Shadow Report
Reviewing Progress made in Jordan for Targets Number 4, 5, 6 and 10 under Goal Number 16 From

2019
Rasheed for Integrity and Transparency (Transparency International - Jordan) was established at the end of 2013, as a non-for-profit organization that works on strengthening the pillars of good governance based on integrity, transparency, accountability and the rule of law within Jordanian institutions. Rasheed (TI-JO) has been granted accreditation to become a full chapter of Transparency International and has access to the expertise of the Berlin based TI-Secretariat and more than a hundred TI chapters around the world, which work to eliminate corruption by bringing together government, civil society, business and media.

Prepared by: Emad Al-Quraan

Supervision: Rasheed for Integrity and Transparency (Transparency International – Jordan)

This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of Rasheed for Integrity & Transparency and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.
Shadow Reporting Questionnaire for SDG 16.4, 16.5, 16.6 & 16.10

Background

The purpose of this questionnaire is to enable National Chapters to conduct an independent appraisal of their country’s progress in fighting corruption, tackling illicit financial flows, and improving transparency and access to information, as national governments begin implementing the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development.

The information gleaned from this exercise can be used as an input into two processes. At the global level, this information can be used to complement National Voluntary Reviews at the High-Level Political Forum in July 2018, while at the national level, the information generated can feed into governmental SDG reporting processes taking place on a rolling basis in each country.

Introduction

The SDGs set out an ambitious global development agenda until the year 2030. They consist of 17 goals and a total of 169 targets. The goals broadly cover three aspects of development: economic prosperity, social development, and the protection of the environment.

Global progress towards the targets will be monitored through a set of indicators, a number of which have yet to be finalized, while the data needed to measure progress against some indicators has never before been collected by UN agencies. At the national level, countries are encouraged to integrate global targets into national planning and policy processes, developing national targets and indicators tailored to their specific circumstances.

Over the coming years, state parties will report on national progress against the 17 SDGs to the High-Level Political Forum on a voluntary basis. While “in-depth” reporting on SDG 16 is due in 2019, integrity risks across the SDG framework make it essential to monitor national progress against corruption from the outset. National Voluntary Review reports to the 2018 High-Level Political Forum will cover all goals, though this year’s focus is on SDG 6 (water and sanitation), SDG 7 (sustainable energy), SDG 11 (cities), SDG 12 (sustainable consumption), SDG 15 (ecosystems and biodiversity), and SDG 17 (partnership), providing opportunities to track the impact of corruption in these sectors.

Outside official review processes, national chapters can:

• monitor country-specific corruption indicators which may not have been officially selected by the government, but are relevant to implementing the SDGs;
• comment on the official country report, calling attention to inaccuracies, omissions, or weaknesses;
• conduct parallel reviews and produce shadow reports using alternative data sources to complement and/or scrutinize the story of progress being told through official monitoring.
The purpose of this questionnaire is to support national chapters to monitor national anti-corruption progress. To do so, it covers a broad range of issues related to a robust anti-corruption framework. It aims to assist national chapters to identify areas where the national anti-corruption system leaves room for improvement and to collect data and information that will serve as a basis for compiling the shadow report.

Not all aspects and issues covered by the questionnaire may be relevant to all national contexts and the work of all chapters. Chapters can customize this questionnaire to reflect their national circumstances and support their advocacy priorities. Some sections can be dropped and questions may be adapted to fit the needs and context of each country.

Based on this first data collection effort, chapters will be able to compile shadow reports, using a template provided by the Secretariat. The shadow reports will be presented in July 2018, when national governments come together to present their first progress reports. They will complement and challenge reports produced by national governments, highlight areas that require reforms, and provide specific recommendations and next steps in order to generate momentum for the anti-corruption movement.

The development of regional reports is also envisaged to support national advocacy efforts based on these national shadow reports. These regional reports will build on the data provided by national chapters through this questionnaire.

**How to complete this questionnaire**

This questionnaire covers four SDG 16 targets which specifically relate to the fight against corruption:

- **16.4** – By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime
- **16.5** – Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
- **16.6** – Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
- **16.10** – Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, per national legislation and international agreements

Questions are designed to collect relevant data and information to track progress made towards achieving these targets, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators and suggesting possible data sources. Users completing this questionnaire may find it useful to refer to the Resource Guide on SDG indicators developed by the Secretariat.

When filling out the questionnaire, one to three paragraphs will likely be sufficient to answer most questions. To the extent possible, the response should always be backed by adequate and reliable sources. Please always try to provide links and sources to the information you have based your assessment on.
Text in *italic* provides background information to clarify the question and points researchers to possible sources where relevant information to answer a question may be found.

Sections with “guidance” provide links to relevant background documents that may also be useful when developing recommendations for the shadow report.

**There are three types of questions in this questionnaire.**

- Some of questions pertaining to the de jure legal framework contain “scoring” references. Please provide a scoring or rating suggestion, based on information you have identified. Details about the scoring process are provided in the methodological scoring document, and a list of all the questions and an overview of the scores is provided in this spreadsheet. Scored questions are highlighted in this colour.

- Alongside the score, there will be an opportunity to provide a brief narrative to answer the question and addressing de facto implementation and compliance. Narrative questions are highlighted in this colour.

- Information and data from relevant third party assessments will be also requested. These questions are highlighted in this colour.

Questions marked with * should be considered “optional” and only be answered if they appear relevant to the national context, time and resources permitting.

### Scores

Scored questions will require researchers to assign a numerical value to their country’s legal framework, based on guidance provided in the question. Each numerical value will correspond to one of the following five scores:

- Dark Green / 1
- Light Green / 0.75
- Orange / 0.5
- Light Red / 0.25
- Dark Red / 0
- Grey / Not applicable or no data available

**Note:** not all five coloured scores will be available for each question. Where a law or agency does not exist, subsequent questions about the provisions of that law or mandate of that agency should be scored 0 rather than marked as “not applicable”.
Table of Contents

Background

1. National SDG implementation plan and monitoring process
2. Recent developments

Target 16.4: significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime

3. Anti-money laundering
4. Beneficial ownership transparency
5. Recovery of stolen assets
6. Fight against organised crime (optional)
7. Arms trafficking (optional)

Rasheed’s observations on Target 16.4: Jordanian context

Target 16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
8. Experience and perception of corruption
9. Anti-corruption framework and institutions
10. Private sector corruption
11. Lobbying transparency
12. Party and election campaign finance transparency

Rasheed’s observations on Target 16.5: Jordanian context

Target 16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
13. Transparency and integrity in public administration
14. Fiscal transparency
15. Public procurement
16. Whistleblowing and reporting mechanisms

Target 16.10: Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements
17. Protection of fundamental freedoms
18. Access to information
19. Open government data (optional)
1. National SDG implementation plan and monitoring process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>BACKGROUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 =</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Has the government taken steps to develop an SDG action plan on how to implement the Agenda 2030 at the national level?

**Response**

In 2002, Jordan instated the Higher National Committee on Sustainable Development (HNCSD) as the national platform for dialogue surrounding sustainable development. The HNCSD is chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, whose ministry in 2015 managed the development of Jordan 2025, a national strategy that incorporates Agenda 2030 and aims to promote and direct sustainable social and economic policy within Jordan into 2025. More than 300 experts from the governmental, business, and civil society sectors supported the Jordan 2025 Steering Committee, and various processes – such as advertising a Public Call for Submissions and holding a National Conference – were carried out to foster broader engagement with citizens, civil society organizations, political parties, and businesses.

In July 2017, Jordan was one of forty-three countries that completed and presented at the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) a National Voluntary Review. Jordan’s National Voluntary Review highlighted the country’s progress toward the goals set out by the Jordan 2025 roadmap, challenges both encountered and foreseen, and the measures that must still be taken to achieve set goals.

Under the national voluntary review, the government decided to focus on the following priorities:

- Continue directing capital funding towards achieving comprehensive and sustainable development through the funding of national plans and priorities;
- Further strengthen Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), given their important role in implementing economically and socially viable strategic projects within a conducive legislative and business environment;
- Develop a business and investment environment that encourages local and foreign investment, especially ensuring that Jordan enjoys a competitive advantage in this field, in addition to legislation, privileges and incentives;
- Strengthen the competitiveness of Jordanian products in international markets and increase the growth of national exports by opening new markets and strengthening the rules of origin in international agreements, providing Jordan with a competitive edge;
- Promote regional cooperation in the areas of trade, transport, water and energy, leading to economic and social development without harming the environment;
- Promote North-South and South-South cooperation among countries, especially since Jordan enjoys a strategic position between Asia, Africa and Europe;
- Cooperate with developed economies in the fields of knowledge transfer and technology for the achievement of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;
- Secure funding for the national plan to reduce emissions submitted at the Paris Climate Change Conference, which strives for a global contribution to climate change mitigation;
- Strengthen the framework of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) with the private sector, ensuring engagement in sustainable development and community service.
### Dimension Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>1.2 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator question(s)</strong></td>
<td>Which government body or bodies are in charge of the implementation of the national SDG implementation process, and in particular concerning the implementation of SDG 16?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
<td>The Higher National Committee on Sustainable Development (HNCSD), chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, has been designated as the primary body in charge of the national SDG implementation process. The government bodies that take part in the implementation of SDG 16 specifically include the Anti-Money Laundering Unit, the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Information Council, and the Public Security Directorate, among others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>1.3 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator question(s)</strong></td>
<td>Has civil society been able to contribute to the selection of national indicators concerning SDG 16 and have there been any formal discussions about how anti-corruption targets will fit into the implementation of a national SDG plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
<td>As the National Voluntary Review was being developed, relevant stakeholders – such as civil society organizations focusing on human rights, women’s rights, and community development; youth and volunteer organizations; the private sector; workers’ unions; local councils and committees; figures within academia; the science and technology communities; and representatives from refugee communities – were consulted in workshops and meetings to contribute to the drafting of the review. However, although government transparency and accountability targets – as well as corruption performance measurement indicators – are included in Jordan 2025, the National Voluntary Review itself does not go into great detail on progress made toward targets 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, and 16.10. While the review stresses the importance of freedom of expression and the media in promoting stability and peace, data on country-wide progress toward target 16.10 was not included. In addition, although aims such as judicial independence, greater access to justice, and penal code amendments were mentioned, these aims remain only tangentially related to targets 16.4, 16.5, and 16.6. More specific anti-corruption targets can be found in Jordan’s National Integrity Charter and Executive Plan to Enhance the National Integrity System, as well as the 2013-2017 and 2017-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategies. These materials were developed in consultation with anti-corruption partners in the private and public sectors, NGOs, and civil society institutions, all of which provided data and information that was integrated into the Charter, Executive Plan, and Strategy. The Charter and Executive Plan contain data from relevant anti-corruption actors (including civil society) through outreach activities, consultative meetings, and the announcement of an email address and fax number to receive public recommendations and notes. The Strategy contains data collected from meetings and workshops with relevant anti-corruption actors, online questionnaires, and previous anti-corruption evaluation reports. It is recommended that more specific anti-corruption targets, which can be found in the aforementioned charter, executive plan, and strategy, be integrated into all future sustainable development plans and reviews.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DIMENSION BACKGROUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Has the development of national SDG implementation reports relating to SDG 16 been open and inclusive?</td>
<td>No implementation reports relating specifically to SDG 16 are publicly available at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>No official assessments or implementation reports on progress toward targets 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, and 16.10 specifically are publicly available at this time.</td>
<td>No implementation reports relating specifically to SDG 16 are publicly available at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Are there any salient corruption or governance issues which are omitted or not adequately addressed in the official national report?</td>
<td>Not applicable, given that SDG 16 was not substantially addressed in the VNR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Has the country adopted a national anti-corruption action plan?</td>
<td>1: A national anti-corruption action plan has been adopted</td>
<td>In 2012, the National Integrity Charter and Executive Plan to Enhance Jordan’s National Integrity System were instated to serve as a pillar of reform that would work to address citizen confidence in and trust toward government institutions. The Jordanian government has also developed a series of National Anti-Corruption Strategies, including the 2008-2012 Strategy, the 2013-2017 Strategy, and the 2017-2025 Strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scoring</td>
<td>0.5: There is an ongoing process to draft and adopt a national anti-corruption action plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0: There is no national anti-corruption action plan and no apparent process to adopt one</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2. Recent developments
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD-PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>2.2 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>55% of respondents state that their government performs “well“ at fighting corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in government, according to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Please provide the percentage from the most recent TI Global Corruption Barometer</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(<a href="http://gcb.transparency.org">http://gcb.transparency.org</a>), and provide the year of the GCB you are quoting</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(if data is available for your country), otherwise please provide similar survey</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>results from another regional or national survey, if available.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>BACKGROUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>2.3 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Has your country’s current political leadership made public declarations about fighting corruption in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past two years? Have there been high-level commitments by the current administration to strengthen the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>legal framework, policies or institutions that are relevant to preventing, detecting and prosecuting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>corruption?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many figures in Jordan’s political leadership are publicly referring to corruption and the efforts to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fighting corruption as a national priority, and King Abdullah II has directed the government to coordinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fighting corruption and to accelerate the implementation of automation procedures related to government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>processes (e-government). The Prime Minister also expressed his satisfaction on the procedures that his</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>government followed to fight corruption in Jordan from both the legislative side and the procedural sides,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>where he stated that the government managed to identify and refer several cases to the Integrity and Anti-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption Commission in Jordan. The Prime Minister promised reforms for ensuring JIACC’s independence and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to enable the commission to operate freely. As a result, a corresponding legislative proposal was recently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>submitted to parliament and approved latter by the parliament.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>BACKGROUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>2.4 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there evidence that laws and policies are not equally applied to all officials, resulting in an increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>risk for misuse of power and grand corruption?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Prime Ministry quarter report for the government’s commitments for the years 2019 – 2020 included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fighting corruption and strengthening transparency and integrity as one of this government’s national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>priorities. The report reflects that 148 cases were referred to JIACC in the first six months of 2019 and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the amount of assets recovered due to corruption or other illicit gains to reach 33 million Jordanian dinars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moreover, the parliament voted on sending two main cases to the courts for persecution for two ex-ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on corruption cases, as for evidence that laws or policies not equally applied to officials in general, there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>was no evidence found of such cases registered at courts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Indicator number 2.5 = Have there been significant anti-corruption reforms or advances in the fight against corruption in the past two years?

**Response**

Several laws and regulations have been amended or are in the process of being amended in Jordan including the illicit gains law no (40) for the year of 2018 that included additional positions that are covered under the law, thus expanding the level of monitoring for higher positions. In January 2019, the PM cabinet decided to include the public servants in the AML/TF units to the illicit gains law\(^{10}\). Another key law that governs fighting corruption is the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law which was submitted by the PM to the parliament and approved by the lower house in August\(^{11}\). Amendments to this law increased the independence of the Anti-Corruption Commission’s chief and enforced the Commission’s ability to monitor unjustifiable growth of wealth under the illicit gains law\(^{12}\).

### Indicator number 2.6 = How do you assess the space for civil society and the media to investigate and highlight corruption risks and cases, and to demand accountability from the country’s political and economic elite?

**Indicator question(s)**

Have there been significant developments that affected the room of manoeuvre of the media and civil society, positively or negatively? Have fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of speech and assembly, been restricted? Please briefly describe.

**Response**

Several national discussions addressed the issues related to freedom of expression especially since the Cybercrimes law was due to some amendments that included the following:

- The proposed law equalised treatment between newspapers, websites and social media networks.
- Suspended arrests in defamation and humiliation.
- Re-defined hate speech.
- Setting the jurisdiction for the first instance courts for all cybercrimes law.

However, the amended law was never approved. and still arguable even in the parliament and through social media in Jordan which in all cases can limit the media’s abilities to conduct investigative reports and the lack of clarity for some other definitions within the law to limit freedom of expression.

While the media, within the current context, would be best suited to investigate and highlight corruption risks and cases in Jordan, Rasheed – Transparency International gave the collective Jordanian media a poor rating in its National Integrity System evaluation report. Although it has played an increasingly important role in highlighting a number of corruption cases over the past five years, the media as an institution largely lacks independence in practice, given that the majority of media outlets are owned by the public sector.
In addition, the Access to Information Law does not include a self-disclosure principle, in which public institutions are required to regularly publish information regarding their work. This issue is primarily evident on governmental institution websites, which are irregularly updated and rarely include statistics related to their work.

Furthermore, the NIS evaluation found that, within the past two years, the media has largely retreated from its role in exposing and monitoring corruption. The roots of this media retreat can be traced back to a general lack of information, as well as a widespread fear of retaliation and possible prosecution.\textsuperscript{15} Despite this, the media has retained its important role in publicising corruption cases raised by the House of Representatives, reports issued by the JIACC, and press conferences held by the JIACC President.\textsuperscript{16}

“The current situation is not encouraging for journalists to investigate corruption cases” was a quotation from one of the key informants interviewed in relation to the current space given for media, who further added that sometimes the barrier is the lack of clarity of the rules and regulations, which results in drawing limitations that don’t even exist in some cases. Moreover, two key informant interviews shared one key concern regarding access to information as one of the key obstacles that journalists face as, according to the key informant, several requests were denied.\textsuperscript{17}

Target 16.4: “By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 16.4.1:</th>
<th>Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 16.4.2:</td>
<td>Proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Anti-money laundering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>3.1 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Has the country adopted a law to criminalize money laundering, in line with recommendation 3 of the FATF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: Compliant (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.75: Largely Compliant (LC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: Partially Compliant (PC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: Non-compliant (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, no major amendments took place in the AML side in the past year to address certain gaps in the current law. Notably, the law does not provide enough detail to adequately cover FATF recommendations:

- 3.5, which states, “when proving that property is the proceeds of a crime, it should not be necessary that a person be convicted of a predicate offense;”
- 3.7, which stipulates, “the money laundering offence should apply to persons who commit the predicate offense, unless this is contrary to fundamental principles of domestic law;” and
- 3.8, which specifies, “it should be possible for the intent and knowledge required to prove the money laundering offense to be inferred from factual circumstances.”

### DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>3.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Has the government during the last three years conducted an assessment of the money laundering risks related to legal persons and arrangements, in line with Principle 2 of TI’s “Just for Show?” report? Has the final risk assessment been published?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Scoring | 1: A risk assessment was carried out and is available to the public  
0.5: A risk assessment was carried out; only an executive summary of the risk assessment has been published  
0: No, the risk assessment has not been published or conducted  
- : Not applicable or no data available |
| Response | Score: 0.5 The Anti Money Laundering Unit “AMLU” underwent a national assessment that studied the threats of money laundering and terrorist financing in Jordan, as well as the weaknesses and threats faced by its anti-money laundering and terrorist financing system, in coordination with the IMF. This assessment was planned in 2017 and implemented in throughout June and July of 2018. The report is not yet available to the public. Given that the report was not published the score given is the same score as last year. |
## DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

### Indicator number 3.3 =

**Indicator question(s)**
Are financial institutions (banks) prohibited by law from keeping anonymous accounts and are they required to undertake due diligence on their customers, in line with FATF recommendation 10?

**Scoring**

1: Financial institutions are prohibited by law from keeping anonymous accounts; they are also required to undertake due diligence on their customers, in line with FATF recommendation 10

0.5: Only one of those provisions is in place: Financial institutions are prohibited by law from keeping anonymous accounts, or they are required to undertake due diligence on their customers

0: Financial institutions are allowed to offer anonymous accounts, and they are not required to carry out due diligence on their customers

- : Not applicable or no data available


### Response

Score: 1  Financial institutions in Jordan are prohibited from keeping anonymous accounts and are required to undertake due diligence on their customers, according to new instructions issued by the Central Bank of Jordan and approved by the AMLU in June, 2018.19

These regulations, effective as of June 26, 2018, replaced Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Instructions No. 51 of 2010 and are based upon FATF 2012 recommendations and recent market developments, both locally and internationally.20 In particular, the instructions integrate elements of FATF’s risk-based approach, such as new and specific procedures for banks to conduct required client checks, identify high-risk persons (both Jordanian and foreign), and adhere to specified practices when sending, receiving, or mediating the transfer of money.21 Further, the regulations require both the development of anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing training programs and the allocation of funds to be used specifically for these training programs.22

## DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

### Indicator number 3.4 =

**Indicator question(s)**
Are financial institutions required by law to inform relevant authorities when they suspect (or have reasonable grounds to suspect) that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity, in line with FATF recommendation 20?

**Scoring**

1: Financial institutions are required by law to inform relevant authorities when they suspect or have grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity, in line with FATF recommendation 10

0.5: Financial institutions are required by law to inform relevant authorities, but the requirements are only partially in line with FATF recommendation 10

0: Financial institutions are not required by law to report funds they suspect are the proceeds of criminal activity

- : Not applicable or no data available
### Indicator question(s)
You may find some relevant information in mutual evaluation reports on FATF compliance and TI’s Just for Show report on G20 countries’ compliance with G20 beneficial ownership transparency principles.


### Response
Score: 1 Financial institutions are required by law to inform relevant authorities when they suspect that funds are related to money laundering or terrorist financing, according to the regulations issued pursuant to the Banking Law No. 28 of 2000, the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Law No. 46 of 2007, and the new 2018 regulations for financial institutions.²³

### DIMENSION
**LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>3.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Are designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) – casinos, real estate agents, jewellers, lawyers, notaries, other legal professionals, accountants, and trust and company service providers – required to carry out customer due diligence, to keep records, and to report suspicious transactions to the financial intelligence unit, in line with FATF recommendations 22 and 23?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Scoring | 1: Designated non-financial businesses and professions by law are required to carry out customer due diligence, to keep records and to report suspicious transactions, in line with FATF recommendations 22 and 23.  
0.5: There are some legal obligations for designated non-financial businesses and professions to carry out customer due diligence, or to keep records, or to report suspicious transactions. These requirements are only partially in line with FATF recommendations 22 and 23.  
0: There are no legal obligations for designated non-financial businesses and professions to carry out customer due diligence, or to keep records, or to report suspicious transactions  
- : Not applicable or no data available |

Response

Score: 0.5  Jordanian legislation is in part aligned with FATF recommendations 22 and 23 in designated non-financial businesses. The Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Law No. 46 of 2007 lists the following DNFBPs as entities required to comply with the provisions of the law: “persons or entities trading in real estate and its development; persons or entities trading in precious metals and stones; and persons or entities that perform the following business transactions on behalf of a third party: sale or purchase of real estate, management of funds or any other financial assets, management of bank accounts, postal saving accounts, or investments accounts in local and international financial markets, legal procedures necessary for establishing or managing any legal person, purchasing or selling commercial stores, and organization of contributions related to establishing or managing companies” (Article 13b). Only entities carrying out legal procedures for legal entities are specified, and casinos are not relevant within the Jordanian context. Accountants, as well as trust and company service providers, are not explicitly mentioned in the law, but could be covered under the “management of funds or any other financial assets” and “management of bank accounts” specifications.

DNFBPs are required to follow the same due diligence procedures that, by law, financial entities must carry out, as specified within Article 13. Politically exposed persons (PEPs) are now defined as those connected to public offices in foreign countries, as per the instructions issued under the 2007 Law, as well as those connected to public offices in Jordan, as per the 2018 regulations for financial institutions and select DNFBPs, including licensed real estate companies. Previously, the instructions for financial institutions and licensed real estate companies called for enhanced diligence for PEPs according to Recommendation 22, but such practices of enhanced diligence apply only to foreign PEPs. 24

In addition, it is not adequately addressed whether or not reliance on third parties to carry out customer due diligence is permitted for DNFBPs, as specified in Recommendation 22. The instructions for companies trading in real estate and precious stones and metals also include most regulations specified in Recommendation 23. However, screening procedures for employee hiring and the employment of an independent audit function to test internal controls are not mentioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>3.6 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Does the law require financial institutions to conduct enhanced due diligence in cases where the customer or the beneficial owner is a PEP (politically exposed person) or a family member or close associate of a PEP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring</strong></td>
<td>1: Yes, financial institutions are required to conduct enhanced due diligence in cases where their client is a foreign or a domestic PEP, or a family member or close associate of a PEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: Yes, but the law does not cover both foreign and domestic PEPs, and their close family and associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: No, there is no requirement for enhanced due diligence in the case of PEPs and associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This information may be partly included in the FATF mutual evaluation report. Search for answers in national anti-money laundering legislation or any guidance or policies issued by the Financial Intelligence Unit, or contact them. See TI’s Just for Show report on G20 countries’ compliance with G20 beneficial ownership transparency principles [http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises](http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises).*
### Response

Score: 0.5 According to the new regulations issued in 2018, financial institutions are required to conduct enhanced due diligence on both foreign politically exposed persons and their first-degree family members (at minimum) and local politically exposed persons and their family members.

### Scoring

1: Yes, financial institutions are required to conduct enhanced due diligence in cases where their client is a foreign or a domestic PEP, or a family member or close associate of a PEP

0.5: Yes, but the law does not cover both foreign and domestic PEPs, and their close family and associates

0: No, there is no requirement for enhanced due diligence in the case of PEPs and associates

- : Not applicable or no data available

*This information may be partly included in the FATF mutual evaluation report. Search for answers in national anti-money laundering legislation or any guidance or policies issued by the Financial Intelligence Unit, or contact them. See TI’s Just for Show report on G20 countries’ compliance with G20 beneficial ownership transparency principles [http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises](http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises).*

### Response

Score: 1 Regulations for DNFBPs were re-written in 2018 to define both foreign and domestic PEPs as higher risk, thus necessitating enhanced due diligence. However, new regulations for all internationally-recognized DNFBPs that adhere to this same standard must be created.

### Response

Score: 0 Jordan is not currently a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Forum and has not signed the multilateral competent authority agreement on the exchange of country-by-country reports on key indicators of multinational enterprise groups.

### Scoring

1: Yes

0: No

- : Not applicable or no data available

*Please answer “Yes” if your jurisdiction is listed in the OECD’s Country-Specific Information on Country-By-Country Reporting Implementation [https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/country-specific-information-on-country-by-country-reporting-implementation.htm](https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/country-specific-information-on-country-by-country-reporting-implementation.htm).*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 3.9 =</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Has the country signed the competent authority multinational agreement on automatic exchange of financial account information?

**Scoring**

1: Yes  
0: No  
- : Not applicable or no data available

*The OECD maintains a list of signatories and the date the information exchange is intended to start by [https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/MCAA-Signatories.pdf](https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/MCAA-Signatories.pdf). Please answer with “Yes”, if your jurisdiction is included in the list and provide the start date stated in the document. The OECD also provides information on the details of which jurisdictions will bilaterally exchange financial account information [https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs](https).*

**Response**

Score: 0 Jordan has not signed the competent authority multinational agreement on automatic exchange of financial account information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 3.10 =</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

How is the jurisdiction’s performance on the exchange of information for tax purposes on request assessed by the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes?

**Scoring**

1: Compliant (C)  
0.75: Largely Compliant (LC)  
0.5: Partially Compliant (PC)  
0: Non-compliant (NC)  
- : Not applicable or no data available


**Response**

Not applicable.
DIMENSION THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT

Indicator number 3.11 =

Indicator question(s) What is the country’s score in the Basel Institute on Governance’s Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index https://index.baselgovernance.org/?

Response Jordan’s score on the Basel Institute on Governance’s 2019 Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index is 4.77 on a scale of 0 (low risk) to 10 (high risk). This score places Jordan 86th out of 125 total countries ranked, the second-most favourable ranking within the Middle East region.

DIMENSION THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT

Indicator number 3.12 =

Indicator question(s) What is the country’s secrecy score in the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index https://financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2018-results?

Response No results are available for Jordan in the Tax Justice Networks Financial Secrecy Index.

DIMENSION THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT

Indicator number 3.13 =

Indicator question(s) What is the estimated illicit financial outflow of funds from your country in the latest available year, according to Global Financial Integrity http://www.gfintegrity.org/issues/data-by-country?

Response The estimated illicit financial outflow of funds from Jordan in 2015 (the latest available year) was 759 (in millions of USD), according to Global Financial Integrity.

DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

Indicator number 3.14 =

Indicator question(s) Is there evidence that money laundering is effectively prosecuted?

Response If available, please provide the following statistics from the two most recent years:

- The number of criminal investigations for money laundering (ML) activity;
- The number of prosecutions for ML activity;
- The number of ML convictions (number of cases and individuals convicted);
- The average length of custodial sentences imposed for ML convictions;
- The average value of fine imposed on ML convictions;
- The number of sanctions imposed for ML offences;
- The value of proceeds of crime, instrumentalities, or property of equivalent value confiscated.

FATF considers these statistics to be particularly useful, the data is likely to be included in the most recent mutual evaluation report http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations.

The Ministry of Justice was contacted and provided with a request in regards to the number of cases that were persecuted in Jordan, however, no response has been received to date. However, due to the link between money laundering and corruption, JIACC was also asked to provide this data and the feedback from the Commission included the following:
**Dimension: Implementation and Compliance**

**Indicator number 3.15**

**Indicator question(s)**

How many suspicious transactions reports did financial institutions and different types of DNFBPs file in the last two years for which data is available?

**Response**

If any data is available, you may find it in the most recent FATF mutual evaluation report or an annual report issued by the country's Financial Intelligence Unit. Please name the source.

Data not available

---

**Indicator number 3.16**

**Indicator question(s)**

Have there been any noteworthy changes or developments in the past two years that indicate improvement or deterioration in the framework or practice to prevent and fight money laundering?

**Response**

Please see response 3.5

**Guidance**


## 4. Beneficial ownership transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>4.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

To what extent does the law in your country clearly define beneficial ownership?

**Scoring**

1: Beneficial owner is defined as a natural person who directly or indirectly exercises ultimate control over a legal entity or arrangement, and the definition of ownership covers control through other means, in addition to legal ownership.

0.5: Beneficial owner is defined as a natural person [who owns a certain percentage of shares], but there is no mention of whether the control is exercised directly or indirectly, or if control is limited to a percentage of share ownership.

0: There is no definition of beneficial ownership, or the control element is not included.

- : Not applicable or no data available

The beneficial owner(s) is the person who ultimately exercises control through legal ownership or other means. The beneficial owner should always be a natural (physical) person and never another legal entity. Please provide the name and links to the law that defines beneficial ownership and provide an assessment of this definition. You find more information in TI’s “Just for Show?” report and the G20 country reports (Principle 1, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises).

**Response**

Score: 1

The Anti Money Laundering Law No. 46 for the Year 2007 defines the beneficial owner as “the natural person with the real interest for whom the business relationship is conducted for or on his behalf, or who has full or effective control over a legal person or has the right to conclude a legal arrangement on its behalf.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>4.2 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Does the law require that financial institutions have procedures for identifying the beneficial owner(s) when establishing a business relationship with a client?

**Scoring**

1: Yes, financial institutions are always required to identify the beneficial owners of their clients when establishing a business relationship.

0.5: Financial institutions are required to identify the beneficial owners only in cases considered as high-risk, or the requirement does not cover the identification of the beneficial owners of both natural and legal customers.

0: No, there is no requirement to identify the beneficial owners

- : Not applicable or no data available

Please assess your country’s framework against the standards described in Principle 7 of TI’s “Just for Show?” report, which also provides relevant information on G20 countries (https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises).

For a detailed definition of “financial institution”, please see the FATF definition (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/glossary/d-i/).
| Score: 1 | The law stipulates that entities subject to the provision of the Anti Money Laundering Law, including both financial institutions and Transparency International’s minimum specified DNFBPs, must “give due diligence to the identification of the customer’s entity, legal status, activity of the customer, purpose of the business relationship and nature, and the beneficiary owner of the relationship between the entities and the customer, if any, and verifying such.” It also states that entities subject to the provision of the law must “keep records and legal instruments to document the local and international financial transactions to include sufficient data to identify such transactions; as well as maintaining such records, documents, legal instruments, data and information including customer’s due diligence data and beneficiary owners for not less than five years from the date of completion of the transaction or the date of termination of the business, as the case may be, which shall be updated periodically”.  

The specific entities subject to this law are both financial entities and non-financial entities.  

Financial entities include banks operating in Jordan, exchange and money transfer companies, persons or companies exercising any of the activities subject to the supervision and licensing of the Securities Commission and the Insurance Commission, entities offering postal services, as well as entities that:

- Grant all types of credit,
- Provide payment and collection services,
- Issue and administrate instruments payments and credit,
- Trade in stock exchange market and capital market instruments for its own account of for clients,
- Purchase and sell debts with or without the right of recourse,
- Provide financial leasing, or
- Manage investments and financial assets on behalf of a third party

Non-financial entities include all persons/entities trading in real estate and real estate development, or trading in precious metals and stones as well as entities performing any of the following:

- Sale and purchase of real estate;
- Management of funds or any other financial assets;
- Management of bank accounts, postal saving accounts, or investment accounts in local and international financial markets;
- Legal procedures necessary for establishing or managing any legal person,
- Purchasing, or selling commercial stores; or
- Organize contributions related to establishing or managing companies.  

<p>| Response | 31 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>4.3 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Does the law specify which competent authorities (e.g. financial intelligence unit, tax authorities, public prosecutors, anti-corruption agencies, etc.) have access to beneficial ownership information?

**Scoring**

0: The law or relevant decrees or policies do not specify which authorities should have access to beneficial ownership information

1: Yes, the law specifies that all law enforcement bodies, tax agencies, and the financial intelligence unit should have access to beneficial ownership information

0.75: Yes, a decree or another authoritative standard or policy specifies that all law enforcement bodies, tax agencies, and the financial intelligence unit should have access to beneficial ownership information

0.5: Only some competent authorities are explicitly mentioned in the law, decree or policy

0: The law or relevant decrees or policies do not specify which authorities should have access to beneficial ownership information

- : Not applicable or no data available

*You may find information in TI’s “Just for Show?” report and the G20 country reports (Principle 4, [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises](https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises)].*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Score:** 0

As stipulated in the 2011 Instructions No. 3, issued pursuant to the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Law, companies are required to designate an accredited, independent Reporting Officer and Deputy Reporting Officer in the Officer’s absence. These officers are tasked with implementing the provisions of the Anti Money Laundering Law and its related instructions, including the gathering of information regarding beneficiary ownership. The entity’s chairman, board members, general managers, and all employees, in compliance with the law, must alert the Reporting Officer of any transactions suspected to be connected to money laundering or terrorist financing, and the Reporting Officer must then inform the AMLU immediately of any suspicious transaction. However, the instructions only specify the employment of this reporting mechanism in the event of suspicious transactions, or at the AMLU’s request.

Further, while the bodies such as the Securities Commission, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade are tasked with the supervision and monitoring of securities companies, banks, and companies – which includes having access to information such as company owners – none of these authorities are explicitly mentioned in the legislation that contained information on beneficiary ownership monitoring procedures.
### Dimension: Implementation and Compliance

#### Indicator number 4.4

**Indicator question(s)**

Which information sources are competent authorities allowed to access for beneficial ownership information?

**Scoring:**
- 0.5: Information is available through a central beneficial ownership registry/company registry
- 0.75: Information is available through decentralized beneficial ownership registries/company registries
- 0.5: Authorities have access to information maintained by legal entities/or information recorded by tax agencies/or information obtained by financial institutions and DNFBPs
- 0: Information on beneficial ownership is not available
- -: Not applicable or no data available

*These rules may be defined by law or by policy. You may also find information in TI’s “Just for Show?” report and G20 country reports (Principle 4, [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises]).*

**Response**

The Companies Control Department (CCD), within Jordan’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, holds and supervises the company registry.34

---

#### Indicator number 4.5

**Indicator question(s)**

Which public authority supervises/holds the company registry?

In case there are regional company registries, please briefly explain which authorities are supervising/holding them (you don’t have to provide a list of all entities).

**Response**

The Companies Control Department (CCD), within Jordan’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, holds and supervises the company registry.35

---

### Dimension: Legislative and Institutional Framework

#### Indicator number 4.6

**Indicator question(s)**

What information on beneficial ownership is recorded in the company registry?

**Scoring**
- 1: All relevant information is recorded: name of the beneficial owner(s), identification or tax number, personal or business address, nationality, country of residence and description of how control is exercised
- 0.75: Information is partially recorded
- 0.5: Only the name of the beneficial owner is recorded
- 0: No information is recorded
- -: Not applicable or no data available

*You may find information in TI’s “Just for Show?” report and the G20 country reports (Principle 4, [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises]).*

In countries where there are sub-national registries, please respond to the question using the state/province registry that contains the largest number of incorporated companies.
Score: 0  According to the CCD, all owners, partners, and shareholders of a company are required to register their names to the company and sign a form stating that there are no ‘hidden persons’ in ownership. If such a form is not signed, the company cannot be registered. Thus, a company is forbidden to have beneficiary owners if these owners are not registered to the company. However, the CCD stated that, in practice, some company owners, shareholders, and partners may violate this law.36

If the CCD has reason to suspect hidden persons or other unlawful activities, Article 273 of the Companies Law 22 of 1997 and its Amendments gives the CCD the power to form an investigation committee that is tasked with auditing the company in question. Further, if a complaint is raised initially to the JIACC or the AMLU about a registered company, the CCD is notified and the agencies will work in close coordination to monitor the company in question. According to the CCD, 20 investigation committees were formed in 2017 and 8 investigation committees were formed in 2018 as of July 10, 2018.

Because the law requires that all owners, partners, and shareholders be registered under these categories, ‘beneficial ownership’ specifically is not a field that companies are required to submit to the registry. Instead, the identifying information recorded in the registry includes owner, partner, and shareholder names, national identification numbers, and nationalities. Business addresses and the names of general managers are also included in the registry.37

As for the most recent developments by the Companies Controller Department aiming for increasing the accuracy or transparency of the beneficial ownership a special record for beneficial owner of the (companies)/shareholders – Non Jordanians is under development and that the estimated date for completion is the end of 2020.

In regards to the activities and actions that have been taken by the CCD since December 2018 included the following:

- Publishing a guide for identifying the real beneficial owners for the companies and sharing it officially with the staff members.
- Showing the companies partners records (Both Jordanians and foreign investors)
- If a company is a shareholder in another company its details are showed and any person can use the link to access the original company records and the names of the owners and authorized signatories.
- In regards to the foreign companies as partners/ shareholders, the names of the beneficial owners are published on the website (only the name exists due to the unavailability of information on the database).
- The CCD also issued a circular requiring all foreign companies that desire to register to provide the names of the founders in the original country of registration. 38
**DIMENSION** | **LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**  
---|---  
**Indicator number** | **4.7 =**  
**Indicator question(s)** | What information on beneficial ownership is made available to the public?  
Scoring: 0.5  
1: All relevant information is published online: name of the beneficial owner(s), identification or tax number, personal or business address, nationality, country of residence and description of how control is exercised  
0.75: Information is partially published online, but some data is omitted (e.g. tax number); sufficient information is accessible to identify the beneficial owner  
0.5: Only the name of the beneficial owner is published, or information is only made available on paper/physically  
0.25: Only the name of the direct owner (who may not be beneficial owners) is accessible  
0: No information is published, or accessible information is insufficient to identify direct or beneficial owners  
- : Not applicable or no data available  
*You may find information in TI’s “Just for Show?” report and the G20 country reports (Principle 4, [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises]).*  
*Please briefly describe what information is available to the public, based on the details listed in the scoring criteria below. Mention any other information included in the registry that appears relevant. Please provide a link to the register.*  
  
**Response**  
Score: 0.25  
All the aforementioned information is available to the public through the company registry, which can be found online.  

**DIMENSION** | **LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**  
---|---  
**Indicator number** | **4.8 =**  
**Indicator question(s)** | Does the law require legal entities to update information on beneficial ownership, shareholders, and directors provided in the company registry?  
Scoring criteria: 0.75  
1: Yes, legal entities are required by law to update information on beneficial ownership or information relevant to identifying the beneficial owner (directors/shareholders) immediately or within 24 hours after the change  
0.75: Yes, legal entities are required to update the information on beneficial ownership or directors/shareholders within 30 days after the change  
0.5: Yes, legal entities are required to update the information on the beneficial owner or directors/shareholders on an annual basis  
0.25: Yes, but the law does not specify a specific timeframe  
0: No, the law does not require legal entities to update the information on control and ownership  
- : Not applicable or no data available  
*You may find information in TI’s “Just for Show?” report and the G20 country reports (Principle 4, [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises]).*
Score: 0.75  In the event that information relevant to identifying owners, shareholders, and directors changes, the CCD typically requires that these changes be reported within ten days. In the case of a death, there is a 60 to 90 day limit for reporting changes. According to the CCD, in an effort to encourage investment, a one to two week breach of the 10-day requirement does not typically result in repercussions. However, if there is a significant breach of the 10-day condition, there will be repercussions that may eventually result in advancing the case to the general prosecutor, and the breach will be recorded on an incident tracker that is held internally within the CCD. This tracker allows CCD employees to monitor breaches and share internal knowledge with new employees. 39

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>4.9 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Indicator question(s) | Is there a registry which collects information on trusts?  
Scoring: 0.5  
1: Yes, information on trusts, including beneficiaries/beneficial owners, is maintained in a registry and accessible to the public  
0.5: Yes, there is a registry of trusts, but information available to the public is not sufficient to identify the beneficiaries/beneficial owners  
0: No, there is no registry in which all trusts are listed  
- : Not applicable or no data available  

Does the register contain information on the beneficiaries or beneficial owners and officers of the trust? Does it contain annual accounts? Please also consider including any similar types of legal entity in your country, such as foundations. You may find information in TI’s “Just for Show?” report and the G20 country reports (Principle 6, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises). |
| Response | Financial information and stock and trusts information are recorded but considered a non-public information under the Jordanian Banking law number (29). 40 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>4.10 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>What is the country’s score in the Open Company Data Index produced by Open Corporates <a href="http://registries.opencorporates.com">http://registries.opencorporates.com</a>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Jordan’s score is 25/100. 41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Dimension: Implementation and Compliance

**Indicator number 4.11 =**

**Indicator question(s):** How strong is the level of transparency of the company registry in practice?

*Please provide the following information:*

a. Is the registry easily accessible online? Is it searchable by various relevant parameters (such as addresses of registration, company name, company ID and by the names of directors and owners)?

b. Is access free? If not, how much do you have to pay for search and receive the ownership information of one company?

c. Are annual accounts and other filings of companies accessible to the public?

d. Is registration required for the entity to be legally valid and/or allowed to operate in the country?

**Response**

The registry is easily accessible and available online and it includes the company name and registration ID in addition to the company structure and means of management that includes the names of the shareholders, authorised signatories, manager/management committee names and national ID numbers. The access for the website is free and no fees are required for accessing any of the aforementioned information, in addition, any amendments that take place to the company i.e. changing the shareholders or the company capital are available in the website. Moreover, any other legal changes to the company. However, the annual accounts are not available except for public shareholding companies and foreign companies. The registration of the company is required for most of the companies to operate and use the company name in business.

However, if proven to the CCD that a company is practicing commercial activities with no registration, the company is eligible for prosecution under Article 3 of the Jordanian Companies’ Law.42

---

**Dimension: Implementation and Compliance**

**Indicator number 4.12 =**

**Indicator question(s):** Have there been any developments in the past two years that indicate improvement or deterioration of the transparency of corporations and other legal entities?

**Response**

There have been no major changes on the beneficial ownership in Jordan where the information that is available to the public is available in the CCD website for all types of companies that operate in the Kingdom. The information that is available to the public includes the following: The Anti Money Laundering Law No. 46 for the Year 2007 defines the beneficiary owner as “the natural person with the real interest for whom the business relationship is conducted for or on his behalf, or who has full or effective control over a legal person or has the right to conclude a legal arrangement on its behalf.” 43

One key development for the improvement of the transparency of corporations is mandating the adaptation of good governance as a key requirement for companies under the latest amendments of the aforementioned law of 2018, in addition to the various circulars issued by the CCD including circular(/8134/26/5/1)
Guidance

• More information about the importance of beneficial ownership transparency is available at Open Ownership (http://openownership.org/) and in TI’s 2015 report: Just for Show? Reviewing G20 promises on beneficial ownership (https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/just_for_show_g20_promises)

• Mutual evaluation reports by the FATF, especially compliance with recommendations 24 and 25 (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations)


• Relevant information on corporate ownership transparency may be included in an assessment of your country in the Financial Secrecy Index (https://financialsecrecy-index.com/introduction/fsi-2018-results)

• You may find information that helps you answer these questions on the website of Open Corporates’ Open Company Data Index (http://registries.opencorporates.com/) and by accessing and searching one (or in some cases, several) national company registries

• OCCRP’s investigative dashboard (https://investigativedashboard.org/databases) may help you to identify relevant business registries and databases

• There may have been media coverage or other reports that describe the use of certain legal entities in corruption or money-laundering scheme


5. Recovery of stolen assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>5.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

- Does the country have a specific asset recovery policy?

  Scoring: 0-5
  1: A comprehensive asset recovery policy is in place
  0.5: The country has adopted an asset recovery policy, but it fails to address some important aspects
  0: No asset recovery policy has been adopted

  **Such a policy may exist as one or several laws, decrees or in another form. Have there been speeches or statements by national political leaders or government press releases which articulated a concrete or concerted policy stance affirming to making asset recovery a policy priority? Is there evidence that resources been put in place to facilitate the implementation of such a policy?**
Score: 0.5 Jordan’s asset recovery policy is addressed in the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law (Law No. 13 of 2016). Article 29 of Law No. 13 of 2016 states that asset recovery processes cannot be dropped or withdrawn, even if a court issues a decision to drop the lawsuit for public right, cessation of prosecution, or amnesty due to punitive exemptions or lack of responsibility. An additional amendment to this law, Amendments to the Anti-Corruption Law approved in 2019 by the parliament reinforce this by barring the use of statutes of limitations in cases of corruption and asset recovery. Furthermore, Article 30 permits the Commission to instate a “Reconciliation and Settlement Trust Account” at Jordan’s Central Bank, which is tasked with preserving the assets derived from acts of corruption that have been seized or recovered, until the assets are returned to their rightful owners. However, while the asset recovery policy in place is fairly comprehensive, it does not address certain important aspects. Please see indicator number 5.2 for these gaps.

Asset recovery units have been integrated into most JIACC departments for the purpose of ensuring proper diligence in asset recovery and its processes including freezing the assets. In addition, the Jordanian government through its progress reports stresses the importance of asset recovery with the amounts of assets recovered within the said report period.

### DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

#### Indicator number 5.2

Has the country established a wide range of asset recovery mechanisms, including a) measures that allow for the seizure and confiscation of proceeds from money laundering without requiring a criminal conviction (non-conviction based confiscation), b) a policy that requires an offender to demonstrate that the assets were acquired lawfully, and c) the recognition/enforceability of foreign non-conviction based confiscation/forfeiture orders?

**Scoring**

0.5: The country has adopted measures that allow for non-conviction based confiscation and/or measures that shift the burden of proof that assets were acquired legally on the offender, as well as a mechanism that allows for the recognition and enforcement of foreign non-conviction based confiscation orders

0.25: One of the above mechanisms has been adopted

0: None of the approaches has been adopted

- : Not applicable or no data available


**Response**

Score: 0.5 The latest Integrity and Anti-Corruption law amendment expanded the authority given to investigators and authorities for asset recovery where Article (6) of the amending law grants the Commission the right to confiscate any assets that are connected with corruption act prior to the conviction which can be considered as a significant amendment and positive change for securing assets.

In addition, the said amending law grants the Commission the right to access the asset declaration records for any suspicion of an illicit gains, which then entails the commission to investigate the potential offence. In terms of enumerated asset recovery mechanisms, Article 23 of the 2016 Law states that the JIACC, during its investigation, may instruct the court to “suspend any contract or agreement or privilege or concession where it deems it apparent from the face value of the evidence that it was obtained as a result of an act of corruption, until the issuance of a decision in the case.”
However, the law does not put forth the requirement that the offender must always demonstrate that the assets were acquired lawfully. For certain offenses, such as illicit enrichment, the burden of proof is placed upon both the public official, who must explain any significant increase in his or her wealth, if such wealth does not seem to reflect his or her earnings, and the prosecutor, who must prove that the earnings were illegally acquired. Otherwise, the burden of proof in criminal cases is to be carried out by the public prosecutor. In addition, the law does not address the enforceability of foreign non-conviction based confiscation orders.

### DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>5.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Has the country created a specialized asset recovery team or unit?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Scoring | 1: There is a team, unit or agency that specializes in asset recovery and the legal framework provides sufficient political independence and resources to carry out its responsibilities  
0.5: There is a team, unit or agency that specializes in asset recovery and the legal framework provides either sufficient political independence or sufficient resources to carry out its responsibilities  
0.25: There is a team, unit or agency that specializes in asset recovery but the legal framework fails to provide sufficient political independence and resources for this body  
0: There is no specialized team or agency tasked with asset recovery  
- : Not applicable or no data available |
| Response | Score: 1 The 2016 Anti-Corruption Commission Law gives the JIACC the power to implement asset recovery proceedings. The JIACC has the authority to prosecute any person who commits any act of corruption and seize his or her movable and immovable assets (Article 3). The JIACC is also given the authority to instate a Reconciliation and Settlement Trust Account at the Central Bank that is designated for preserving assets recovered from corruption cases until they are returned to their rightful owner or owners (Article 30). The 2016 law protects the independence of the JIACC in all its tasks, including asset recovery, by stating that the JIACC “shall carry out its authorities and tasks freely and independently without influence or interference by any other party” and that the Commission shall remain financially and administratively independent in all its functions, including asset recovery processes (Articles 3 and 5). |

### DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>5.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there evidence of a strong political commitment to promoting asset recovery?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have there been speeches or statements by national political leaders or government press releases which articulated a concrete or concerted policy stance affirming to making asset recovery a policy priority? Is there evidence that adequate resources are allocated towards State bodies responsible for carrying out asset recovery actions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several statements have been made by the Prime Minister of Jordan on TV and addressing the media in addition to JIACC stressing on the importance of fighting corruption and asset recovery, in addition to the latest adopted amendments to the law especially in regards to the confiscation of assets in Article (6) which gives JIACC’s committee the ability to request the judicial seizure of assets in corruption cases or cases under investigation and Article (13) of the amending law which adds the reverse burden of proof.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>5.5 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Does the country actively participate in international cooperation networks focusing on asset recovery?

Is the country a member or observer in organisations and networks relevant to asset recovery? You can find a list of such bodies on page 5 of STAR: Nine Key Principles of Asset Recovery Benchmarking Survey (https://star.worldbank.org/star/about-us/g20-anti-corruption-working-group). Does the country have designated appropriate authorities responsible for mutual legal assistance requests relating to asset recovery, as well as points of contact for asset recovery and law enforcement cooperation? Have efforts been made to improve the capacity to respond to requests for mutual legal assistance in corruption and asset recovery cases? Does the country encourage spontaneous disclosures by domestic authorities to facilitate an international response? Does the country provide technical assistance specifically pertaining to asset recovery to developing countries? You may find relevant information in FATF mutual evaluation reports on recommendations 35 to 40 (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/).

**Response**

Jordan is a part of peer review under UNCAC for the implementation of chapter 2 prevention and chapter 5: asset recovery. Jordan is also a member of MENAFATF and the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery, a body closely connected to the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (STAR). Jordan has attended the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery since 2012 and all plenaries of MENAFATF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>5.6 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Is there public evidence of any asset recovery cases involving your country in the past two years?

Is there evidence (such as credible news reports, press releases of government agencies, statistics etc.) that proceeds of foreign corruption cases have been confiscated in your country, that such proceeds from cases in your country have been returned to another country, or of close bi-lateral cooperation on investigations involving asset recovery? The STAR Corruption Case database (http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases) may help you to identify relevant cases. If there were numerous cases, please state the (approximate) number of identified cases and provide a brief description of the three biggest and most relevant cases, preferably ones involving grand corruption.

**Response**

Press releases from the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission regularly announce the recovery of assets in addition to the Prime Minister quarter reports that includes the amounts of assets recovered. In addition, in response to a request submitted for the purpose of this research, JIACC stated the value of the assets recovered was 202 million Jordanian Dinars from January to October 2019.
a. Is there public evidence of proactive enforcement actions? Is there evidence of a proactive information exchange concerning proceeds of corruption with relevant stakeholders from other countries?

*Is there evidence that enforcement bodies take an active approach to tracing and confiscating assets, including without foreign requests to do so? Have relevant bodies which seized assets actively informed counterparts in the jurisdiction of origin?*

According to JIACC, the Commission actively works within the diplomatic channels for the purpose of exchanging information.55

b. Has there been adequate transparency and accountability with regard to the confiscation of assets and their return?

*Are there known cases where assets were returned by/to your country? Was there adequate transparency about this transfer, including what assets were recovered and who received the returned assets? Is information on the number of cases, their impact and outcomes released regularly (at least annually)?*

The Ministry of Justice was contacted for obtaining accurate information in regards to the number of cases that were persecuted in the Jordanian courts, however the data was not provided. Nonetheless, the JIACC has been fairly transparent in publishing the amounts recovered,56 moreover it is worth noting the existence of an account with the central bank for the recovered assets of which all assets should be deposited in the aforementioned account.

**Guidance**

- The second review cycle of the UN Convention Against Corruption, which includes Chapter V and its provisions on asset recovery, is currently underway. First country review reports may become available throughout 2017 (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-profile/index.html)
6. Fight against organised crime (optional)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>6.1 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there evidence of strong public trust in the integrity of the police?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Response | Please refer to available data on perceived corruption and integrity of the police in the Global Corruption Barometer (http://gcb.transparency.org), or in other regional or national surveys. Has there been a significant change in public trust in law enforcement in recent years (based on results from similar previous surveys)? If any polling data on perceived ability of law enforcement to fight against organised crime is available, please also provide that information. 

In the latest GCB conducted in 2019 by TI, more than 50% of the respondents reported that the police is not involved in corruption cases.57 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>6.2 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there evidence of effective policing against organised crime by (specialized) law enforcement units? Do these bodies have sufficient independence, resources, capacity and adequate integrity mechanisms to be effective?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Response | Please refer to statements and press releases by government bodies, assessments of Anti-Corruption Bodies, academia, think tanks, civil society organisations or to relevant media coverage. 

There is no evidence through media investigations or reports of the penetration of organised crime into the police, the prosecution, or the judiciary. 

However, Jordan’s Public Security Directorate has a Transparency and Human Rights Bureau tasked with receiving and investigating complaints from citizens about instances of abuse and malpractice among staff members of the Public Security Directorate. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>6.3 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there evidence of effective policing against organised crime by (specialized) law enforcement units? Do these bodies have sufficient independence, resources, capacity and adequate integrity mechanisms to be effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Please refer to statements and press releases by government bodies, assessments of Anti-Corruption Bodies, academia, think tanks, civil society organisations or to relevant media coverage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 7. Arms trafficking (optional)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator number</strong></td>
<td>7.1 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator question(s)</strong></td>
<td>Has the country ratified the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Scoring** | 1: The Protocol has been ratified (or accepted)  
0: The Protocol has not been ratified  
- : Not applicable or no data available |
| **Response** | Score: 1  Jordan has ratified the Protocol.\(^{58}\) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator number</strong></td>
<td>7.2 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator question(s)</strong></td>
<td>Has the country signed and ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Scoring** | 1: The ATT has been ratified  
0.5: The ATT has been signed but not ratified  
0: The ATT has not been signed or ratified  
- : Not applicable or no data available |
| **Response** | Score: 0  Jordan has neither signed nor ratified the ATT. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator number</strong></td>
<td>7.3 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator question(s)</strong></td>
<td>Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Response** | Is there evidence that the country has taken action to comply with each of the three ATT articles: 7.1 IV, 11.5 and 15.6? Are upcoming arms exports subject to robust parliamentary approval and debate? Does the Parliament play any role in approving or scrutinising arms exports? You may find relevant information in the TI Government Defence Index (question 21, http://government.defenceindex.org).  
Jordan committed in 2001 to a United Nations consensus decision to adopt, support, and implement the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. To this end, Jordan has submitted reports on the national application and implementation of this program of action. Within the regional sphere, Jordan adopted the 2002 Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives, and Hazardous Material. |
However, Jordan’s Parliament does not have any permanent committees focused on military, defence, or security matters. Ensuring adequate technical expertise and sufficient administrative resources to supervise arms export decisions is therefore difficult. In addition, while the Prime Minister holds the right to question the General Intelligence Directorate head and the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, the Parliament’s access to these figures is contingent upon the Council of Ministers’ access, which has historically been limited. According to Transparency International’s 2015 Government Defence Index report, instances of weapons being sent from Jordan to neighbouring countries with shaky human rights records and others engaged in civil conflict have been reported.

**DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>7.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within the defence and security apparatus tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Response**

As stipulated by the General Intelligence Law No. 24 of 1964, Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) has within it a Military Council with jurisdiction over all defence personnel in intelligence matters. According to a statement made by the Jordanian Government in 2013, the GID’s court is tasked with prosecuting individuals for crimes, including corruption and bribery that threaten to violate the GID’s integrity. There are also Military and Police Courts that function independently from the GID. However, according to the JIACC’s past national strategies, defence, intelligence, and security apparatuses – with the exception of the Public Security Directorate, which is mentioned briefly – do not seem to be of primary focus.

**DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>7.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>How effective are controls over the disposal of assets? Is information on these disposals and the proceeds of their sale transparent?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Response**

According to a government representative reviewer for Jordan’s Defence Index Country Assessment report, the Military Supplies Act No. 3 of 1995 and its instructions set out certain regulations for the sale and disposal of assets, and disposals are scrutinised by a delegated audit body. However, while information on sales is often reported in press releases, industry organizations, and defence-trade publications, asset disposal audits and relevant information on the processes and procedures of asset disposals are not made available to the public.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>7.6 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>How do you assess the integrity and corruption risks related to customs and border officials? Do customs and border agency have adequate capacity and resources to ensure effective control of goods moving in and out of the country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have customs and border control agencies adopted strong anti-corruption and ethics mechanisms? Is there evidence that anti-corruption trainings are conducted? Are there documented cases and reports that would suggest that customs and border officials have been bribed to allow for the illegal trafficking of arms?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>The issue of border security and smuggling has been raised in the news lately especially in the aftermath of opening the Jordanian – Syrian border crossing officially in 2018, several reports and Minister of Finance actually stating that smuggling tobacco products from Syria resulted in a drop of local taxes generated from tobacco sales tax. Moreover a circular from the prime minister stressed on the importance of securing the borders from the smuggled goods especially tobacco products in addition to weapons and drugs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The capacities allotted to Jordan’s Customs Department suggest its control over goods moving in and out of the country. In terms of structure, the Director General of the Jordanian Customs Department oversees all Clearance Agents and other department officials and is appointed by the cabinet. According to Articles 171 and 172, department officials receive certain service authorisations from the Director General upon their appointment, and civil and military authorities, as well as public security forces, are required to provide any necessary assistance to department officials when asked to do so. The Department is also entitled to exchange information with all Ministries, government agencies, and other official bodies for the purpose of executing its mission. The Customs Department also contains an Enforcement Directorate, which is tasked specifically with identifying and seizing all smuggled goods. This Directorate is given the power to coordinate anti-smuggling programs on regional and international levels, in cooperation with the Intelligence Liaison Office for the Middle East and the World Customs Organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further, the Department is provided with the capacity to improve the efficiency of its information systems to facilitate information sharing with neighbouring countries and international customs administrations, as well as the capacity to improve the efficiency of its laboratories used to detect harmful and dangerous items in line with international standards. Government websites also stress the provision of a positive working environment through skills building and support for customs workers, in order to promote motivation and efficiency amongst these personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65
66
Rasheed’s observations on Target 16.4: Jordanian context

While Jordan is developing and adopting several laws, it was noted that the AML agenda has not been prioritized, and that creates a great gap that needs to be addressed, especially since Jordan signed the UNCAC and shall under its international obligations to criminalize and update the laws and regulations. Aiming to accommodate any new approaches, which can be used in money laundering.

Moreover, while Jordan defines beneficial ownership and sets a process to pre-disclose beneficial ownership especially in the CCD side, where the companies register department requires that all shareholders sign, there is still a lot to be done in that side especially in verification in addition to the importance of following the same approach with foreign companies not only regular shareholders.

As for the recovery of stolen assets, the amendment of JJACC’s law has been seen as a positive update, while there are several amendments needed from the AML side as explained in the recommendations, the AML shall have the legal tools to seize properties and assets that are linked with AML.

Target 16.5: “Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.”

| Indicator 16.5.1: | Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months |
| Indicator 16.5.2: | Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months |

8. Experience and perceptions of corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>8.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

4% of respondents state that they or a member of their household made an unofficial payment or gift when coming into contact with public services over the past 12 months, according to Transparency International’s 2019 Global Corruption Barometer (or similar national surveys). 67

Please provide the percentage from the most recent TI Global Corruption Barometer (http://gcb.transparency.org) or its regional editions, and provide the year of the survey you are quoting. If no GCB data is available, you can use data from other surveys (see guidance below). In this case, please name the source, information when the fieldwork for your country was conducted and ensure that you correctly represent the answers respondents provided and the question(s) they were asked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>8.2 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

___% of respondents state that corruption or bribery is one of the three most important problems facing this country that the government should address, according to Transparency International’s ___ Global Corruption Barometer (or similar national surveys).

Please provide the percentage from the most recent TI Global Corruption Barometer (http://gcb.transparency.org), and provide the year of the GCB you are quoting.

**Response**

Data not available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Indicator number** 8.3 = | **Indicator question(s)** 43% of respondents state that their government performs “badly” at fighting corruption in government, according to Transparency International’s 2019 Global Corruption Barometer. 68  

*Please provide the percentage from the most recent TI Global Corruption Barometer ([http://gcb.transparency.org](http://gcb.transparency.org)), and provide the year of the GCB you are quoting (if data is available for your country).* |
| **DIMENSION** | **THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT** |
| **Indicator number** 8.4 = | **Indicator question(s)** In Transparency International’s most recent Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, the country scored ___ points on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), ranking ___ out of 176 countries. |
| **DIMENSION** | **THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT** |
| **Indicator number** 8.5 = | **Indicator question(s)** Has corruption experienced by people increased or decreased in recent years?  

**Response**  

*Compare data from the most recent edition of the Global Corruption Barometer 2019 with data from the 2013 edition (if no data is available for your country, try to find other relevant surveys you could use for a comparison over time).*  

55% of the respondents reported an increase in corruption 69 |

**Guidance**  


- The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey includes polling data on corruption ([http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploretopics/corruption](http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploretopics/corruption))  

## 9. Anti-Corruption framework and institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>9.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are the following offences clearly defined and banned by criminal law?

*Please assess if the country is compliant or not compliant with each of these provisions. You will find relevant information in available UNCAC review reports ([https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-profile/index.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-profile/index.html)) and civil society monitoring reports of UNCAC Coalition member organisations ([http://uncaccoalition.org/en_US/uncac-review/cso-review-reports](http://uncaccoalition.org/en_US/uncac-review/cso-review-reports)). You may find the relevant references to your national legislation in the UNODC TRACK database ([https://track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary](https://track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary)).*

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Active bribery of domestic public officials, in line with Art. 15(a) of UNCAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: The offence is clearly defined and banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Passive bribery of domestic public officials, in line with Art. 15(b) of UNCAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: The offence is clearly defined and banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversions of property by a public official, in line with Art. 17 of UNCAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: The offence is clearly defined and banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Trading in influence, in line with Art. 18 of UNCAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: The offence is clearly defined and banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Abuse of functions, in line with Art. 19 of UNCAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: The offence is clearly defined and banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>: Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>a. Score: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Score: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Score: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Score: 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Score: 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f. Illicit Enrichment, in line with Art. 20 of UNCAC

Scoring
1: The offence is clearly defined and banned
0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition
0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned
- : Not applicable or no data available

g. Bribery in the private sector, in line with Art. 21 of UNCAC

Scoring
1: The offence is clearly defined and banned
0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition
0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned
- : Not applicable or no data available

h. Embezzlement of property in the private sector, in line with Art. 22 of UNCAC

Scoring
1: The offence is clearly defined and banned
0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition
0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned
- : Not applicable or no data available

i. Laundering the proceeds of crime, in line with Art. 23 of UNCAC

Scoring
1: The offence is clearly defined and banned
0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition
0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned
- : Not applicable or no data available

j. Concealment, in line with Art. 24 of UNCAC

Scoring
1: The offence is clearly defined and banned
0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition
0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned
- : Not applicable or no data available

k. Obstruction of justice, in line with Art. 25 of UNCAC

Scoring
1: The offence is clearly defined and banned
0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition
0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned
- : Not applicable or no data available
Article 6 of the Financial Declaration Law of 2006 defines illicit enrichment as all movable or immovable property, benefits, or beneficial rights acquired, for him/herself or others, by any public official by means of abuse of office or capacity. The Article specifies that if there is an inexplicably significant increase in assets owned by the official or his/her children that does not match the official’s income, and if the official is unable to prove the legitimate source of this increase, this increase will be deemed the result of an abuse of office.

The Penal Code’s articles on bribery refer only to “any state official or person seconded to perform a public service either through election or appointment and any other person assigned to perform an official function such as an arbitrator or an expert” in Articles 170-173.

The offense is defined and banned in Article 422 of the Penal Code. Specifically, Article 422 names the act of receiving any property, item, or document to be kept, to perform a certain job, or includes an undertaking or release of debt, based on a trust and to be used and returned and denying receiving the item or replacing, consuming, or refusing to hand it over punishable by law.

The Anti Money Laundering Law (Law No. 46 of 2007) stipulates in Article 4 that any money obtained from the following crimes is considered to be related to money laundering: (1) any crime that is to be punished with a felony penalty according to Jordanian law, and (2) crimes specified by international agreements to which Jordan adheres that deem the proceeds of such crimes to be subject to money laundering regulations, provided that Jordanian law also punished such crimes. Article 3 of the law prohibits the laundering of proceeds resulting from any of the aforementioned crimes, regardless of whether these crimes are committed inside or outside Jordan, provided that the act is subject to penalty according to valid laws of the country within which the act was committed.

In the Anti Money Laundering Law, the act of concealment is mentioned in the definition of money laundering, which the law criminalizes. The money laundering definition put forth by the law is, “every conduct involving acquisition, possession, disposing of, moving, managing, keeping, exchanging, depositing, investing of funds or manipulating its value or movement and transferring, or any action that leads to conceal or disguise its source, origin, nature, place, disposition means, ownership, or related rights, with knowledge that the funds are proceeded of one of the crimes stipulated in Article 4 [detailed above] of this law.”

However, there is no standalone definition of concealment, and, although concealment is punishable according to the law, it is only punishable within the context of money laundering.
Jordan addressed and criminalized obstruction of justice through violent means in its Penal Code, as specified in Article 25 of UNCAC. However, there are shortcomings in the Penal Code’s characterization of obstruction of justice definition. Article 208 of the Penal Code partially addressed UNACA’s Article 25a in stipulating that “whoever inflicted any form of violence and force, not allowable by law, in order to obtain a confession for committing a crime or information regarding such a crime [...] shall be punished by imprisonment [...].”

However, this covers only the extraction of information, evidence, and confessions through violent means. It does not cover the “use of physical force, threats, or intimidation or the promise, offering, or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence [...].”

UNACA’s Article 25b is also partially addressed in the Penal Code, specifically in Article 185. Article 185 states that “whoever attacks or violently resists a public official while executing the applicable laws or regulations or while collecting the fees and taxes stated in the law or while executing a judicial decision or order or any other order issued by a competent authority shall be punished [...].” However, this law only specifies violent resistance and does not specify threats or intimidation, as stipulated in UNACA’s Article 25b.
**DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>9.2 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator question(s)</strong></td>
<td>Please provide case statistics for each of those offences, including, if available, the number of trials in each of the past two years (ongoing and finalized), the number of convictions, the number of settlements, the number of acquittals and the number of cases currently pending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
<td>As of January 2019, no response has been received to a request for data on case statistics submitted to the Ministry of Justice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>9.3 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Indicator question(s)** | Anti-Corruption Agency  
a. To what extent is there formal operational independence of the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), and what evidence is there that, in practice, it can perform its work without external interference?  
b. To what extent does it have adequate resources and capacity to achieve its goals in practice?  
c. To what extent are there mechanisms in place to ensure the integrity of the ACA, and to what extent is its integrity ensured in practice?  
d. To what extent does the ACA engage in preventive, educational and investigation activities on corruption and alleged corruption cases? |
| **Response** | In practice, the JIACC, over the past three years, gained notable, society-wide recognition, brought on by recent political movements that condemned the spread of corruption in all its forms. Since its inception in 2006, the JIACC has undertaken a significant number of corruption cases, some of which were highly visible and issues of public opinion.  
However, the laws governing the JIACC should be reviewed to ensure that the JIACC is given the authority to investigate all types of corruption crimes stipulated in the UNCAC. In addition, relative to other institutions, the JIACC is allotted a smaller amount of resources, which are subject to debate by both the Parliament and the Cabinet. Furthermore, while the JIACC’s coordination with other national supervisory entities, such as the Companies Control Department and the Ministry of Labor, does exist, more streamlined mechanisms for communication and coordination should be created between the JIACC and institutions such as the Department of Financial Disclosure, Customs, the Audit Bureau, the AMLU, and the Attorney General.  
However, it should be noted that the JIACC has held several training workshops on concepts of integrity and corruption prevention for various government departments. Further, the 2017-2025 National Strategy listed as a goal the implementation of a monitoring project that would provide a platform for electronic information sharing between various government institutions and departments to detect and track corruption cases. |

*You may find relevant information to answer the following questions in an NIS assessment conducted by your chapter (https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nis). Alternative sources are provided in the guidance at the end of this section.*
Since the inception of its 2017-2025 strategy, the JIACC has made a number of significant strides in the area of public engagement and awareness raising. Awareness-raising materials, lectures, and seminars on integrity and corruption prevention have been prepared for youth in schools, youth centres, and universities, and training materials were created for educational supervisors, professors, and deans.

Finally, the JIACC is implementing a program that promotes raising awareness through the religious preaching of both Muslim and Christian leaders in Jordan. The JIACC should continue with these efforts to strengthen its public engagement and awareness-raising programming.83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>9.4 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Supreme Audit Institution**

- a. To what extent is there formal operational independence of the audit institution, and what evidence is there that, in practice, it can perform its work without external interference?
- b. To what extent does it have adequate resources and capacity to achieve its goals in practice?
- c. To what extent are there mechanisms in place to ensure the integrity of the audit institution, and to what extent is its integrity ensured in practice?
- d. To what extent does the audit institution provide effective audits of public expenditure? Are its reports, findings, and recommendations available to the public?

**Response**

Like the JIACC, the Audit Bureau is regarded as one of the principal control agencies in the country, given its mandate to monitor all public institutions, departments, municipalizes, and companies in which the government holds more than a 50% share. The Bureau has gained much credibility within recent years and has secured the confidence of both the government and the general public.84

However, fast-paced development and expansion of roles within the various ministries necessitate the adoption of a strategy that allows the Bureau to keep up with such changes. This strategy must consider areas such as retaining full control over revenue and expenditure monitoring, retaining control over pre and post audit procedures, and developing both internal and external controls to ensure such regulation.

Modern control mechanisms and international standards, such as the International Accounting Standards, should also be adopted to control public spending. In addition, the Bureau lacks legislation that would:

- Secure its full independence in employing its powers,
- Enable its staff to develop penalties for non-complaint institutions,
- Grant its staff with powers of judicial policing.85

Further, while the Bureau produces a comprehensive report annually that is submitted to the House of Representatives and is usually uploaded onto the Bureau’s website for the public to view, some years’ reports cannot be found on the website and public awareness-raising measures about the content of the reports should be introduced as a component of report dissemination.86
## DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

### Indicator number 9.5 =

**Indicator question(s)**
- **Judiciary**
  a. To what extent is the judiciary independent by law, and to what extent does it operate without interference from the government or other actors?
  b. To what extent are there laws seeking to ensure appropriate tenure policies, salaries and working conditions of the judiciary, and does it have adequate levels of financial resources, staffing, and infrastructure to operate effectively in practice?
  c. To what extent does the public have access to judicial information and activities in practice?
  d. To what extent is the integrity of members of the judiciary ensured in practice? To what extent is the judiciary committed to fighting corruption through prosecution and other activities?

**Response**

The judiciary remains highly autonomous, as the legal framework, overall, provides regulations and rules to ensure the integrity and impartiality of judicial decisions. Further, the 2011 formation of the Constitutional Court has expanded the judiciary’s means of monitoring the executive branch. Corruption cases are heard just like any other case and require by law the same investigation, pursuit, and evidence gathering processes.

In terms of resources, within the past ten years, the judiciary’s budget has expanded tremendously, thus ensuring adequate financial resources to carry out its duties. This budget expansion has, in large part, been reflected in the salaries, benefits, and working conditions of judges.87 Public Prosecutors also exist under the Ministry of Justice and thus function under the laws and instructions of the judicial authority and its code of conduct. Further, Public Prosecutors are held accountable by the Judicial Inspection Department within the Ministry of Justice, which carries out investigations on allegations of corruption or misuse of office.88

However, more must be done to implement fair trial safeguards and avoid administrative duplications with law enforcement agencies. Further, there is no legal provision necessitating that the judiciary circulates its reports and decisions for public access. However, the Judicial Council is required to prepare an annual report, which includes information on the activities, resolutions, strategies, achievements, and actions taken by the Council to further develop the work of the judicial authority. These reports are available online for the public to download or read.89

---

### Indicator number 9.6 =

**Indicator question(s)**
- **Law Enforcement Agencies**
  a. To what extent are law enforcement agencies independent by law, and to what extent are they independent in practice?
  b. To what extent do law enforcement agencies have adequate levels of financial resources, staffing, and infrastructure to operate effectively in practice?
  c. To what extent do law enforcement agencies have to report and be answerable for their actions in practice? To what extent is the integrity of members of law enforcement agencies ensured?
  d. To what extent do law enforcement agencies detect and investigate corruption cases in the country?
Response

Law enforcement agencies execute State directives only, thus removing, both by law and in practice, any partisan bias. Further, all employees of law enforcement agencies are forbidden by law from practicing partisan activities or being involved in political parties. However, law enforcement agencies do not practice full independence when it comes to protecting and supporting State and regime interests, particularly during times of protest.\(^9\)

Law enforcement agencies have at their disposal the funding and human resources required to carry out their activities and develop their infrastructure. However, it is vital to ensure that the financial and administrative resources allotted to these agencies keep pace with the growing need for security, given the surrounding civil wars and the sudden population influx due to refugee intake.\(^1\)

According to the NIS report, the endeavours of law enforcement agencies to fight corruption within the past few years have been met with great success. However, these agencies need to instate more diverse mechanisms to strengthen transparency and accountability in their practices, adding to the already-established Transparency and Human Rights Bureau.\(^2\)

Guidance

- Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/reports)
- Reports by Global Integrity (http://www.globalintegrity.org/research/reports/)
- GRECO evaluation reports will contain relevant information for countries that are part of the Council of Europe (https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations)
- UNCAC Coalition: civil society review reports and self-evaluation reports (http://uncaccoalition.org/en_US/uncac-review/) shadow monitoring reports
10. Private sector corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>10.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>It a criminal offence under the country's laws to bribe a foreign public official?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Scoring              | 1: The offence is clearly defined and banned  
                       0.5: The offence is banned, but there are shortcomings in its definition  
                       0: The offence is not adequately defined or not banned  
                       - : Not applicable or no data available |

| Response | Score: 0 Under the relevant legislation, the act of bribing a foreign public official is not adequately defined, however, under the Article (12) of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Amending Law, foreign public officials fall under the jurisdiction of JIACC and any act of corruption as defined in Article (16) which includes bribery will be criminalized and persecuted. The inclusion of foreign public officials is a step in the right direction. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>10.2 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>Does the country's legal framework prohibit collusion?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Scoring              | 1: The law prohibits hard core cartels and collusion  
                       0.5: The law prohibits hard core cartels, but not all major forms of collusion are banned  
                       0: The law does not prohibit hard core cartels or most forms of collusion  
                       - : Not applicable or no data available |
| Does the legal framework prohibit hard core cartels (when firms agree not to compete with one another), including fixing prices, making rigged bids (collusive tenders), establishing output restrictions quotas, and sharing or dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or lines of commerce? |

| Response | Score: 1 The Competition Law (Law No. 33 of 2004) outlaws “collusion in tenders or bids, whether in overbidding or underbidding, but it shall not be considered collusive to submit joint offers in which the parties announce such join offer ab initio, and without the goal of such joint bidding being to prevent competition on any way” (Article 5). |
In addition, Article 5 prohibits the fixing of process of products, services, or conditions of sale; the fixing of quantities of production or service provision; sharing the market on the basis of geographical regions, quantities of sales, purchases, customers, or any other basis that negatively affects completion; and setting barriers to entry of enterprises into the market or eliminating them from the market. This Article’s stated purpose is to prohibit all “practices, alliances, and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit, or prevent competition.” Although the law does not employ the term ‘hard core cartel,’ it does prohibit all major hard core cartel and collusion activities. 94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 10.3 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is the ban on foreign bribery enforced?

Is there evidence that the law is applied effectively? Is there a dedicated body charged with investigating allegations of foreign bribery, and if so, does this body have adequate resources and capacity? Have there been investigations against individuals and/or legal entities in cases involving bribery of a foreign public official in the past two years? Have there been any cases where sanctions under criminal proceedings or in administrative and civil proceedings were imposed in the past two years against legal and natural persons? Are the sanctions applied for bribery dissuasive, proportionate and effective? Does the ban also include facilitation payments? Can bribes be deducted as business expenses for tax purposes? You may find relevant information in the OECD’s data on enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention (https://www.oecd.org/corruption/dataonenforcementoftheanti-briberyconvention.htm).

Response

Please refer to question 10.1, where as stipulated the amendments are not fully in place.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 10.4 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are anti-collusion provisions effectively enforced?

Is there a dedicated body that investigates and sanctions companies involved in collusive practices? Does this body have adequate independence, resources, and capacity? Is there evidence of sanctions being imposed for collusion in the past two years?

Response

As stipulated by the Competition Law, the body dedicated to investigating collusive practices is the Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Article 12), and the Minister of Industry and Trade is charged with taking all measures necessary to guarantee the execution of court decisions regarding penalties against violators of this law (Article 18). 95 Relevant legislation provides the Competition Directorate with adequate independence to carry out its work. First, it is required of all enterprises wishing to carry out economic concentration operations to submit a petition to the Directorate with ample information regarding the enterprises concerned, and the Directorate reserves the right to request from the parties concerned all additional information or documents deemed necessary. Further, the Directorate is given the power to contribute to setting competition plans and legislation, enter commercial shops, offices, and stores during working hours to conduct inspections or searches, seize and review any relevant documents, records, or files, conduct all
necessary investigations, and listen to the testimony of any person suspected of
violating competition laws. Further, according to the Directorate’s latest published
reports, its investigations and studies have increased from 7 in 2004 to 18 in 2013,

In addition, the judiciary appoints judges and prosecutors tasked with trying suits
related to anticompetitive practices specifically. The Ministry of Industry and
Trade also held training courses and arranged external visits for these judges and
prosecutors to learn about regional and international experiences and best practices
in competition law, highlighting the importance of this area of law and the Ministry’s
willingness to dedicate the resources needed to the dedicated authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>10.5 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Are there specific rules or practices related to the transparency of corporations that
result in high corruption risks?

*For example, are companies required to maintain accurate books and records
available for inspection that properly and fairly document all financial transactions?
Are companies that are publicly traded, as well as large non-listed or privately held
companies with substantial international business, required to have accounts
externally audited and published on an annual basis according to internationally
recognised auditing standards, such as International Standards on Auditing? Are these
rules enforced? Are there requirements or incentives for companies that participate
in public procurement to adopt integrity measures (code of conducts and an anti-
corruption policy for employees, statements certifying that they have not engaged in
illegal conduct as part of their bid; anti-corruption programmes etc.)?*

**Response**

Jordan attempts to mitigate private sector corruption risks by enforcing certain rules
regarding transparency. Companies that are required to appoint an external auditor
are:

- public shareholding companies,
- private shareholding companies, and
- private limited companies both for profit and not for profit.

However, there remains some room for improvement in making financial information
available to the general public for viewing. According to the Companies Control
Department, only public shareholding companies and foreign companies operating
in Jordan are required by law to publish their financial information in the newspaper.
It is also not required, but rather suggested, that these companies also publish this
financial information on their websites for public viewing. Moreover, mandating
private and public shareholding companies to good governance rules if its capital is
above 500,000 JOD.
Guidance:


### 11. Lobbying transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>11.1 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there a law or policy that sets a framework for lobbyists and lobbying activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: there is a legal framework that regulates lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: there is no such framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If yes, please name the law, briefly describe to which actors it applies and what requirements it contains. Please provide relevant sources/links.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Lobbying is not regulated in Jordan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>11.2 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is the definition of (i) lobbyists, (ii) lobbying targets, and (iii) lobbying activities clear and unambiguous? Who is covered by the definition (consultant lobbyists/in-house lobbyists/anybody engaging in lobbying activities)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: All those who engage in lobbying are covered by the regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: Only consultant lobbyists and in-house lobbyists are covered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.25: Only consultant lobbyists are covered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: There is no legislative framework on lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definitions should also clearly specify what communication with public officials is not considered 'lobbying.' For guidance, see the OECD's Elements of strong lobbying regulation and TI's International Standards for Lobbying Regulation; TI's Lobbying in Europe reports contain information on the framework in EU countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Lobbying is not regulated in Jordan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMENSION</td>
<td>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>11.3 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there a mandatory lobbying register? Do disclosure requirements provide sufficient and relevant information on key aspects of lobbying and lobbyists, such as its objective, beneficiaries, funding sources, and targets?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Scoring | 1: There is a mandatory lobby register  
0.5: There is a voluntary lobby register; only some lobbyists are required to register  
0: No such information is made publicly accessible through a register  
- : Not applicable or no data available |
| Please briefly explain, if and what information is publicly accessible, for example through a lobbyist register and provide relevant links. Is the information published in a timely manner and regularly updated? |
| Response | Lobbying is not regulated in Jordan. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>11.4 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Are there rules and guidelines, which set standards for expected behaviour for public officials and lobbyists, for example to avoid misuse of confidential information? Guidelines for public officials and civil servants and their communication with lobbyists may be included in a code of conduct or similar policies. Rules of engagement for lobbyists may be included in a code of conduct adopted by the industry or specific companies and organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>11.5 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Indicator question(s) | Are procedures for securing compliance framed in a coherent spectrum of strategies and mechanisms, including monitoring and enforcement?  
Are there incentives for lobbyists to comply with the integrity and transparency rules?  
Are there visible and proportionate sanctions (such as the public reporting of confirmed breaches, financial and administrative sanctions, such as debarment, and criminal prosecution as appropriate)?  
Is there evidence that the organisational leadership in public bodies promotes a culture of integrity and transparency in daily practice through regular disclosure and auditing to ensure compliance? |
| Response | Not applicable. |
### DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

**Indicator number 11.6 =**

**Indicator question(s)**
Are there documented cases of lobbying misconduct that have been investigated in the past two years? Are there documented cases of sanctions being imposed for non-compliance?

*Please describe briefly and provide relevant sources/links.*

**Response**
Not applicable.

**DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**

**Indicator number 11.7 =**

**Indicator question(s)**
Have there been noteworthy efforts to promote transparency and integrity related to lobbying in the past two years? Have there been relevant changes to the framework or its implementation?

*Please describe briefly and provide relevant sources/links.*

**Response**
Not applicable.

**Guidance**


### 12. Party and election campaign finance transparency

**DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**

**Indicator number 12.1 =**

**Indicator question(s)**
Is there a legal framework regulating the financing of political parties and the finances of candidates running for elected office?

**Scoring:**
1: There is a legal framework regulating the financing of political parties and the finances of candidates running for elected office
0.5: There is a legal framework regulating the financing of political parties and the finances of candidates running for elected office but some actors or candidates are not subject to this regulation
0: there is no such framework
- : Not applicable or no data available
Please provide the name and a link to the relevant law(s), decrees or other regulation. You may briefly elaborate on any political actors that are not covered by the regulation and mention any important shortcomings of the legislation. For example, do existing rules address the following aspects?

- Parameters for the limits, purpose and time periods of campaign expenditures;
- Limits on contributions;
- Identification of donors, including whether or not anonymous, international and third-party donations or loans are permissible, restricted or prohibited;
- What types of in-kind contributions are allowable;
- The form and timing of submission and the publication of accounts and expenditure by party organisations;
- Means to verify income and expenditure;
- Whether tax relief is allowed on donations or loans;
- Means to dissuade governments from using public resources for electoral purposes;
- How government subsidies for elections and parties are calculated and awarded and how the development of new parties is encouraged (while the creation of parties whose prime purpose is to access funding is avoided)

Response

Score: 0.5 When considering legislation regulating parties and elections, it is important to note the new election law of 2016, which was instated with the intention of strengthening political parties and preventing votes for candidates solely according to tribal or familial affiliations. In particular, all running candidates must join a list and all parties must submit their respective lists of candidates to each district within the country. Each Jordanian voter must then vote for one of these lists, which will include several candidates from his or her district, and choose individual candidates from his or her chosen list. However, despite this new law, both political parties and individual candidates remain important entities in Jordanian electoral politics. For this reason, the following responses will consider the legislative frameworks pertinent to both parties and candidates, in turn.

The Law on Political Parties (Law No. 39 of 2015) is the latest law addressing the financing of political parties. Article 25 requires that all party donations be identified, announced, specific, and from Jordanian sources, and may include donations from specified natural and corporate Jordanian persons. The same article goes on to prohibit a party’s acceptance of cash, funding, grants, or in-kind donations from anonymous sources and foreign states or entities. According to Article 20, a party cannot offer cash, grants, or in-kind donations to any of its members. However, the law stipulates that a party may invest its funds in: party periodicals and other printed literature, the ownership of media outlets in compliance with relevant legislation, the ownership of real estate for its branches and headquarters, the holding of ceremonies and events, and treasury bonds in compliance with relevant legislation (Article 26). In general, Article 26 limits the party expenditure to the lawful aims and purposes set forth in its bylaws.
The government contribution bylaw was drafted and approved in 2016 to directly authorize and restrict certain government contributions and incentives offered to political parties. This bylaw kept the government contribution amount to political parties at JD 50,000 per year, the amount originally stipulated Law No. 62 of 2013, given that one year has passed since party establishment. This direct contribution to parties from the public treasury may be increased to 50,000 JD if the party’s candidates run in at least 35% of the constituencies and had been party members for at least one year prior to Lower House elections. During election years, the government can grant parties with an additional 20,000 JD for campaign expenses, and an additional 5,000 JD is given to parties that form coalitions. According to government officials, the goal of this bylaw is to assist parties that have clearly defined platforms reach Parliament.

In addition, while the Law on Political Parties does not provide parties tax relief on donations or loans, rent of State owned premises at subsidized rates, or exemption of party supplies from customs duties, the law does provide exemption from all government taxes and fees on immovable properties and allows parties to use public cultural and social facilities for events (Articles 27 and 24, respectively). While all political parties are subject to the above regulations, the lower score reflects other shortfalls in the legislation, particularly that law does not specify limits on contributions or which types of in-kind contributions are permitted.

As for candidates, official instructions, in accordance with the Independent Election Commission Law of 2012, were issued in 2016 to act as the authoritative document on candidate finance regulations. The instructions forbid candidates and lists to accept any financial or material contributions from foreign governments, international organizations, foreign companies, and foreign citizens (Article 13). The instructions also forbid candidates and lists to accept any monetary or material contributions from funds that the candidate or list knows have been obtained through illicit activity such as stolen funds, contributions from outlawed establishments, and donations from wanted individuals (Article 13).

Article 14 goes on to establish maximum ceilings for expenditure on campaigns, based upon constituency sizes, voter numbers, and standards of living. Specifically, the expenditure ceiling for Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa is 5 JD per voter, multiplied by the number of voters within the constituency. The expenditure ceiling for the remainder of the governorates is 3 JD per person, multiplied by the number of voters in the constituency.

These instructions go further to set specific starting and ending dates for campaigns and regulate where campaign events may be held. According to Article 3, a candidate’s campaign begins on the date the candidate announces his/her candidacy and ends 24 hours before Election Day, and candidates may not conduct campaigns in ministries, government directorates, public institutions, educational institutions, and places of worship (Article 7).

Similar to the Law on Political Parties, these instructions do not specify limits on contributions or what types of in-kind contributions are allowed. Neither does it include any stipulations on whether tax relief is allowed on donations or loans. Another shortfall present in both party-centred and candidate-centred regulations is the lack of specification that the financial disclosures submitted to the Committee of Party Affairs and the IEC must be published for public viewing.

It is worth mentioning that there are demands for amending the parties law in Jordan in addition to the elections law, however, the official direction is not clear yet, and there are no amending laws at the parliament floors currently.
Are political parties and individual candidates running for elected office required to disclose financial statements for their campaigns detailing itemized income and expenditure, as well as individual donors to their campaign finances?

Scoring
1: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release itemized income and expenditure reports on their campaigns and to disclose donors who contributed to a party’s or candidate’s electoral campaign, with the threshold of disclosure at 1,000 Euro/USD or less
0.5: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release income reports of political campaigns to the public and to disclose major donors who contributed to a campaign, with a threshold between 1,001 and 5,000 Euro/USD
0.25: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release income reports of political campaigns to the public and to disclose big donors of an electoral campaign, with the threshold being between 5,001 and 20,000 Euro/USD
0: Parties and candidates are not required to release financial information, or the reporting does not require the disclosure of donors who contributed more than 20,001 Euro/USD to a campaign
- : Not applicable or no data available

Please briefly elaborate: Can donors be uniquely identified, based on details that are made public? How timely is the information disclosed, does information on campaign finances become available to the public before election day? What are the exact thresholds for contributions to be disclosed? Are the accounts published in a standardized manner and in a format that facilitates analysis and re-use of the data?

Score: 1

Regarding parties, Article 8 of the Law on Political Parties requires that every party create a bylaw requiring the identification of their party’s financial resources, as well as provisions detailing the mechanisms the party will use to organize its financial affairs, plan its annual budget, carry out bookkeeping procedures that record how funds are spent, distribute disbursements, and produce final accounts statements for the preceding year. In addition, Article 22 states that a party must keep detailed records of all its revenues and expenditures, and Article 29 requires every party to appoint a certified accountant to audit its yearly finances and account statements. The article also requires parties to submit to the Committee of Party Affairs, on an annual basis within three months of the end of the fiscal year, its annual budget and financial statements of the preceding year, along with a statement signed by the party’s secretary-general that includes a breakdown of the party’s financial resources. According to Article 29, the Committee’s Chairperson or an official delegated by the Chairperson, who must be either a certified accountant or Audit Bureau representative, has the right to review the accounts and finances of a party, audit its financial records, and submit a report to the Committee and the party’s secretary-general.

Regarding candidates, in order to regulate campaign finances, electoral candidate lists are required to open a special account through which all campaign spending is transacted. In addition, electoral lists must appoint a certified accountant to audit the list’s account and submit a report on resources and expenditure to the Commission upon request (Article 15, Independent Election Commission Instructions). List commissioners or any of their candidates must also declare their sources of campaign funding and their channels of expenditure (Article 14). However, unlike the regulations governing party finances, these instructions do not specify that these reports must be submitted on a yearly basis.
### DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

#### Indicator number 12.3 =

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are political parties and, if applicable, individual candidates running for elected office required to disclose annual accounts with itemized income and expenditure and individual donors?</td>
<td>1: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release itemized income and expenditure reports on their annual accounts and disclose donors who contributed to a party’s or candidate’s annual finances, with the threshold of disclosure at 1,000 Euro/USD or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release annual income reports to the public and to disclose major donors, with the threshold between 1,001 and 5,000 Euro/USD in contributions over one year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.25: Political parties (and, if applicable, political candidates) are required to release annual income reports to the public and to disclose big donors, with the threshold being between 5,001 and 20,000 Euro/USD in contributions over one year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: Parties and candidates are not required to release annual financial information, or the reporting does not require the disclosure of donors who contributed more than 20,001 Euro/USD over one year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Please briefly elaborate:** Can donors be uniquely identified, based on details that are made public? How timely is the information disclosed? What are the exact thresholds for contributions to be disclosed? Are the accounts published in a standardized manner and in a format that facilitates analysis and re-use of the data?

**Response**

Score: 0.25 Candidate lists, as well as parties, are required to appoint a certified accountant to audit party’s or list’s accounts and submit to the Committee or the Commission, respectively, a report on resources and expenditure. The Law on Political Parties stipulates that this submission must be on a yearly basis, but the IEC Executive Instructions on Guidelines for Electoral Campaigns Publicity (No. 7 for the year 2016) does not specify that submissions must be on a yearly basis. Neither the law nor the instructions name an exact threshold for contributions to be disclosed. In addition, no specific formats for resource declaration are included in the law and the instructions. However, both the law on parties and the instructions on candidates clearly state that parties and candidates must declare all sources of campaign funding to the relevant authority.

### DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

#### Indicator number 12.4 =

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are parties’ (and, if applicable, candidates’) electoral campaign expenditures subject to independent scrutiny?</td>
<td>1: The campaign finances of parties and/or candidates for elected office are subject to independent verification, and the legal framework provides the oversight body with sufficient independence, powers and resources to scrutinise the statements and accounts in an effective manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5: The campaign finances of parties and/or candidates for elected office are subject to verification, but available the legal framework fails to guarantee the political independence of the oversight body and/or does not provide the oversight body with sufficient powers and resources to effectively scrutinise the statements and accounts in an effective manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0: Parties and/or candidates are not required to release financial information on their electoral campaigns, or the law does provide for a control mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Is there publicly available evidence of independent scrutiny, such as audit reports produced by the Central Election Commission, the Court of Audit, or a comparable oversight body? Is the political independence of that body guaranteed by law, and is there evidence that it is not subject to political interference? Does the oversight body have adequate investigative powers to verify financial information?

Response

Score: 0.5

While regulations ensure political independence for the IEC in practice, no equivalent regulations exist, as of yet, for the Committee of Party Affairs. In particular, the IEC is, by law, financially and administratively autonomous to practice its assigned duties (IEC Law No. 11 of 2012 and Amended with Law No. 46 of 2015, Article 3). In addition, the Commission is given the power to request, at any time, a detailed report on any candidate’s or list’s resources and expenditures, prepared by the list’s or the candidate’s appointed and accredited auditor. The law states that the commissioners of the IEC are subject to the illicit enrichment law and audit bureau control (Article 25) and must assume their posts as full-time positions an must not hold any other positions in the public or private sectors, in order to eliminate potential conflicts of interest (Article 9).

The regulations stipulated on commissioner selections add an additional layer of assurance in IEC political autonomy. The commission members are selected by a committee that includes the Chairman of the House of Representatives, the Head of the Judicial Council, and the Chairman of the House of Senates and is presided by the Prime Minister. These commissioners, among other requirements, must be Jordanian citizens for a period of ten years or more and must not be members of the Senate. Commissioners are also barred from running in any election supervised by the Commission and from participating, either directly or indirectly, in the election campaign of any candidate (Article 17).

To date, no information has been published indicating that any IEC Commissioners or staff members have committed any acts that might affect the IEC’s autonomy. In order to ensure that this does not change, an internal control unit within the IEC is tasked with investigating any suspicions of activity that might negatively affect the IEC’s autonomy.

The Committee of Party Affairs, for its part, is a semi-governmental committee includes the secretary-generals of the office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Culture, a civil society representative, and a representative from the National Centre for Human Rights (Article 9, Law No. 39 of 2015). While the Committee’s Chairperson and his or her delegate – a certified accountant or representative of the Audit Bureau – are also given the authority to review the accounts and financial records of a party at any time, the legislative framework ensuring the political autonomy of the Committee is much less robust than that ensuring the autonomy of the IEC. Indeed, semi-governmental nature of the committee necessitates that the majority of its members hold political office during their tenure on the committee.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>12.5 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Are the annual accounts of political parties (and, if applicable, of candidates) subject to independent scrutiny?

**Scoring**

1: Annual financial statements of parties and/or candidates are subject to independent verification, the legal framework provides the oversight body with sufficient independence, powers and resources to scrutinise the statements and accounts in an effective manner

0.5: Annual financial statements of parties and/or candidates for elected office are subject to verification, but available the legal framework fails to guarantee the political independence of the oversight body and/or does not provide the oversight body with sufficient powers and resources to effectively scrutinise the statements and accounts in an effective manner

0: Parties and/or candidates are not required to release annual financial statements, or the law does provide for a control mechanism

- : Not applicable or no data available

*Is there publicly available evidence of independent scrutiny, such as audit reports produced by the Central Election Commission, the Court of Audit, or a comparable oversight body? Is the political independence of that body guaranteed by law, and is there evidence that it is not subject to political interference? Does the oversight body have adequate investigative powers to verify financial information?*

**Response**

Score: 0.5

Please see response 12.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>12.6 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

What is the score in the Money Politics and Transparency assessment produced by Global Integrity?

*See https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/*

**Response**

Not available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>12.7 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Are political parties and/or candidates been sanctioned for violating political finance rules or non-compliance with disclosure requirements in the past two years, according to publicly available evidence?

*Please briefly describe if the publicly available evidence suggests that political parties and candidates have faced proportionate, timely and effective sanctions for non-compliance with financial transparency requirements, and if these sanctions were administered in a transparent and objective manner.*
### Response

According to the Ministry of Justice, in 2016, there was one conviction for the acceptance of donations or funding from Jordanian persons without disclosing and recording, and one conviction for terrorist financing. In 2017, there were 3 convictions for the acceptance of donations or funding from Jordanian persons without disclosing and recording, one case in which the individual(s) in question were declared innocent, and one conviction for terrorist financing. Currently, there is one ongoing case for the acceptance of donations or funding from Jordanian persons without disclosing and recording. JIACC also added that there were some cases and investigations that included potential corruption cases in political parties, and some of these cases were referred to courts.119

### Guidance

- You may find relevant information in the law on political parties. Information about the finances of parties and sanctions for violations may be released by the Supreme Audit Institution, the Elections Commission, an Anti-Corruption Agency or a similar body.

  - Global Integrity/Sunlight Foundation: Money Politics and Transparency, country assessments (https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org)

  - Council of Europe: GRECO evaluation reports (round 3 and follow-up reports), (https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations)

  - International IDEA political finance database (currently being updated, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/political-finance-database)


### Target 16.6: “Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 16.6.1:</th>
<th>Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 16.6.2:</td>
<td>Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. Transparency and integrity in public administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>13.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Is there a law, regulation or Code of Conduct in place, covering public officials, employees and representatives of the national government, that adequately addresses the following issues:

- Integrity, fairness, and impartiality;
- Gifts, benefits, and hospitality; and
- Conflicts of interest?

**Scoring**

1: A law, regulation or Code of Conduct is in place and addresses the aspects mentioned above
0.5: A law, regulation or Code of Conduct is in place but only addresses two of the aspects mentioned above
0.25: A law, regulation or Code of Conduct is in place but only addresses one of the aspects mentioned above
0: No law, regulation or Code of Conduct is in place or an existing law, regulation or Code fails to address any of those aspects
- : Not applicable or no data available

**Response**

Score: 1

The Jordanian Code of Conduct in the Public Sector adequately addresses the topics of integrity, fairness, and impartiality (Articles 3, 5, 9); gifts, benefits, and hospitality (Article 8); and conflicts of interest (Article 9).\(^{120}\)

More specifically, Article 3 states that the Code of Conduct shall apply to all civil service staff, along with all staff of other independent government institutions and departments, and that all individuals subject to this code shall practice the principles of justice, equal opportunity, transparency, accountability, professionalism, integrity, and neutrality that the code is founded upon. Article 3 also states that any violation requires accountability and disciplinary actions in accordance with the rules of the code.

Article 5 goes further to specify that employees should “work to serve the goals and objectives [needed to achieve] the public interest only.” Article 8 stipulates that an employee should not “accept or request any gift or hospitality or any other benefits of any kind, whether directly or through a medium, [that] may have a direct or indirect impact on objectivity in the implementation of [his/her job] functions, or would affect [his/her] decisions, or has compelled him to commit something for acceptance.”

Article 9 requires that employees “refrain from any activity that would lead to the emergence of a real or apparent conflict or a potential reconciliation between personal interests on one hand and [their] functional responsibilities and tasks on the other,” as well as “refrain from any activity [that] is not commensurate with the objective and impartial performance of his duties, or can lead to preferential treatment for the natural or legal persons in their dealings with the government, or harms the reputation of his department, or [puts] its relationship with the public at risk.”\(^{121}\)
### Indicator number 13.2

**Indicator question(s)**

Is there a law or clear policy in place to address the ‘revolving door’ – the movement of individuals between public office and private sector, while working on the same sector or issue, which may result in conflicts of interest and in former public officials misusing the information and power they hold to benefit private interests?

**Scoring**

1: There is a law or clear policy addressing the ‘revolving door’

0: There is no law or policy addressing the ‘revolving door’

- : Not applicable or no data available

If yes, please provide the name of the law and a link/source.

**Response**

Score: 1

Within this code, the topic of the ‘revolving door’ is addressed and measures are put forth to prevent any conflicts of interest that may arise. Specifically, Article 9 of the Code of Conduct states that an employee cannot accept a post, within one year following his or her employment in the public sector, with any institution that has had official dealings with his former office, unless he or she obtains the written approval of the relevant minister. The article also does not allow the former public employee to provide advice to clients of these institutions, based upon information gained from his or her former public post regarding programs and policies of the department with which he or she was working, if this information is not already available to the public.

There is also a provision that requires all public employees to immediately inform his or her direct supervisor in writing if any conflicts of interest arise: in any employee’s dealings with the government, between any employee’s private interest and public interest, in any instance of subjection to official pressure that is incompatible with the employee’s duties, or in any instance that raises doubts about the employee’s objectivity in his or her position. In addition, the Code instructs public employees to avoid establishing close relationships with individuals and institutions that heavily rely on the decisions of the department for which he/she works. This policy on movement between public office and the private sector is addressed in an article on conflict of interest (Article 9), which applies to “all staff subject to civil service and the staff of independent institutions and departments.”

### Indicator number 13.3

**Indicator question(s)**

Does the law or policy that addresses the ‘revolving door’ cover all relevant public-sector decision-makers?

**Scoring**

1: The law or policy in principle provides comprehensive coverage of relevant public-sector decision-makers

0.5: The law or policy addressing the ‘revolving door’ covers most relevant public-sector decision-makers but fails to include some relevant positions

0.25: The law or policy addressing the ‘revolving door’ only applies to some relevant decision-makers and fails to include many relevant decision-making posts.

0: No law or policy exists or an existing law or policy does not specify which positions are covered

- : Not applicable or no data available
The law or policy should cover all relevant decision-makers, such as members of the government and the legislature, political advisors and cabinet members, senior public servants, chief executives and managers of state-owned enterprises. The public-sector positions covered by laws or policies to control the ‘revolving door’ should be context and country relevant. It is thus left to the National Chapter to consider which positions it considers ‘relevant’ in this context. If applicable, describe which positions are covered by such a law or policy, and/or briefly elaborate on important positions that should be covered by a control of the ‘revolving door’ but are not covered by an existing law or policy. There may be different systems to regulate different categories of public office holders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>13.4 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there a mandatory cooling-off period – a minimum time interval restricting former officials from accepting employment in the private sector that relates to their former position – for members of the government and other relevant high-level decision-makers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoring</td>
<td>1: The policy contains a minimum cooling-off period of at least 2 years for certain positions and cases where the new employment of former government members and other high-level decision-makers would result in a conflict of interest 0.5: The policy contains a minimum cooling-off period of at least 6 months for certain positions and cases where the new employment of former government members and other high-level decision-makers would result in a conflict of interest 0: There are no or shorter minimum post-employment restrictions - : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please provide what cooling-off period(s) are set by the policy and to whom or in what cases they apply. Good practice stresses that the type of restriction and length of the time limits on certain activities, including lobbying, should be proportionate to the threat imposed from their role as a public official. TI has recommended a cooling-off period of at least two years to mitigate the risk of potential conflicts of interests, but restrictions should always take into account the specificities of the position and the country context. A mandatory cooling-off period should primarily apply to high-level decision-makers – which positions and what types of post-employment should be controlled by a cooling-off period is best determined in the national context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Score: 0.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please see response 13.2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>13.5 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there a single public body or are there designated authorities responsible for providing advice and overseeing ‘revolving door’ regulations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoring</td>
<td>1: There is a single body, or there are various designated authorities charged with providing advice and overseeing the implementation of the policy 0: No authority or public body is charged with overseeing the implementation of the policy : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Score:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please see response 13.2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Describe, if such a designated authority exists, name it and briefly describe its mandate. In some cases, these bodies may also be responsible for approving public officials’ future employment plans.

**Response**  
Score: 1  
Ministers and secretaries-general are responsible for overseeing and ensuring the application of the Code of Conduct in its entirety, including Article 9. In addition, ministers must give written approval for an employee to change posts, within one year of their public post, to an institution that works closely with their former office.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>13.6 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Are there proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for both individuals and companies that do not comply with the law or policy controlling the ‘revolving door’?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Scoring         | 1: Sanctions in the law (or policy) can be considered proportionate and dissuasive  
                  | 0.5: There are sanctions in the law (or policy) but they are not considered to be proportionate and dissuasive  
                  | 0: The law (or policy) includes no sanctions  
                  | - : Not applicable or no data available  
                  | Possible sanctions may include fines, the reduction of government pensions, imprisonment, the cancellation or refusal of contracts with the private sector employer of the offending former official, fines to the prospective employer, prohibition to occupy a public office for a certain period of time, suspension of registration in professional associations or registries. Sanctions should be context and country specific, it is up to the National Chapter to decide if possible sanctions are considered proportionate, timely and dissuasive. |
| Response        | Score: 0  
                  | The code does not specify sanctions for individuals and companies that do not comply with the policies regulating the ‘revolving door’ specifically. However, the code does state that any violation of any provision, thus including the ‘revolving door,’ “requires accountability and to take disciplinary action and penalties in accordance with the rules of this system.”  
<pre><code>              | Because unchecked ‘revolving doors’ often form relationships that may lead to conflict of interest, the non-disclosure of such relationships may amount to a violation of the Anti-Corruption Commission Law’s Article 5, which deems as corruption the “undeclaring or undisclosing of investments or properties or benefits that may lead to conflict of interest if laws and regulations require that, of which personal benefits can be directly or indirectly gained from him who refrained from declaring” and “the abuse of authority contrary to the provisions of the law.” The penalties for such acts of corruption are imprisonment for not less than four months, a fine not less than five hundred Dinars and not exceeding five thousand Dinars, or both (Article 22). |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>13.7 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

The ‘revolving door’ provisions implemented and enforced in practice? Have there been any developments in the past year that indicate an improvement (or deterioration) in how the ‘revolving door’ and related conflicts of interests are addressed?

Relevant changes may include changes in the legal framework, changes in anti-corruption mechanisms, important cases, and the extent to which civil society is able to participate and contribute in this area. Have there been prominent cases of a ‘revolving door’ that resulted in potential conflicts of interest in the past two years? Please provide any publicly available statistics about enforcement and compliance from the past two years, such as the number of cases in which former officials sought permission from a designated ethics office to move to the private sector and the number of cases in which fines or sanctions were imposed for violating ‘cooling-off’ periods or other ‘revolving door’ provisions. Procedures and criteria for making approval decisions in individual cases as well as for appeals against these decisions should also be transparent and applied in an objective manner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>13.8 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Does the legal framework require high-level public officials and senior civil servants to regularly (at least once per year) declare their interests, including any paid or unpaid positions and financial interests in companies and other entities?

**Scoring**

1: The legal framework requires high-level public officials and senior civil servants to declare their interests at least once per year.
0.25: The legal framework requires high-level public officials and senior civil servants to declare their interests but either does not require this on at least an annual basis or does not specify how regularly declarations are required
0: High-level public officials and senior civil servants are not required to declare their interests
- : Not applicable or no data available

Please provide the law or regulation containing the disclosure requirements and links to relevant sources and available declarations. You may also want to highlight any relevant gaps in the disclosure requirement.

**Response**

Score: 0.25

In enumerating the policies for declaration of interest, the Financial Declaration Law No. 54 of 2006 defines any money, moveable or immovable, as a benefit or a right of interest. Article 5 states that those subject to the law must submit a declaration of financial assets and liabilities of themselves, their spouses, and their minor children within three months of receiving declaration forms, and periodically during January, after two years have passed from the time of the previous submission. As stipulated by the 2014 Illicit Enrichment Law, officials of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as other civil service employees, must comply with financial disclosure requirements enumerated in Law No. 54 f 2006. The 2014 Illicit Enrichment law established the Financial Disclosure Department within the Ministry of Justice to manage financial disclosures. The Department is headed by a Court of Cassation judge, who is chosen by the Judicial Council, and is staffed with a sufficient amount of employees necessary to run the Department, as stated by the law.
In the event that an official, subject to 2006 and 2014 laws, does not comply with the enumerated asset disclosure requirements, Articles 11 and 12 of the 2006 law details a number of dissuasive and proportionate penalties based upon the offense. While the Financial Declaration Law and the Illicit Enrichment Law adequately detail the requirements and processes for income and asset disclosure, as well as the penalties for non-compliance, no equivalent legislation details interest disclosure processes. In addressing interest disclosure, the Code of Conduct only requires that the employee submit in writing any potential conflicts of interest to his or her supervisor immediately, when they happen.\textsuperscript{128}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please briefly describe which officials at which level have to comply with interest disclosure requirements (top-level officials, members of Parliament, members of the government, cabinet members, heads of public bodies and agencies, heads of departments, other senior officials)? Are there different disclosure requirements for different levels and branches?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please provide the law or regulation containing the disclosure requirements and links to relevant sources and available declarations. You may also want to highlight any relevant gaps in the disclosure requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

Do the income and asset disclosure requirements cover officials of all branches of government – executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and civil service as well as other relevant public bodies?

**Scoring**

1: the asset and income disclosure applies to high-level officials from the executive, legislature, judiciary and civil service/other public bodies

0.75: the asset and income disclosure applies to three of these sectors

0.5: the asset and income disclosure applies to two branches of government

0.25: the asset and income disclosure applies to one branch of government

0: there is no asset and income disclosure requirement

- : Not applicable or no data available

*Please briefly describe which officials at which level have to comply with income and asset disclosure requirements (top-level officials, members of Parliament, members of the government, cabinet members, heads of public bodies and agencies, heads of departments, other senior officials)? Are there different disclosure requirements for different levels and branches?*

**Response**

Score: 1

Article 3 of the Illicit Enrichment Law specifies the officials that must comply with financial disclosure policies, stating that “the provisions of this law shall apply as of the date of the financial disclosure law No. 54 of come into force to whoever occupied or occupies any of the following posts:

a) Prime Minister and ministers,
b) Chairman and members of the Senate,
c) Chairman and members of the House of Representatives,
d) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Court,
e) Judges,
f) Governor and deputy governor of the Central Bank,
g) Chief of Royal Court, secretary-general and minister of royal court, consultants of the King and consultants in the royal court,
h) Heads of independent agencies, authorities and members of their councils,
i) Heads and members of the council of commissioners, if any,
j) Rectors of public universities,
k) Ambassadors and senior staff and similar capacity and/or salary in government departments, financial institutions and public institutions,
l) Mayor of GAM and members of city council and heads of municipal councils and members of the first and second class municipalities in accordance with Municipalities Act,
m) Chairmen of public central tender committees and civil private tenders, ministry and security committees, tenders and procurement committees in the government departments, public institutions, municipalities and their members,

n) The representatives of the government, social security in boards of directors of the companies where the government and social security contribute to,
o) Chairmen and members of boards of directors or any director general of companies wholly owned by the government or social security or of financial institutions or public institutions,
p) Presidents and members of sports, labour, charities and cooperative councils and heads of parties and secretaries-general.
### Indicator 13.12

**Indicator question(s)**

Does the framework require that information contained in interest declarations and income and asset disclosures be made publicly accessible?

**Scoring**

- **1**: All or most information contained in interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms has to be made available to the public (some redaction may be necessary to protect legitimate privacy interests)
- **0.75**: Information contained in both interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms has to be made available to the public, but there are significant omissions for either interest declarations or income and asset disclosure forms
- **0.5**: Information from interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms has to be publicly accessible, but there are significant omissions for both interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms
- **0.25**: Only limited information from either interest declarations or income and asset disclosure forms has to be made publicly accessible
- **0**: No information contained in interest declarations and income and asset disclosure forms has to be made publicly accessible
- **-**: Not applicable or no data available

*Are declarations of interest available to the public? Are asset and income declarations accessible online in a central registry? Is there evidence that all declarations are published, if required by law? Please provide relevant sources and links*

**Response**

Score: 0

There is no requirement that information contained in interest and asset declarations must be made accessible to the public. On the contrary, access to the asset declaration form is restricted and procedurally complicated.

### Indicator 13.13

**Indicator question(s)**

Does the legal framework establish an oversight body that is provided with sufficient political independence and legal powers to scrutinise income and asset disclosures?

**Scoring**

- **1**: The legal framework provides for an independent oversight mechanism with sufficient independence and powers to scrutinise income and asset declarations
- **0.75**: The legal framework provides for oversight of the income and asset declarations, but only provides the body or bodies with either sufficient independence or with adequate powers to scrutinise the submissions
- **0.25**: The legal framework provides for oversight of the income and asset declarations, but provides the body or bodies neither with sufficient independence nor with adequate powers to scrutinise the submissions
- **0**: The legal framework does not provide for any oversight of the income and asset declarations
- **-**: Not applicable or no data available

*Please elaborate on any features and shortcomings you deem relevant in the narrative.*

**Response**

Score: 1

The 2014 Illicit Enrichment law established the Financial Disclosure Department within the Ministry of Justice to manage financial disclosures. The Department is headed by a Court of Cassation judge, who is chosen by the Judicial Council, and is staffed with a "sufficient number of employees necessary to run this Department."
## DIMENSION LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>13.14 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Does the law or policy contain dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for failure to comply with interest, income, and asset disclosure requirements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoring</td>
<td>1: The law or policy contains dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for non-filing of disclosures, or for incomplete or false claims made in disclosures, covering both interests and income and assets 0.75: The law or policy contains sanctions for non-filing of disclosures, or for incomplete or false claims made in both interests and income and assets disclosures, but these sanctions are only dissuasive and proportionate in either the area of interest declarations or income and asset disclosures 0.5: The law or policy contains sanctions covering interest and/or income and asset disclosures, but in neither area are such sanctions dissuasive and proportionate 0.25: The law or policy contains sanctions covering interest and/or income and asset disclosures but they only cover some types of non-compliance (such as false or incomplete claims) while failing to address other forms of non-compliance (such as the non-submission of declarations) 0: The law or policy contains no sanctions for non-submission of interest and income and asset declarations, or for incomplete or false claims made in disclosures - : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Score: 1 The law or policy contains dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for non-filing of disclosures, or for incomplete or false claims made in disclosures, covering both interests and income. The 2014 Illicit Enrichment Law specifies year imprisonment or 1000 JOD in fine (or both) for not providing the disclosure and 3 months of imprisonment for submitting inaccurate information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>13.15 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Have there been cases in the past two years of sanctions being imposed on elected or high-level public officials or senior civil servants for failing to file declarations of their interest declaration or their assets and income declaration, or for intentionally providing false or incomplete information in their disclosure, according to publicly available evidence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If available, please provide annual statistics for the past two years or briefly describe not more than three selected cases.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Data specifically on cases of sanction imposition on officials for failing to file declarations of interests, assets and income is largely unavailable publicly. According to the Ministry of Justice, investigation committees are formed within the individual institutions concerned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Indicator question(s)  
How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the disclosure mechanism for interests, assets and income? Is there a disclosure requirement for gifts and hospitality received by public officials and civil servants (if applicable)? Have there been any developments in the past two years that indicate improvement or a deterioration of the disclosure mechanism? 

Relevant changes may include changes in the legal framework, changes in anti-corruption mechanisms, important cases, and the extent to which civil society is able to participate and contribute in this area. 

Please briefly assess any relevant weaknesses of the interest and asset declarations: 
• Are declarations easily accessible to the public – is the data easily searchable, are the declarations available in machine-readable formats that facilitate easy reuse and analysis of the information? 
• Does the disclosure regime cover all relevant elected and senior public officials, does it cover relevant other people connected to those officials (such as their spouses or household members), are all relevant types of income and assets covered, are assets provided with sufficient level of detail (including unique IDs for companies, real estate, etc.), so that independent verification of key bits of information is possible? 
• Is the disclosure made in a timely and regular (yearly) manner and at the point the official leaves his/her post? 
• Are adequate steps taken to ensure that disclosures are complete and of sound quality (for example, information is provided in a consistent form)? 
• Have there been any noteworthy cases where information contained in asset declarations helped to highlight conflicts of interest or potential corruption cases, or where these declarations were used by the media or civil society actors to raise issues related to the accountability of public officials? Please briefly explain and provide relevant sources/links. 

Response  
Disclosure mechanisms for assets and income are fairly comprehensive. In fact, the Code of Conduct goes as far as instating mechanisms for gift and hospitality acceptance. Article 8 requires that all employees of public institutions refuse to accept any gift, hospitality, or any other benefit that may have a direct or indirect impact on his or her objectivity within his or her post. However, when the employee cannot be refused gifts, hospitality, or any other benefit, given that this gift, hospitality, or benefit is not deemed impactful on the employee's objectivity or when it is decided that the acceptance of certain types of hospitality would be to the benefit of the institution, the employee must inform his direct supervisor, and the supervisor must instruct the employee in writing whether to accept or reject the gift, hospitality, or benefit. If the gift is deemed acceptable, the supervisor must notify the employee whether the gift will be retained by the institution, donated to charity, disposed of, or retained by the employee. The Code also stipulates that public institutions should instate a register of accepted gifts and how they were handled.  

However, in addressing interest disclosure, the Code of Conduct only requires that the employee submits in writing any potential conflicts of interest to his or her supervisor immediately, when they happen. Furthermore, the Financial Declaration Law and the Illicit Enrichment Law only detail the disclosure mechanisms for assets and income. Thus, disclosure mechanisms established to monitor assets and income are much more robust than those established to monitor interests. 

According to the JIACC, one goal set forth by the 2017-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy is to increase electronic connectivity and information exchange between the Commission and other monitoring partners. Under this goal, the Commission established a monitoring project to compile information, specifically on the assets of the accused, their spouses, and their minor children, from relevant government institutions and departments that can be used in detecting corruption cases.
DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

Indicator number 13.17 =

Indicator question(s)

Does publicly available evidence suggest that sufficient resources are allocated to the implementation of an ethics infrastructure? Have there been other noteworthy changes to public sector ethics framework, based on publicly available evidence?

- Have integrity advisors or units been established in ministries and other public bodies?
- Are trainings on the Code of Conduct for public sector employees carried out?
- Are other measures taken to promote and raise awareness of the ethics regulation?
- Have an Anti-Corruption Agency, the Supreme Audit Institution or civil society organisations raised concerns about insufficient resources?
- Have assigned resources improved over the last two years?

Response

The JIACC, within which the Directorate of the Ombudsman is also integrated, is allotted a smaller amount of resources relative to other government institutions, as its resource allotments are subject to debate by both the Parliament and the Cabinet. On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice, under which the Financial Disclosure Department exists, is highly autonomous both in terms of its legislative framework and in terms of its resource allotment.

According to the JIACC’s report of achievements on the 2017-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy, the Commission implemented several training workshops for government officials, over 21 lectures on integrity and corruption prevention in various ministries and departments, and 7 meetings with various government departments and institutions since the inception of the 2017 Strategy. Further, it has provided materials and training courses on integrity and anti-corruption standards to the Institute of Public Administration – the institution responsible for the development of human resources and building capacities within the public sector – for its supervisory capacity building programs and new employee training programs.

In addition, Prime Minister Omar Razzaz, Jordan’s newly-appointed prime minister who took office following the resignation of his predecessor over widespread protests against austerity measures, recently gave visibility to the Financial Disclosure Department and disclosure mechanisms more generally by meeting with the Director of the Financial Disclosure Department and disclosing his personal finances. While doing so, the Prime Minister urged all ministers to submit their financial disclosures to the Department, in accordance with the Illicit Fortunes Law.

Guidance

- TI: Codes of Conduct: A Tool to Clean-up Government (http://blog.transparency.org/2012/07/19/codes-of-conduct-a-tool-to-clean-up-government)
• See the eligibility criteria of the Open Government Partnership (http://www.opengovpartnership.org/how-it-works/eligibility-criteria) and the OGP score of your country’s asset disclosure system

• You may find information on relevant laws in the World Bank’s Financial Disclosure Law Library (http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/)


• You may find relevant information in the law on public sector employment, in a conflict of interest law, in dedicated post-public employment rules or a Code of Conduct. Statistics on compliance may be available from a designated Anti-Corruption Agency or a designated body overseeing public servants


14. Fiscal transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>14.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indication question(s)

Is there legislation or policy in place requiring a high degree of fiscal transparency?

Scoring

1: The legal framework requires a high degree of fiscal transparency and the publication of all the key budget documents listed below;

0.75: The legal framework requires a fairly high degree of fiscal transparency and the publication of 7 of the key budget documents;

0.5: The legal framework requires some degree of fiscal transparency and the release of 6 of the key budget documents

0.25: The legal framework requires little fiscal transparency and only the release of 5 of the key budget documents

0: The legal framework requires insufficient transparency and only the release of 4 or less of the key budget documents

-: Not applicable or no data available

Does the legal framework require that key budget documents (pre-budget statements, the executive budget proposal and supporting documents, the enacted budget, a citizen budget, in-year reports in budget success and execution, mid-year reviews, a year-end report and an audit report) be published? You may find relevant information in the Open Budget Survey (http://www.internationalbudget.org/opening-budgets/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/update/).
The Jordanian constitution requires from the government the submission of the fiscal budget to the parliament, under the current practice:

- the pre-budget statements,
- the executive budget proposal,
- the enacted budget,
- the citizen budget

In addition, the in-year reports with the mid-year reviews are publically available, as are the audit reports through the general budget department and the PM websites.

### DIMENSION THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.2 =</td>
<td>What is the country’s score and rank in the most recent Open Budget Survey, conducted by the International Budget Partnership (<a href="http://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/">http://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/</a>)?</td>
<td>Jordan’s latest score is 63/100 in budget transparency and 41 in budget oversight.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.3 =</td>
<td>Are key budget-related documents published in practice? Key budget documents are pre-budget statements, executive budget proposal and supporting documents, enacted budget, citizen budget, in-year reports in budget success and execution, mid-year reviews, year-end reports and audit reports. Is the information available in formats that facilitate the use and analysis of the data? You find information on the availability of these documents in the Open Budget Survey (<a href="http://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/update/">http://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/update/</a>).</td>
<td>Please see response 14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Guidance

- International Budget Partnership (http://www.internationalbudget.org/)
- Global Open Data Index by the Open Knowledge Foundation (http://index.okfn.org/dataset/budget)
15. Public procurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>15.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicator question(s)

Does the law clearly define up to what threshold(s) single-sourced purchases of goods, services and public works are allowed?

Scoring

1: Thresholds concerning the single-sourcing of goods, services and public works are clearly defined by law
0.75: Thresholds concerning the single-sourcing of goods, services and public works are clearly defined by a decree (or a similar administrative standard)
0.25: Thresholds for two of the three categories are clearly defined by a law or a decree
0: Thresholds for only one or none of the categories are defined by a law or a decree
- : Not applicable or no data available

Please provide the reference and link to the relevant law(s) or decree(s) and the thresholds for the three categories (goods, services and public works) in the local currency and the Euro/USD equivalent.

Response

Score: 0

Public procurement in Jordan has been regulated through several different regulations that separated government procurement from independent bodies’ procurement and the procurement of goods from the procurement of services, and that decreased the state’s ability to monitor the different procurement systems. However, a regulation that was issued in 2019 aimed to merge several departments in one department that is now named Government Tender Department. Regulation 28/2019 aimed to create more transparency in public procurement and tenders in addition to the introduction of using the e-tenders. Moreover, it is also worth noting that the Government Tender Department announced in July launching the online system on a trial period for testing it.

Article (49) of the government tenders regulation specifies the conditions for resorting to single-sourced procurement, which includes the following:

Moreover, Article (69) sets the authorities given to the ministers and their staff in the procurement of goods or technical services and consultancies to a (5000 JD) for the Ministers in each procurement and up to (1000) for their deputies and Article (75) conditions that procurement shall be made through the government tender unit if it exceeds the thresholds as the following: procuring medical supplies and medicine for (40000 JD) and for medical hardware that exceeds the amount of (100000 JD). However, the regulation does not set value thresholds for single sourcing which may be used as a loophole for nepotism and other corruption-related issues.
### Indicator question(s)

**What are exceptions in the legal framework for public procurement that allow for single-sourced contracting above these thresholds?**

**Scoring**
- 1: Single-sourcing of contracts above certain thresholds is not allowed or only allowed in limited circumstances that are clearly defined by law
- 0.5: The law provides exceptions that may be vulnerable to misuse
- 0: The law does not address this aspect or provides highly ambiguous reasons based on which single-sourced contracting is possible
- -: Not applicable or no data available

*Please provide details concerning exemptions you deem important in this narrative, including on exemptions that may only apply to specific types of purchases (for public works, for example).*

**Response**

Score: 0

Please see 15.1

---

### Indicator question(s)

**Does the legal framework require that information on public procurement above certain thresholds be published?**

**Scoring**
- 1: The legal framework requires tender announcements and contract award information to be released and procurement contracts to be published in full text (possibly with partial redactions)
- 0.5: The legal framework requires tender announcements and contract award information (including information on the procuring entity, the supplier, the number of bidders, the good/service procured, the value of the contract) to be released
- 0: Less information than described above has to be published
- -: Not applicable or no data available

**Response**

Score: 0.5

*Article (10) of the government tender regulation stipulates that tender announcements and the information needed for preparing the tender documents are to be published. In addition, Article (20) conditions the publication in paper and online from the government authority that publishes the tender to update the information related to the submitted applications and the initial scores and results.*

*Article (29) of the same regulation conditions the publication of the national and international tenders in two newspapers and online and in the case of the publication of an international tender a dual announcement shall be made in both Arabic and English.*

*Finally, Article (63) conditions the establishment of an official website, which shall be used as the principal information source for public procurement and tenders.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>15.4 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Are bidders required to disclose their beneficial owners?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Scoring | 1: Bidders have to disclose beneficial owners, and this information is made public for successful bidders  
0.5: Bidders have to disclose beneficial owners, this information is not made public  
0: There is no requirement for bidders to disclose their beneficial owners  
- : Not applicable or no data available |
| Response | Score: 0  
Bidders are not required to disclose their beneficial owners. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>15.5 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Indicator question(s) | Are there legal provisions, regulations or policies in place for bidders to file complaints in case they suspect irregularities at any stage of the procurement process?  

Please briefly describe the complaints mechanism and highlight any relevant shortcomings. Does available evidence suggest that mechanisms and procedures are in place to ensure that complaints are handled in an impartial, timely, effective and transparent manner? Is there evidence that companies are aware of the channels to pursue complaints and have confidence in this mechanism? Please provide relevant sources and references. |
| Response | Articles (59) and (60) regulated complaints from the bidders where the process is divided into two stages the initial stage is the objection phase and if the bidder did not accept the response then a complaint shall be made in that regard of which a special committee shall look into as per to Article (90) and once a complaint is received by the authorities the entity of question shall be notified to suspend the procurement process till a final resolution is made for the complaint. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>15.6 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Indicator question(s) | Which information and documents related to public procurement and other relevant government contracts (such as privatizations, licenses etc.) are published proactively and are available in full text? Are any of these documents published online through a central website or database?  

Is sufficient information released so that the public is able to identify which entities and actors receive what contracts? Is there evidence of strong compliance with existing legal requirements to publish key information on public procurement above certain thresholds? Please briefly explain and provide relevant sources/links. |
| Response | Beginning in 2018, information on public procurement is accessible to the public through the General Supplies Department’s central e-procurement database, joneps.gov.jo. Documents that detail particular conditions and technical specifications are often included in JONEP tender invitations, opening results for each bidder are listed, and the bidder name, country of origin, awarding decision number, delivery period, unit and unit price, manufacturer, awarding quantity, and total price are listed in the details of awarding section. |
Prior to the 2018 inception of JONEP, a moderate amount of information on public procurement was available through both online sources (including on the Government Tenders Department website) and public events and announcements. However, the publishing of this information was inconsistent, thus making the establishment of the JONEP system a notable improvement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLAINECE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>15.7 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

To what extent does the country use electronic procurement that is open, provides the public with access to procurement information and opportunities to engage in the procurement process?

*Is procurement data released in a timely and structured manner, and released in a data format that facilitates re-use? Have any actions been taken to adopt the Open Contracting Data Standard and implement the Open Contracting Principles ([http://www.open-contracting.org](http://www.open-contracting.org))?*

*Are there any aspects, practices or approaches related to government contracting and public procurement in your country that you consider to be (potentially) effective in promoting integrity and deterring corruption that could be replicated elsewhere? Are there growing opportunities for civil society and citizens to provide input to public procurement processes? Is there increasing scope for the participation of relevant stakeholders (supplier representatives, users and civil society) during the pre-tendering phase? Please provide any relevant examples and include links/sources.*

**Response**

Please see response 15.1, 15.6

**Guidance**

- Information for several European countries is available through EuroPam ([http://europam.eu](http://europam.eu))
- Open Contracting Partnership ([http://www.open-contracting.org](http://www.open-contracting.org))
## 16. Whistle-blowing and reporting mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>16.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Indicator question(s)

Is there a legal framework to protect whistleblowers from the public and the private sector who report reasonable belief of wrongdoing?

Score:

1: The law provides protection for whistleblowers from both, public and private sector
0.5: The law provides protection for whistleblowers from either the public or the private sector
0: There is no protection of whistleblowers guaranteed by law
- : Not applicable or no data available

Please provide the name and a link to the law and briefly describe its scope. Are any organisations exempt from whistleblower legislation (such as the police, the military or security services)?

### Response

Score: 1

One minor amendment was made to the bylaw 62 of 2014 by enacting the amending regulation No. (46) of 2019. This amendment only affected one article of the regulation, which shifted the decision making power from the Cabinet to the Minister of Justice for the approval of appropriate support for the whistleblowers under protection.

Bylaw No. 62 of 2014 defines a whistleblower as “any person who provides information on a matter of corruption.” Article 24 of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law address protection of whistleblowers as defined in the bylaw, particularly that the Anti-Corruption Commission must provide sufficient protection for informants, including whistleblowers and their families and others close to them, in corruption cases. The Commission must protect whistleblowers from any potential retaliation or intimidation by:

- Providing whistleblowers with protection at their places of residence and workplaces,
- Refraining from disclosing information regarding their whereabouts and identity,
- Providing them with protection from discrimination, ill-treatment, or arbitrary dismissal in the workplace,
- Allowing them to provide testimony through modern communication technology that will ensure their safety, and
- Providing them with safe accommodation, financial aid, and any other measures to ensure their security.

The Law also specifies that any disclosure of information related to the whereabouts or identity of whistleblowers, assault of whistleblowers, mistreatment and discrimination toward whistleblowers, and the prevention of whistleblowers’ testimonies are also punishable offenses (Article 26).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator number 16.2 =</strong></td>
<td>Does the law provide for broad definitions of whistleblowing and whistleblower?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Does the law provide for broad definitions of whistleblowing and whistleblower?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score:</td>
<td>Score:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: The law contains a broad definition of whistleblowing and whistleblower, that is fully in line with TI’s principles</td>
<td>1: The law contains a broad definition of whistleblowing and whistleblower, that is fully in line with TI’s principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75: The law contains a broad definition of whistleblowing and whistleblower, that is largely in line with TI’s principles</td>
<td>0.75: The law contains a broad definition of whistleblowing and whistleblower, that is largely in line with TI’s principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5: The law contains a definition of whistleblowing and whistleblower, that is partly in line with TI’s principles but excludes some important potential cases</td>
<td>0.5: The law contains a definition of whistleblowing and whistleblower, that is partly in line with TI’s principles but excludes some important potential cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: The law does not contain a definition of whistleblowing or whistleblower, or the definition is very narrow</td>
<td>0: The law does not contain a definition of whistleblowing or whistleblower, or the definition is very narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Whistleblowing should be defined as the disclosure or reporting of wrongdoing which is of concern to or threaten the public interest, including but not limited: to corruption; criminal offences; breaches of obligation; miscarriages of justice; specific dangers to public health, safety or the environment; abuse of authority; unauthorized use of public funds or property; gross waste or mismanagement; conflict of interest; and acts to cover up any of these.**

The definition of whistleblower should cover any worker who discloses such information and is at risk of retribution. It should cover include individuals outside of the traditional employee-employer relationship, such as contractors, consultants, suppliers, volunteers, trainee/interns, temporary and part-time workers and former employees. See: TI’s Principles for Whistleblower Legislation [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/international_principles_for_whistleblower_legislation](https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/international_principles_for_whistleblower_legislation). Please briefly list important shortcomings.

| Response | Bylaw No. 62 of 2014 defines a whistleblower as “any person who provides information on a matter of corruption.” While the definition covers any person, who discloses information of corruption, the definition does not specifically mention all instances aligned with TI’s principles, including: criminal offenses, breaches of obligation, miscarriages of justice, specific dangers to public health, safety, or the environment, abuse of authority, unauthorized use of public funds or property, gross waste or mismanagement, conflict of interest, or acts to cover up any of these. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator number 16.3 =</strong></td>
<td>Does the law provide sufficient protection for whistleblowers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is the identity of whistleblowers protected (strict confidentiality or anonymity)? Do protections apply to a wide range of retaliatory actions (including disadvantages or discrimination) and detrimental outcomes (e.g. relief from legal liability, protection from prosecution, direct reprisals, adverse employment action, or harassment)? Are there sanctions foreseen against perpetrators of retaliation? See TI Principles 6, 7 and 10-14 <a href="https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/international_principles_for_whistleblower_legislation">https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/international_principles_for_whistleblower_legislation</a>. Please briefly explain important shortcomings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score:</td>
<td>Score:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: The law does provide strong protection for whistleblowers</td>
<td>1: The law does provide strong protection for whistleblowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75: The law provides good protection for whistleblowers, but there are some important weaknesses</td>
<td>0.75: The law provides good protection for whistleblowers, but there are some important weaknesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5: The law provides limited protection for whistleblowers</td>
<td>0.5: The law provides limited protection for whistleblowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: The law provides no or insufficient protection for whistleblowers</td>
<td>0: The law provides no or insufficient protection for whistleblowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As stated above, the JIACC must protect whistleblowers from any potential retaliation or intimidation by: providing whistleblowers with protection at their places of residence and workplaces, refraining from disclosing information regarding their whereabouts and identity, providing them with protection from discrimination and ill-treatment in the workplace, allowing them to provide testimony through modern communication technology that will ensure their safety, and providing them with safe accommodation, financial aid, and any other measures to ensure their security.  

Further, any disclosure of information related to the whereabouts or identity of whistleblowers, assault of whistleblowers, mistreatment and discrimination toward whistleblowers, and the prevention of whistleblowers’ testimonies are also punishable offenses.

However, the law does not mention additional protections such as relief from legal liability, protection from prosecution, and compensation for reprisals. Neither does it include any regulations on the protection of whistleblowers who disclose their information publicly or to third parties, such as the media or NGOs, if necessitated by circumstance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>16.4 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Does the law provide for adequate and diverse disclosure procedures?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score:</td>
<td>1: The law provides for strong disclosure procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5: The law fails to address some important aspects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: The law provides no or inadequate disclosure procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Procedures and regulations for reporting should be highly visible and understandable; confidentiality or anonymity should be protected; there should be timely, thorough and independent investigations of disclosures as well as transparent, enforceable and timely mechanisms to follow up on retaliation complaints. Whistleblowers should be informed about the outcome of any investigation and have the opportunity to comment on the results.

If reporting within the workplace does not seem practical or possible, disclosures should be possible to regulatory, oversight or investigative agencies. In cases of urgent or grave public or personal danger, or persistently unaddressed wrongdoing that could affect the public interest, disclosures to external parties (media, civil society organisations, etc.) should be protected. If disclosures of national security or official secrets are not covered by the regular procedures, are there adequate special measures in place? See TI Principles 15-19, 22 and 30 (https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/international_principles_for_whistleblower_legislation). Please briefly list important shortcomings.

Response | Please see response 16.8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>16.5 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the law provide for adequate remedies for whistleblowers?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: The law provides for adequate remedies, including compensation rights, the reversal of the burden of proof in favour of the whistleblower, and the right to a new supervisor or department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75: The law provides several remedies, including two out of the following: compensation rights, the reversal of the burden of proof, and the right to a new supervisor or department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5: The law fails to address several important aspects, and only provides for one of the following: compensation rights, the reversal of the burden of proof, and the right to a new supervisor or department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: The law provides no or inadequate remedies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are there comprehensive and accessible civil and/or employment remedies for whistleblowers who suffer detrimental action (i.e. compensation rights covering attorney and mediation fees as well as compensation for lost past, present and future earnings and status and for pain and suffering; the right to transfer to a new supervisor or department)? Is there a reversal of the burden of proof in favour of the whistleblower who alleges detrimental action? See TI Principles 8. and 20. (https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/international_principles_for_whistleblower_legislation). Please briefly list important shortcomings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>16.6 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there an independent authority responsible for the oversight and enforcement of whistleblowing legislation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: There is an independent authority with a strong and comprehensive mandate to oversee and enforce whistleblowing legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5: There is an independent authority, but its mandate to oversee and enforce whistleblowing legislation is limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: There is no independent authority to oversee and enforce whistleblowing legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please provide a short description of the authority and its mandate, as well as relevant sources and references. For the scoring, please consider the criteria listed under 16.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under the regulation of the protection of reporters, witnesses, informants and experts in corruption cases and their relatives and close members of 2014 which is issued by implementing Article (24) of JIACC law which stipulate that the protection of reporters shall be under the jurisdiction of JIACC and shall be regulated in a regulation that ensures proper implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The regulation initiated a unit within JIACC tasked for the protection of reporters, which starts from the receipt of requests for protection and analysing the risk potentials and shall be tasked to omit any information that could link the reporter to the case reported in addition to requesting security details. The unit is also tasked with conducting studies and research for improving the protection tools and procedures. Moreover, the protection of the reporters is not limited to physical threats where under Article (9) of the regulation there shall be protection provided for ensuring the protection of any illegal administrative action that could change or undermines any of the reporters’ rights or any action that could lead to mistreatment, harm, position or reputation.

Moreover, the protection shall be coordinated through the police, which can include hiding the name and other personal records with all ID related information and coding it, changing the place of residence or work, protection details, protection of homes and properties in addition to any other action if needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Implementation and Compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>16.7 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Where an independent authority to oversee and enforce whistleblowing legislation exists, does it have sufficient powers and resources to operate effectively?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the whistleblowing authority competent to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Receive, investigate and address complaints of unfair treatments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Receive, investigate and address complaints of improper investigations of whistleblower disclosures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide advice and support to whistleblowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitor and review whistleblower frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Raise public awareness to encourage the use of whistleblower provisions and enhance cultural acceptance of whistleblowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Collect and regularly publish data and information regarding the functioning of whistleblower laws and frameworks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Legislative and Institutional Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>16.8 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Is there a law/policy that establishes a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption (such as a hotline or a secure and anonymous electronic post box)? Does the law provide the body charged with operating it with sufficient independence and powers to investigate the reports it receives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score:</td>
<td>1: The law/policy creates a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption. The body charged with operating it is provided with sufficient independence and powers to investigate the reports it receives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5: The law/policy creates a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption, but it does not provide the body charged with operating it with sufficient independence and powers to investigate the reports it receives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: There is no law or policy mandating that a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption be established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- : Not applicable or no data available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Response

To facilitate witness reporting, the JIACC website includes a hotline telephone and fax number, as well as an electronic submission form that specifically asks for the informant’s authorization for mentioning his or her name in investigation proceedings. However, no information addressing the security of the hotline and online informant submission tools themselves is included on the JIACC website. Both the reporting mechanisms and the witness protection mechanisms operate with sufficient independence, capacity, and resources, given that, by law, the JIACC as a whole remains financially and administratively independent with the ability to “undertake all necessary legal actions to achieve its objectives.”

Once the complaint is received, Bylaw No. 62 of 2014 – or the protection of whistleblowers, witnesses, informants and experts in cases of corruption, their relatives and persons who are closely related to them – states that informants’ names must be sealed and kept in a safe that only the chairman of the JIACC and the assigned judge can order to disclose (Article 7b).

In terms of offering diversity in disclosure procedures, Jordan’s 2017 Open Government Partnership Midterm Self-Assessment details plans to launch and enhance a complaints registration system and follow-up mechanism to address complaints in a serious, streamlined manner and refer them to the judiciary. This complaints registration system will address complaints and grievances related both to violations committed against citizens and to government services and their provision. While the former is still being worked on, significant progress has been made on the latter, with an online site and mobile application having been rolled out in 2017.

---

**DIMENSION** IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

**Indicator number** 16.9 =

**Indicator question(s)**

Does such a dedicated reporting mechanism for witnesses and victims of corruption exist in practice?

Does available evidence suggest that it is secure and able to protect the anonymity of the people who use it in case they wish to remain anonymous? What kind of mechanism(s) exist, and which body is responsible for operating them? Does available evidence suggest that the body operating has sufficient independence, capacity, and resources to investigate cases that are reported? Briefly describe.

**Response**

Yes, the dedicated reporting mechanism exists in practice under the witnesses’ protection department/ JIACC.

**DIMENSION** IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

**Indicator number** 16.10 =

**Indicator question(s)**

Is data and information regarding the operation and performance of such reporting mechanisms (in compliance with relevant privacy and data protection laws) published?

*Please provide, if available, data for the past two years: the number of cases received; the outcomes of cases (i.e. dismissed, accepted, investigated, and validated); the prevalence of wrongdoing in the public and private sectors; awareness of and trust in reporting mechanisms; and time taken to process cases.*

**Response**

The numbers are not published, however through a request submitted to JIACC we were informed that the total number of requests submitted under the subject matter is 325 requests, 46 of which were granted protection.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 16.11 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s) Is there evidence that relevant state bodies have taken active steps to promote public awareness of this reporting mechanism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the 2014 inception of the witness protection program, the JIACC has initiated outreach and advertisement efforts to raise awareness, both among personnel from various sectors and among the general online public. The JIACC has held various workshops and meetings on the witness protection program for NGO staff, public security officers, media personnel, and public officials. In addition, the hotline and online forms for informants are advertised on the home page of the JIACC official website, and the topics of whistleblowing and witness protection are discussed in JIACC posts on their official Facebook page.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 16.12 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s) Have there been prominent cases in the past two years where wrongdoing and corruption were unveiled by a whistleblower or through a reporting mechanism? Please provide short descriptions and relevant links/sources. a. Have whistleblowers, in practice, been prosecuted or faced retaliation for unveiling wrongdoings? Where their legally guaranteed rights violated? b. Please provide a brief description of relevant cases from the past two years, including relevant sources and a few links to media coverage. Were any steps taken to improve the system of whistleblower protection?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Guidance**

Target 16.10: “Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.”

| Indicator 16.10.1: | Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months |
| Indicator 16.10.2: | Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information |

17. Protection of fundamental freedoms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>17.1 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>What is the country’s score and rating in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Rating [<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world">https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world</a>]?&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Please provide the score and the rating of your country (&quot;free, “partly free&quot;, “not free&quot;) and the year of the assessment you are referring to.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Response | Jordan’s score is (37) "Partly free" on a scale of 0 as least free to 100 as most free. Its net freedom status, from ranging from 'Free' to 'Not Free,' is rated 'Partly Free'.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>17.2 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>What is the country’s rank and score in the most recent World Press Freedom Index, issued by Reporters Without Borders [<a href="https://rsf.org/en/ranking">https://rsf.org/en/ranking</a>]?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Jordan’s ranking is 130 out of 180 countries in the world rankings in 2019 with a score of 43.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>17.3 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Does the legal framework contain any provisions that threaten or undermine the ability of journalists, bloggers researchers, human rights advocates and other civil society actors to exercise their fundamental rights, to uncover and report on all forms of corruption, and to hold leaders accountable? &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Please name any relevant laws and provisions, briefly explain why they may threaten fundamental rights, and provide links/references to relevant sources.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Article 15 of the Constitution, coupled with Articles 3 and 4 of the Press and Publication Law, guarantees freedom of expression and opinion, as well as freedom of the press and media, by stating that the government will secure for all Jordanians – private citizens, journalists, scientific researchers, artists, and cultural figures – the freedom of opinion and their right to expression through writing, speaking, portrayal, and all other means of expression, provided that the limits of law are observed and public and moral order is preserved. This freedom of press includes printing, publication, and all forms of media, within the limits of the law. Further, no publication or media can be stopped, and no licenses can be revoked, without a court order in accordance with the laws set forth (Articles 19, 31, 35 of the Press and Publication Law). In addition, Article 16 of the Constitution preserves the right of Jordanians to establish societies, provided that they remain peaceful and within the limits of the law.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, Articles 17 and 18 of the Press Associations Law stipulate that the Press Association Law, public authorities, and all other Jordanian organizations will not recognize any journalists or other media professionals who are not registered as members of the Press Association and prohibit anyone who is not registered in the Association’s records from working in journalism. In addition, Article 18 of the Press Associations Law, Article 13 of the Press and Publication Law, and Article 15 of the Audio-Visual Media Law require licenses in order to issue any sort of publication or practice broadcasting works. It should be noted that the Press and Publications Law and Audio-Visual Media Law do not state whether or not applicants for a newspaper license or a broadcast works license have the right to legally challenge their rejection. Further, the Audio-Visual Media Law gives the Council of Ministers – the body tasked with licensure granting – the right to refuse to grant broadcasting licenses to any entity without stating the reason for rejection (Article 18). Each of these provisions gives the Council of Ministers ultimate power over journalists or media institutions that may wish to uncover or report on any instances of corruption and lack of accountability.

Similarly, Article 5 of the 2009 Amendment of the Law on Societies (Law No. 22 of 2009) gives the Board of Societies – made up of seven representatives from ministries and four from the civil society sector who are appointed by the Cabinet for two years (Article 4) – the power to license civil society organizations and determine the relevant ministry that will oversee the organization. In addition, Articles 14 of the Law on Societies (No. 51 of 2008) requires that the organization notify the relevant supervisory minister of the time, location, and agenda of the organization’s general assembly two weeks in advance, or else the meeting will be deemed illegal. Article 14 also stipulates that all decisions by the assembly are deemed invalid until approved by the board within 60 days of their submission. If no response is received after 60 days, the organization is instructed to assume that its decisions were approved. Again, these regulations give the relevant ministry significant control over the licensure and actions of civil society organizations that may be in the position to uncover or report upon instances of lack of accountability.

Further, the Press and Publication Law prohibits the publishing of any material that “offends individuals’ dignity and personal freedoms, or contains untruthful rumours or information about them.” Although this is a standard defamation law, neither the laws regulating press and expression, nor the laws regulating civil society, cover protection of whistleblowers who decide to make public disclosures or report their information to the press or CSOs/NGOs, in the event that their allegations of corruption are indeed true. This, coupled with a 2011 amendment to the anticorruption law that criminalizes reporting on corruption without ample proof of misconduct and the fines imposed by the Press and Publications Law for defamation offenses, may make it less likely for journalists to report on corruption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>17.4 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please provide relevant examples and links/sources. If there are many factors you deem relevant, please briefly describe the three you deem most severe.
In practice, there are some cases in which governmental agencies instruct the Press Association or the Press and Publications Department to issue an official government request to stop all publications on certain specific topics. In addition, the judiciary is given the power to bar the publication of information on cases still under hearing – a power that the judiciary has practiced on certain occasions.\textsuperscript{166}

Media institutions must also consider their stakeholders, which may limit their independence or willingness in publishing on such issues as corruption and lack of transparency. The Minister for Media serves as the chairperson of the board for both the Jordanian Television and the News Agency, two public sector media institutions.\textsuperscript{167} The government also has the power to appoint the boards of directors of, as well as allocate and provide state funding for, public media institutions, which include PETRA, Jordan Radio and Television, and the Audio-Visual Commission. Regarding private sector media institutions, Social Security Corporation is a shareholder in both Al Dustour and Al Rai newspapers.\textsuperscript{168} According to Rasheed-Transparency International’s National Integrity System report, figures from both the public and private sectors appear on the editorial boards of private media institutions, which may impede the institution’s willingness and ability to publish objective information on economic issues, which, if the situation arose, could include instances of corruption.\textsuperscript{169}

Furthermore, self-censorship for the stated sake of public order has become a common practice among media institutions. In line with Article 5 of the Press and Publication Law and Article 20 of the Audio-Visual Media Law on the preservation of public order, the Audio-Visual Media Commission has instructed licensed and approved satellite channels, broadcast channels, and websites to cease the publishing of any information regarding public security and public security employees, unless under the direct request of the Public Security Directorate.\textsuperscript{170} The stated penalty in these instructions was perjury, thus creating an unfavourable environment for journalists to publish any content related to public security and its supporting employees. If a corruption case were to arise within the public security realm during this ordered cessation, it can be assumed that journalists would avoid reporting it. It should also be noted that in October 2015, the Law Interpretation Bureau put forth a ruling that stated Article 11 of the Electronic Crimes Law, which allows for the imprisonment of online media practitioners, applies to cases of online slander – a notable decision, given that Article 42 of the Press and Publication law prohibits detainment based solely upon the expression of opinion in writing, verbally, or in any other form.\textsuperscript{171}

Moreover, Journalists through KII’s reported several laws that limit their ability to cover corruption cases including the penal code, cybercrimes law, access to information law and private documents laws all of which limits their ability to access information, and publish without the fear of slap suits or breaking the cybercrimes law, all of which resulted in drawing several invisible lines around the media in investigation and publication.

However, it is promising that Jordan’s Open Government Partnership Self-Assessment, completed October 2017, contained a detailed commitment dedicated to designing and implementing a technical framework, based on best practices, to strengthen freedom of press in Jordan. According to the report, this commitment’s implementation will be overseen by the Ministry for Media Affairs, and its framework will include a set of legislative amendments to be submitted to Parliament. The report also stated that civil society is expected to play a major role in the development of this framework, so as to better ensure the adoption of best practices and, ultimately, a greater guarantee of freedom of expression.\textsuperscript{172}
**DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>17.5 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indicator question(s) | Have there been documented cases of killings, kidnappings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture or attacks against journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists, human rights and civil society advocates or other people who investigated, uncovered and advocated against corruption in the previous two years?

*If this is the case, please provide approximate numbers of such cases and describe up to two exemplary cases (possibly ones linked to corruption) and corresponding links/sources. You may find useful information in reports by international human rights watchdogs, including Human Rights Watch (https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018), Amnesty International (https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries), Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/reports), Reporters Without Borders (https://rsf.org), in reports and press releases issued by national and local human rights advocates, in national media coverage, in statements made by regional human rights bodies and in reports of a national Human Rights Ombudsman.*

| Response | Given that journalists, associated media personnel, and other civil society figures often practice self-censorship on a range of topics including corruption, these individuals very rarely face the aforementioned forms of retaliation. Thus, no cases of killings, kidnappings, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, or attacks have been reported over the past two years. |

**DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>17.6 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indicator question(s) | Have there been cases of attacks against NGOs, journalists, and others advocating or reporting on corruption adequately investigated and resolved in the past two years? Were perpetrators identified and held accountable?

*Please provide a brief description if and how such cases were investigated and resolved and provide relevant links/sources. If there were numerous such cases in the past two years, please focus on two exemplary ones.*

| Response | Please see response 17.5. |

**DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>17.7 =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indicator question(s) | Have there been documented cases of government censorship, including of online communication, or of undue political interference that limits people’s ability to inform and express themselves online in the past two years?

*If “yes”, please provide a brief description of relevant cases and sources/links. If there were numerous cases or if censorship is an ongoing practice, please briefly describe the three cases or practices you deem most severe.*
## 18. Access to information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>18.1 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

- There is a full constitutional recognition of a public right of access to information
- There is a limited constitutional right
- There is no constitutional right to information
- Not applicable or no data available

*Please provide a brief description and a reference/link to the relevant legal provision. You will likely find relevant information in the country assessment of the RTI-rating (http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/by-indicator/), indicator 1.*

**Response**

Score: 0

There is no right of access to information enumerated within the Jordanian Constitution itself. However, Article 7 of the Law on Securing the Right to Information Access (Law No. 47 of 2007) states, "subject to the provisions of the applicable legislations, each Jordanian citizen has the right to obtain the information he/she requires according to the Provisions of this Law should he/she have lawful interest or justification."

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number</td>
<td>18.2 =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator question(s)**

- The right applies to all materials held by or on behalf of public authorities, with no exceptions
- There are exceptions for "internal documents" or databases
- The definition of information is very limited and includes several and/or broad exceptions of information that is not covered by the right
- Not applicable or no data available

*Please provide a brief description and a reference/link to the relevant article. You will likely find relevant information in the country assessment of the RTI-rating (http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/by-indicator/), indicator 5.*

**Response**

Score: 1

The right of access to information applies to all materials held by or on behalf of public authorities, with no exceptions. This is specified by the definition of ‘information’ in Article 2, “any oral or written data, written, copied, recorded, or electronically stored records, statistics or documents or stored by any other means falling within the scope of the control or the liability of the official charge."
### Dimension: Legislative and Institutional Framework

#### Indicator number 18.3

**Indicator question(s)**

To which branches and bodies does the right of access apply?

**Scoring**

1: The right of access applies, with no bodies excluded, to 1) executive branch; 2) the legislature; 3) the judicial branch; 4) state-owned enterprises; 5) other public authorities including constitutional, statutory and oversight bodies (such as an election commission or an information commission); and 6) private bodies that perform a public function or that receive significant public funding.

0.75: The right of access applies to at least five of the above-mentioned sectors, with no particular bodies excluded.

0.5: The right of access applies to at least four of the above-mentioned sectors, but some bodies are exempt.

0.25: The right of access applies to at least three of the above-mentioned sectors or several key bodies are exempt (such as secret services, military, police, president etc.).

0: There is no access to information framework; or: no clear provision on the institutions that are covered; or: the right of access applies to less than three of the above-mentioned sectors and several key bodies are exempt (such as secret services, military, police, president etc.).

- : Not applicable or no data available.

Please provide a brief description, which bodies and entities are covered by access to information and which important entities are completely exempt. You will likely find relevant information in the country assessment of the RTI-rating (http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/by-indicator/), indicators 7 to 12. If a particular complex national situation is not adequately reflected by the scores, the national chapter should choose the score that appears most adequate and provide relevant details in the narrative section of this question.

#### Response

Score: 1  As stipulated in Article 2’s definition of Department, the right of access applies to all branches and bodies, with no exclusions. Specifically, Article 2 specifies that the scope of the Jordanian citizen’s right of access includes “the ministry, department, authority, entity or any public institution, public official institution or company that is in charge of the management of a public facility.”

---

#### Indicator number 18.4

**Indicator question(s)**

Are there clear and reasonable maximum timelines for responding to a request, regardless of the manner of satisfying the request?

**Scoring**

1: Timeframe is 10 working days (or 15 days, or two weeks) or less.

0.5: Timeframe is 20 working days (or 30 days, four weeks or one month) or less.

0.25: Timeframe is more than 20 working days (or 30 days, four weeks or one month).

0: There is no specified timeframe for responding to a request.

- : Not applicable or no data available.

Please provide a brief description and a reference/link to the relevant article. You will likely find relevant information in the country assessment of the RTI-rating (http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/by-indicator/), indicator 22.
The law clearly specifies the maximum number of days for a response, stating in Article 9, “the official in Charge shall rely to or reject the request within thirty (30) days as of the date following the date of request submission.”

### DIMENSION
#### LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>Indicato question(s)</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.5 =</td>
<td>Are exceptions to the right of access consistent with international standards?</td>
<td>Score 10 points and then deduct 1 point for each exception which either (a) falls outside of this list and/or (b) is more broadly framed: 1: 9 or 10 points 0.75: 7 or 8 points 0.5: 5 or 6 points 0.25: 3 or 4 points 0: 0, 1 or 2 points - : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Permissible exceptions are national security; international relations; public health and safety; the prevention, investigation and prosecution of legal wrongs; privacy; legitimate commercial and other economic interests; management of the economy; fair administration of justice and legal advice privilege; conservation of the environment; legitimate policy-making and other operations of public authorities. It is also permissible to refer requesters to information, which is already publicly available, for example online, or in published form.

Please provide a brief description and a reference/link to the relevant article. You will likely find relevant information in the country assessment of the RTI-rating (http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/by-indicator/), indicator 29.

| Response | Score: 0.75 | Article 10 stipulates, “No information bearing the nature of religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, or colour discrimination shall be requested.” In addition, Article 13(f) mandates that the Official in Charge refrain from disclosure of “correspondences with personal or confidential nature, whether in the form of post, cable, phone call or any other technological means, with governmental departments and the replies thereto.” The intuition driving these provisions may be the protection of privacy, but this is not stated outright within the law. In addition, Article 13(i)’s reference to copyright is overly broad and is not limited to privately-held copyrights: “The information with commercial, industrial or economic nature, information on scientific bids or research or technology, whose disclosure will lead to the violation of its copyright, rights of intellectual property or far or lawful competition or to illegal profit or loss for any person.” |

### DIMENSION
#### LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>Indicato question(s)</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.6 =</td>
<td>Is a harm test applied to all exceptions, so that disclosure may only be refused when it poses a risk of actual harm to a protected interest?</td>
<td>Score: 0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Harm test is applied to all exceptions
0.75: Harm test is applied to all but 1 exception 0.5: Harm test is applied to all but 2 exceptions 0.25: Harm test is applied to all but 3 exceptions 0: No Harm test is required by law, or it does not apply to 4 or more exceptions - : Not applicable or no data available
Response

Score: 0

The four exceptions to which a harm test does not apply are agreements with other States, national security, foreign relations, and judicial investigations. In order, Article 13 prohibits disclosure of information related to:

- “the documents classified as confidential and protected and to be granted by an agreement with another country” (13b),

- “the secrets related to national defence, state security or foreign policy” (13c), which addresses both national security and foreign relations and amounts to two exceptions, and

- “the investigations made by the prosecution, judicial system or security authorities concerning any crime or lawsuit within their scope of power, as well as the investigations made by the appropriate authorities for unveiling financial, customs or banking breaches, unless the appropriated authority permits the disclosure thereof” (13h).

The remainder of the exceptions were either not on the list of exceptions consistent with international standards, or do stipulate some form of ‘harm test’ mechanism, although not labelled as such. 179

### DIMENSION

**LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>Indicator question(s)</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.7 =</td>
<td>Is there a mandatory public interest override so that information must be disclosed where this is in the overall public interest, even if this may harm a protected interest? Are there 'hard' overrides (which apply absolutely), for example for information about human rights, corruption or crimes against humanity?</td>
<td>1: There is a mandatory public interest override that applies to all exceptions and is not subject to overreaching limitations 0.75: There is a mandatory public interest override that applies to all exceptions but one or two and is not subject to overreaching limitations 0.25: The public interest test only applies to some exceptions 0: No public interest test is required by law - : Not applicable or no data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Response

Score: 0

No mandatory public interest override – so that information must be disclosed when in the overall public interest, even at the harm of a protected interest – is mentioned in the law. 180
### Indicator number 18.8 =

**Indicator question(s)**

Is there an independent Information Commission, or a similar oversight body, with whom requestors have the right to lodge an external appeal?

**Scoring**

1: An Information Commission is in place, and it has the necessary mandate and power to perform its functions, including to review classified documents and inspect the premises of public bodies

0.5: An Information Commission or a similar oversight body exists, but either lacks the power to review classified documents or lacks inspection powers

0.25: An Information Commission or a similar oversight body exists, but it neither has the power to review classified documents nor to carry out inspections

0: No independent oversight body exists

- : Not applicable or no data available


**Response**

Score: 0.25  
Article 17(b) states the body with whom requesters have the right to lodge an appeal, specifically, the "Requester may file a complaint against the Official in Charge to the Board by the Information Commissioner in case of his/her rejection or the Official in Charge’s refrainment from the provision of the information required within the legally fixed period."

However, this board – collectively, the Information Council – is made up of solely public officials (Article 3a). Furthermore, the mechanisms necessary to ensure the Board’s mandate and power to perform its functions are not mentioned, including the power to review classified documents and inspect the premises of public bodies.\(^{181}\)

### Indicator number 18.9 =

**Indicator question(s)**

Does the law/policy on access to information contain minimum standards on mandatory proactive (automatic, without having to be requested) publication of information?

**Scoring**

1: if the law on access to information (or another relevant law) contains requirements on the mandatory automatic publication of certain information

0: if there are no requirements to automatically release certain information

- : Not applicable or no data available

Score: 0

*If this is the case, please provide a short description of what information and documents have to be actively released (especially information relevant to deterring or detecting corruption)? How do you, based on the evidence available to you, evaluate compliance by public bodies with these requirements to proactively release information?*

**Response**

Score: 0.5  
While the Law on Securing the Right to Information Access does not contain requirements on the mandatory automatic publication of certain information, enough progress has recently been made to warrant a higher score in this area. According to Jordan’s October 2017 OGP Self-Assessment Report, Jordan has committed to reviewing its legislative framework, identifying gaps, and proposing a new package of legislation and amendments to the Parliament that will work to align Jordan’s access to information policies with international best practices.\(^{182}\)
Beyond plans to amend and add to its legislation, Jordan’s Government Achievement Unit at the Prime Ministry has committed to launching a central electronic portal for citizens, members of Parliament, donors, and investors to monitor government performance by tracking the implementation of government plans throughout different governmental departments.\(^\text{183}\)

Paired with this is another commitment made by Jordan’s Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology to implement an open data sources policy that facilitates access to data in the government’s possession that is non-confidential and non-privacy violating. To this end, an online platform has been launched (https://jordan.gov.jo/wps/portal/OpenData), and the data of three governmental departments are accessible to date – in particular the Ministry of Tourism and Archaeology, the Public Statistics Department, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade.\(^\text{184}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator number</strong></td>
<td>18.10 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator question(s)</strong></td>
<td>What is the country’s score in the Right-To-Information Rating? (<a href="http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/">http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator number</strong></td>
<td>18.11 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator question(s)</strong></td>
<td>What are shortcomings of the access to information regime? Does the law…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Create a specific presumption in favour of access to all information held by public authorities, subject only to limited exceptions, consistent with international standards? ■ Grant everyone (including non-citizens, non-residents and legal entities) the right to request information? ■ Provide a right to both information and access to records/documents? ■ Allow for partial access (a document can be redacted and then be partially released)? ■ Establish an effective appeals mechanism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>You will likely find the needed information in the country assessment of the RTI-Rating (<a href="http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/">http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/</a>). Another relevant source for the access to information framework in Europe is the EuroPam project (<a href="http://europam.eu">http://europam.eu</a>).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Response** | Access to information legislation contains four significant exceptions to which the harm test does not apply: agreements with other States, national security, foreign relations, and judicial investigations (please see Response 18.6 for more information). Further, there is no mention of a mandatory public interest override within the legislation (please see Response 18.7 for more information). In addition, according to the legislation, only citizens are specifically granted the right to request information.\(^\text{185}\)

In terms of appeals, requesters have the right to lodge external appeals with the independent administrative oversight body and to the judiciary, but mechanisms for internal appeals, according to current legislation, do not exist. Further, the legislation does not mention the fees associated with lodging these appeals or the simplicity of the procedure. In addition, there is no mention of whether the government bears the burden of demonstrating that is did not operate in breach of the rules during the appeals process.\(^\text{186}\)
## Indicator number 18.12

Are there any factors that, in practice, make it unnecessarily burdensome and difficult to request or gain access to information?

*Such factors may include that requestors have to identify themselves (anonymous requests are not allowed or possible), high fees to receive information, difficult request procedures, the lack of an effective and timely appeal mechanism, poor record keeping or a lack of awareness among public sector employees about the access to information regime. You may be able to obtain information from colleagues at the TI chapter who have submitted requests in the past, or from other civil society organisations or journalists who have extensively submitted FOI requests. You may also find information in an annual report issued by the Information Commission or a similar oversight body, or in relevant court cases. For European countries, also see EuroPam ([http://europam.eu](http://europam.eu)).*

### Response

The information request application can be accessed and submitted online on the Department of the National Library’s website, or can be completed by calling the Department and signing the application. 187

**The information required within the request application includes the following:**

- Information access purpose,
- Information subject(s),
- Requested information media;
- Applying entity type,
- Applying entity name,
- Written authorization number,
- Written authorization name and delegate name if the applicant is an organization,
- The applicant’s full name and his/her proof of identity type and number,
- Residence,
- Work address,
- Work place,
- Phone number,
- Fax number,
- Postal address and email address
- A pledge to use the information for the purpose that it was accessed for only
- An electronic attachment mechanism.

The form states that the documents needed to complete the procedure are a valid personal identification document and a written request from the requesting entity that includes the information subject, the purpose, and the delegate name. 188

In terms of fees, according to the application form, fees are only incurred for photocopies. The fees include 25 fils for each A4 copy, 50 fils for each A3 copy, 2 dinars for each printed photograph, 1 dinar for each digital photograph, the cost of a CD for information stored on a CD, and for copies over 10 pages. Although relatively small, these fees may deter some individuals from making information requests. 189

Further, the forms state that the application is to be accepted or rejected within thirty days, and receiving no answer within the thirty-day time frame is considered a rejection, thus allowing the Department to reject applications without a stated reason. 190
### Indicator number 18.13

**Indicator question(s)**

How many requests for information were made to public authorities each year in the previous two years?

- a) How many were answered within the time limits provided by the law?
- b) What percentage was fully answered, what percentage partly? What happened with the remaining requests?

You may find this information in an annual report by an Information Commissioner or another public body charged with overseeing the implementation of the law, or in annual reports issued by public bodies. If only information on the national level is available, please provide this information. If information is only available for some public bodies, please provide available data and sources. If no government data is available, provide data from civil-society operated FOI request portals or results from relevant field tests, if such exist.

**Response**

The total number of requests submitted in 2018 was 13383 with a total of denied requests of 34.¹⁹¹

### Indicator number 18.14

**Indicator question(s)**

Have there been any developments in the past two years that suggest an improvement or deterioration in the framework for public access to information and/or its implementation?

Relevant developments may include discussions to adopt a (new) law or policy, changes to current laws and procedures, relevant court decisions, and the reaction of public bodies to requests for information in important cases. Please provide a short description and relevant sources, references and links.

**Response**

There have been no major developments in access to information in general, however, it was noted that the quality and amount of information of data released by the PM office was higher, in addition, there was a promise made by the prime minister to review the current law and ensure proper implementing the needed amendments to enhance the current legislations.

---

**Guidance**

- Freedominfo.org for recent developments related to the right to information (http://www.freedominfo.org)
- Right2Info.org (no longer updated) for international instruments, standards and cases on the right to information (http://www.right2info.org/international-standards)
### 19. Open Government Data (optional)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 19.1 =</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>What is the country’s rank and score in the most recent edition of the Open Data Barometer, produced by the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Wide Web Foundation (<a href="http://opendatabarometer.org/data-explorer">http://opendatabarometer.org/data-explorer</a>)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The assessment may provide valuable insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the open data implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in your country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>THIRD PARTY ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 19.2 =</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>What is the country’s score in the most recent available Open Data Index, produced by Open Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International (<a href="http://index.okfn.org/place">http://index.okfn.org/place</a>)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The assessment is crowd-sourced and may not be complete for all countries. It evaluates the level of openness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of key government datasets, several of which are relevant to the anti-corruption agenda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 19.3 =</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Are there noteworthy efforts or initiatives of public bodies to automatically publish information and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>documents online (especially in machine-readable formats and in line with open data standards) that are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relevant to deterring or detecting corruption?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possible areas where proactively published information may help to fight corruption include government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contracts, public procurement, the budget and details on government spending, government subsidies and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grants, registries for land, companies and their (beneficial) ownership, political and party financing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>asset disclosures of public officials, and information on extractive industries or other sectors with high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>corruption risks. Please provide up to three noteworthy examples, briefly describe the open government effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and provide links to them. You may find relevant examples mentioned in National Action Plans or other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>documents submitted to the Open Government Partnership (<a href="http://www.opengovpartnership.org/countries">http://www.opengovpartnership.org/countries</a>) or listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on dedicated for open government data portal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator number 19.4 =</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator question(s)</td>
<td>Are there noteworthy civil society projects or initiatives that use open government data and/or, other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>publicly available data sources to strengthen government accountability and help deter and/or detect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>corruption?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Please provide brief descriptions on up to three noteworthy projects and provide links to them. In case any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of them have helped to expose specific corruption cases, please mention that case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Guidance**

- Open Knowledge International: Open Data Handbook for background on open data (http://opendatahandbook.org/guide/en/what-is-open-data) and additional resources (http://opendatahandbook.org/resources).
References

7. https://www.almamlakatv.com/news/%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%B8-%D8%A8-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-13111
11. http://alrai.com/article/10496904/%D9%85%D8%B8%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%87%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%B5-%D9%85%D8%B8-%D8%A8-%D8%AA-%D8%A9-%D8%AF-%D8%A9-%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%8A-

20. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. https://aaawsat.com/home/article/1316596/%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%C2%BB-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B7%D8%81-%D8%AC%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B3%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84

26. Ibid.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.


36. Interview Companies Control Department, conducted in Amman (July, 2018).


39. Interview Companies Control Department, conducted in Amman (July, 2018).


42. CCD responses to information update in Oct.2019.

44. 2019 Amendments to the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission Law No. 13 of 2016.


47. JIACC amending law of 2019

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.


52. MENAFATF, MENAFATF Members. http://www.menafatf.org/about/Members-Observers/members


55. This was a response provided in response to information request in October 2019.

56. http://www.jiacc.gov.jo/content/19/numbers-statistics

57. GCB 2019, TI.


60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. The Jordan Times. “Penalties for violators of public assets on top of expected extraordinary session agenda – official.”
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. The Jordan Times. "Labour Ministry ‘coordinating closely’ with anti-graft agency, says Ghezawi.” Interview Companies Control Department, conducted in Amman (July, 2018).
83. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Integrity and anti-corruption amending law 2019.
96. Ibid.

99. Interview Companies Control Department, conducted in Amman (July, 2018).

100. Interview Companies Control Department, conducted in Amman (July, 2018).


103. Ibid.


105. Ibid.

106. Law on Political Parties No. 39 of 2015.


108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Law on Political Parties No. 39 of 2015.

113. Independent Election Commission Executive Instructions No. 7 of 2016 on Guidelines for Electoral Campaigns Publicity

114. Law on Political Parties No. 39 of 2015.
Independent Election Commission Executive Instructions No. 7 of 2016 on Guidelines for Electoral Campaigns Publicity.

115. Ibid.


117. Ibid.

118. Law on Political Parties No. 39 of 2015


121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. The Jordanian Code of Conduct in the Public Sector.


125. Ibid.

126. Financial Declaration Law No. 54 of 2006


129. The Jordanian Code of Conduct in the Public Sector.


131. The Jordanian Code of Conduct in the Public Sector.


135. The Jordanian Code of Conduct in the Public Sector.

136. Ibid.


Financial Declaration Law No. 54 of 2006.


140. Ibid.


145. Please see Alrai online on the new government tender department http://www.gtd.gov.jo/uploads/data/c8f74c75f91560930221.pdf


149. Bylaw No. 62 of 2014.


151. Ibid.

152. Bylaw No. 62 of 2014.


154. Ibid.


156. Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law No. 13 of 2016.


The Jordanian Constitution.


