Timeframe is more than 20 working days (or 30 days, four weeks or one month)</p> <p>0: There is no specified timeframe for responding to a request</p> <p>- : Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>The law clearly specifies the maximum number of days for response, stating in Article 9, "the official in Charge shall reply to or reject the request within thirty (30) days as of the date following the date of request submission."²⁷²</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	18.5 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Are exceptions to the right of access consistent with international standards?</p> <p>Scoring</p> <p>Score 10 points and then deduct 1 point for each exception which either (a) falls outside of this list and/or (b) is more broadly framed:</p> <p>1: 9 or 10 points</p> <p>0.75: 7 or 8 points</p> <p>0.5: 5 or 6 points</p> <p>0.25: 3 or 4 points</p> <p>0: 0, 1 or 2 points</p> <p>-: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.75</p> <p>Article 10 stipulates, "No information bearing the nature of religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, or color discrimination shall be requested." In addition, Article 13(f) mandates that the Official in Charge refrain from disclosure of "correspondences with personal or confidential nature, whether in the form of post, cable, phone call or any other technological means, with governmental departments and the replies thereto." The intuition driving these provisions may be protection of privacy, but this is not stated outright within the law. In addition, Article 13(l)'s reference to copyright is overly broad and is not limited to privately-held copyrights: "The information with commercial, industrial or economic nature, information on scientific bids or research or technology, whose disclosure will lead to the violation of its copyright, rights of intellectual property or fair or lawful competition or to illegal profit or loss for any person."²⁷³</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	18.6 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is a harm test applied to all exceptions, so that disclosure may only be refused when it poses a risk of actual harm to a protected interest?</p> <p>Scoring 1: Harm test is applied to all exceptions 0.75: Harm test is applied to all but 1 exception 0.5: Harm test is applied to all but 2 exceptions 0.25: Harm test is applied to all but 3 exceptions 0: No Harm test is required by law, or it does not apply to 4 or more exceptions -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>The four exceptions to which a harm test does not apply are: agreements with other States, national security, foreign relations, and judicial investigations. In order, Article 13 prohibits disclosure of information related to “the documents classified as confidential and protected and to be granted by an agreement with another country” (13b), “the secrets related to national defense, state security or foreign policy” (13c), which addresses both national security and foreign relations and amounts to two exceptions, and “the investigations made by the prosecution, judicial system or security authorities concerning any crime or lawsuit within their scope of power, as well as the investigations made buy the appropriate authorities for unveiling financial, customs or banking breaches, unless the appropriated authority permits the disclosure thereof” (13h). The remainder of the exceptions were either not on the list of exceptions consistent with international standards, or do stipulate some form of ‘harm test’ mechanism, although not labeled as such.²⁷⁴</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	18.7 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there a mandatory public interest override so that information must be disclosed where this is in the overall public interest, even if this may harm a protected interest? Are there ‘hard’ overrides (which apply absolutely), for example for information about human rights, corruption or crimes against humanity?</p> <p>Scoring 1: There is a mandatory public interest override that applies to all exceptions and is not subject to overreaching limitations 0.75: There is a mandatory public interest override that applies to all exceptions but one or two and is not subject to overreaching limitations 0.25: The public interest test only applies to some exceptions 0: No public interest test is required by law -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0</p> <p>No mandatory public interest override – so that information must be disclosed when in the overall public interest, even at the harm of a protected interest – is mentioned in the law.²⁷⁵</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	18.8 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Is there an independent Information Commission, or a similar oversight body, with whom requestors have the right to lodge an external appeal?</p> <p>Scoring 1: An Information Commission is in place, and it has the necessary mandate and power to perform its functions, including to review classified documents and inspect the premises of public bodies 0.5: An Information Commission or a similar oversight body exists, but either lacks the power to review classified documents or lacks inspection powers 0.25: An Information Commission or a similar oversight body exists, but it neither has the power to review classified documents nor to carry out inspections 0: No independent oversight body exists -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.25</p> <p>Article 17(b) states the body with whom requestors have the right to lodge an appeal, specifically, the "Requester may file a complaint against the Official in Charge to the Board by the Information Commissioner in case of his/her rejection or the Official in Charge's refrainment from the provision of the information required within the legally fixed period." However, this board – collectively, the Information Council – is made up of solely public officials (Article 3a). Furthermore, the mechanisms necessary to ensure the Board's mandate and power to perform its functions are not mentioned, including the power to review classified documents and inspect the premises of public bodies.²⁷⁶</p>

DIMENSION	LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Indicator number	18.9 =
Indicator question(s)	<p>Does the law/policy on access to information contain minimum standards on mandatory proactive (automatic, without having to be requested) publication of information?</p> <p>Scoring 1: if the law on access to information (or another relevant law) contains requirements on the mandatory automatic publication of certain information 0: if there are no requirements to automatically release certain information -: Not applicable or no data available</p>
Response	<p>Score: 0.5</p> <p>While the Law on Securing the Right to Information Access does not contain requirements on the mandatory automatic publication of certain information, enough progress has recently been made to warrant a higher score in this area. According to Jordan's October 2017 OGP Self-Assessment Report, Jordan has committed to reviewing its legislative framework, identifying gaps, and proposing a new package of legislation and amendments to the Parliament that will work to align Jordan's access to information policies with international best practices.²⁷⁷</p> <p>Beyond plans to amend and add to its legislation, Jordan's Government Achievement Unit at the Prime Ministry has committed to launching a central electronic portal for citizens, members of Parliament, donors, and investors to monitor government performance by tracking the implementation of government plans throughout different governmental departments.²⁷⁸</p> <p>Paired with this is another commitment made by Jordan's Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology to implement an open data sources policy that facilitates access to data in the government's possession that is non-confidential and non-privacy violating. To this end, an online platform has been launched (https://jordan.gov.jo/wps/portal/OpenData), and the data of three governmental departments are accessible to date – in particular the Ministry of Tourism and Archaeology, the Public Statistics Department, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade.²⁷⁹</p>

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	18.10 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country's score in the Right-To-Information Rating?
Response	Jordan's overall score in the Right-To-Information Rating is 55. The highest and most favorable rating is 136 and the lowest, least favorable rating is 33. Jordan's ranking is 105 out of 110 countries. ²⁸⁰

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	18.11 =
Indicator question(s)	What are shortcomings of the access to information regime?
Response	<p>Access to information legislation contains four significant exceptions to which the harm test does not apply: agreements with other States, national security, foreign relations, and judicial investigations (please see Response 18.6 for more information). Further, there is no mention of a mandatory public interest override within the legislation (please see Response 18.7 for more information). In addition, according to the legislation, only citizens are specifically granted the right to request information.²⁸¹</p> <p>In terms of appeals, requesters have the right to lodge external appeals with the independent administrative oversight body and to the judiciary, but mechanisms for internal appeals, according to current legislation, do not exist. Further, the legislation does not mention the fees associated with lodging these appeals or the simplicity of the procedure. In addition, there is no mention of whether the government bears the burden of demonstrating that it did not operate in breach of the rules during the appeals process.²⁸²</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	18.12 =
Indicator question(s)	Are there any factors that, in practice, make it unnecessarily burdensome and difficult to request or gain access to information?
Response	<p>The information request application can be accessed and submitted online on the Department of the National Library's website, or can be completed by calling the Department and signing the application.²⁸³</p> <p>The information required within the request application includes the following: information access purpose, information subject(s), and requested information media; applying entity type, applying entity name, written authorization number, written authorization name, and delegate name if the applicant is an organization; the applicant's full name and his/her proof of identity type and number, residence, work address, work place, phone number, fax number, postal address, and email address; a pledge to use the information for the purpose that it was accessed for only; and an electronic attachment mechanism. The form states that the documents needed to complete the procedure are: a valid personal identification document and a written request from the requesting entity that includes the information subject, the purpose, and the delegate name.²⁸⁴</p> <p>In terms of fees, according to the application form, fees are only incurred for photocopies. The fees include: 25 fils for each A4 copy, 50 fils for each A3 copy, 2 dinars for each printed photograph, 1 dinar for each digital photograph, the cost of a CD for information stored on a CD, and for copies over 10 pages. Although relatively small, these fees may deter some individuals from making information requests.²⁸⁵</p> <p>Further, the form states that the application is to be accepted or rejected within thirty days, and receiving no answer within the thirty-day time frame is considered a rejection, thus allowing the Department to reject applications without a stated reason.²⁸⁶</p>

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	18.13 =
Indicator question(s)	How many requests for information were made to public authorities each year in the previous two years?
Response	According to the Information Council, 12,101 Access to Information requests in 2016, of which 12,077 were answered. In 2017, the number of requests increased to 13,383, of which 13,349 were answered. ²⁸⁷

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	18.14 =
Indicator question(s)	Have there been any developments in the past two years that suggest an improvement or deterioration in the framework for public access to information and/or its implementation?
Response	<p>In December 2016, the Planning and International Cooperation Minister shared Jordan's National Integrity Charter and action plan at the Open Government Partnership Summit, which addressed the need to enhance the legal framework regarding access to information.²⁸⁸ Following this, Jordan submitted its OGP Self-Assessment Report in October 2017, which detailed Jordan's plans to ensure greater access to information both in legal terms and in practice. One notable success cited in the report was implementing a program that enabled persons with disabilities to access information regarding court access and the use of the justice system.²⁸⁹</p> <p>In addition, according to the press, the then-Prime Minister stressed in a June 2017 meeting with the Jordan Press Association's President and Vice President, the Minister of State for Media Affairs, and the Association's council that transparency and access to information, for both the press and for individual citizens, is "one of the most important rights" and went on to emphasize the government's commitment to uphold these principles.²⁹⁰ A number of ministries also participated in a UNESCO pilot training on access to information in May of 2016.²⁹¹</p>

19. Open Government Data

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	19.1 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country's rank and score in the most recent edition of the Open Data Barometer, produced by the World Wide Web Foundation?
Response	Jordan's rank in the most recent edition of the Open Data Barometer (2015) is 70, with 1 being the highest ranking and 92 being the lowest ranking. Jordan's score is 10.32, with 100 being the highest score and 0 being the lowest score. ²⁹²

DIMENSION	THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT
Indicator number	19.2 =
Indicator question(s)	What is the country's score in the most recent available Open Data Index, produced by Open Knowledge International?
Response	Jordan's score on the latest available Open Data Index (2015) is 20% open, ranking 88 on a list of 122 countries. ²⁹³

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	19.3 =
Indicator question(s)	Are there noteworthy efforts or initiatives of public bodies to automatically publish information and documents online (especially in machine-readable formats and in line with open data standards) that are relevant to deterring or detecting corruption?
Response	As stated above, Jordan's Government Achievement Unit at the Prime Ministry has committed to launching a central electronic portal for citizens, members of Parliament, donors, and investors to monitor government performance by tracking the implementation of government plans throughout different governmental departments. ²⁹⁴ Further, Jordan's Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology has committed to implementing an open data sources policy that facilitates access to data in the government's possession that is non-confidential and non-privacy violating. An online platform has already been launched, and the data of three governmental departments are accessible thus far. ²⁹⁵ In addition, according to the 2017 OGP report, directives were sent to all governmental units requiring them to submit to the Ministry of Finance their financial accounts in a timely manner to be published, in order to increase the level of transparency surrounding budget disclosure and the publication of financial data. ²⁹⁶ Furthermore, Jordan made all eight of the aforementioned key budget-related documents available to the public online within a timeframe consistent with international standards in 2017 (please see response 14.3 for more information). ²⁹⁷ Lastly, Jordan's company registry and e-procurement system are now both available online (please see responses 4.6 and 15.6 for more information).

DIMENSION	IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
Indicator number	19.4 =
Indicator question(s)	Are there noteworthy civil society projects or initiatives that use open government data and/or, other publicly available data sources to strengthen government accountability and help deter and/or detect corruption?
Response	Civil society is involved in the planning and implementation of nearly all of Jordan's OGP commitments. The OGP national action plan was developed with the help of civil society organizations at its outset. ²⁹⁸ Civil society is also included in OGP processes such as conducting reviews of Jordan's legislative framework regarding access to information, enhancing the access of persons with disabilities to the justice system, developing transparent policies regarding climate change, and implementing an open data sources policy to be adopted throughout the government. ²⁹⁹

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